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Muslims share a common cause with Western critics of liberalism, such as MacIntyre and others who have launched their criticisms from a religious standpoint. By examining this work it may even be discovered that this sort of criticism is more appropriate from an Islamic standpoint than from a Neo‑Thomist one.
The alienation expressed by MacIntyre is a social one, but there are deeper forms of alienation, which from the religious point of view have their source in distance from God. The sort of community MacIntyre seeks is one whose rival paradigms are those of the Christian Church and the Muslim ummah. But the source of the cohesion of these communities is their harmony with the divine order. If the methods of evaluation of rival traditions as outlined by MacIntyre are to be employed to compare Christendom and the ummah, it will be necessary to examine the ways in which the intellectual traditions within the two communities have responded and continue to formulate responses to the challenge of liberal modernism.
For his own part, MacIntyre concludes that the Thomistic synthesis of Augustinian and Aristotelian thought has been confirmed in its encounter with other traditions. But the analysis he offers is not specific to the defense of Catholicism, but rather may be used to support various forms of traditional thought against the secular liberal scientism which prevails in the West. Indeed, a major flaw in all of MacIntyre's writings is that it fails to pay any attention to Islam at all. When MacIntyre compares competing traditions of liberal, Marxist and religious thought, the term religious can always be replaced by Christian without altering the intended meaning. [27]
Prior to his conversion to Neo‑Thomism, which occurred some time between the writing of After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, MacIntyre could be scathingly critical of Christianity, even if, at the very same time, appreciative of its strengths. [28] The weaknesses of Christianity to which he drew attention in his first book were its dogmatism and otherworldliness‑its inherent tendency to disown its own revolutionary vision, to circumscribe itself within the spiritual and to accommodate itself to the status quo, even if this meant tyranny Nothing in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? explains how these criticisms are to be answered. Islam, on the other hand, has not disowned its revolutionary vision, nor has it had an episode comparable to Galileos encounter with the Inquisition. This is not to deny that terrible injustices have been and continue to be perpetrated in the name of Islam, nor that fanatical intolerance has not marred doctrinal disputes among Muslims. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the dogmas accepted by Muslims have not prevented them from accepting the natural sciences or technology, nor from the adoption of Western social institutions when it has appeared (rightly or wrongly) rational to do so. It must also be admitted that the call for justice issued by Islam, particularly in its Shi`i version, retains its ability to inspire revolutionary fervour. The hope for a just society in this world has not been abandoned by Muslims. Because it began as a political no less than spiritual movement, Muslims cannot deny that Islam demands them to seek justice in the here and now. Because of the priority of the spiritual, however, Islam is able to provide the moral basis and orientation lacking in secular ideologies.
MacIntyre's failure to answer his own criticisms of Christianity have left at least one‑Muslim reader with the impression that his work provides a better defense of Islam than it does for the Christianity he himself professes.
Notes: [27]. MacIntyre admits his neglect of Islam, despite its importance, "not only for its own sake but also because of its large contribution to the Aristotelian tradition," in the first chapter of nose Justice? Which Rationality?, p. 11.
[28]. See Alasdair Madntyre, Marxism and Christianity (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984).
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