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Part 5
Tusi and the fall of the Abbasid caliphate

 

 

A quick glance at Tusi’s life reveals that he was simultaneously dissatisfied with the Seveners and their ideas and with the Abbasid caliphs. After Hulāku conquered Alamut in 654 A.H., Tusi accompanied him to Baghdād. According to Rashid al-Din Fazl Allah, Manqu Qā’ān, the great khān of Qarā Qurm, ordered Hulāku to force Tusi into his army.

 

Manqu Qā’ān, familiar with astrology and mathematics, was interested in establishing an observatory in his territory. Aware of Tusi’s expertise in this field, he asked Hulāku to send the scholar to his court after he had conquered the Ismāʻili fortresses.[27]

 

In discussing Tusi’s reasons for traveling with Hulāku’s court, Hā’iri notes that the Mongol kings were extremely interested in history and astronomy. They saw these as the main instruments of their expansion: history to record their expeditions and astrology to predict their chances of success in a new attack. He concludes that they invited Tusi to accompany them as a renowned astrologer.[28]

 

According to some historical documents, Tusi not only encouraged Hulāku to conquer Alamut but also to attack Baghdād.[29] They claim that Hulāku had originally decided to invade Constantinople,[30] but Tusi encouraged him to attack Baghdād. In contrast to the argument of Husām al-Din Munajjim, a Sunni astrologer and consultant in the court of Hulāku, who insisted that invading would cause the corruption of the entire world, Tusi argued that there would not be any problem.

 

Tusi reminded Hulāku that both Abbasid and non-Abbasid caliphs had been killed in the past without dire results. He added that the Abbasid caliph Ma’mun had killed his brother Amin and Mutawakkil, another caliph, had been assassinated by some of his military commanders and even his own son without upsetting the world order. The killing of Musntasir and Muʻtazz occurred without releasing universal corruption into the world.

 

Tusi’s suggestion to Hulāku was not merely the result of an astrological interpretation of the stars. As an Imāmi scholar he did not accept the legal authority that declared the Abbāsid caliphs to be the religious leaders of the Muslim community. His letter to Baghdād, asking Ibn al-ʻAlqami to cooperate with him in converting the Abbāsid caliph to the Shiʻi doctrine, shows his discontent with caliphal religious authority as early as the first half of the thirteenth century.

 

After Hulāku conquered Baghdād, he hesitated to kill Mustaʻsim (d. 656) due to Munajjim’s prediction that killing the vicegerent of the Prophet Muhammad (S) would result in disaster. Again Tusi promised that nothing would happen if the Abbasid caliph was killed and finally, in 656 A.H., the last Abbasid caliph was executed.

 

Other sources suggest that Tusi did not encourage the assassination of the caliph; rather. his support of Hulāku was a way to assist scholars and innocent people.[31] By holding an important position in Hulaku’s court, he was able to restrain some of the Mongol leader’s excesses.

 

At this time, Mustansir’s vizier was a Shiʻi named Ibn al-ʻAlqami (d. 656). He had had some covert relations with Tusi while the latter was living among the Seveners. It is believed that Ibn al-ʻAlqami also wrote a letter to Hulāku, telling him he need not be afraid to come to Baghdād.[32] The fact that he was appointed as the ruler of Baghdād by Hulāku after the Mongol leader had left the city lends some support to this idea.

 

Was Tusi’s advice to Hulāku, perhaps aided and abetted by Ibn al-ʻAlqami, the only reason or even the main reason, for the collapse of the Abbasid caliphate? As Hairi mentions in his analysis of Tusi’s role in the conquest of Baghdād, contemporary sources make no allusion to any political impact made by Tusi.

 

Sources such as the Al-Ādāb al-Sultāniyya, (al-Fakhri) (701/1301) of Ibn TaqTaq or the Mukhtasar of Abu al-Fidā’ (d. 732/1331), as well as Tusi’s own report about the conquest of Baghdād do not mention anything about Tusi’s role. Tārikh-i Vassāf (728/1327) and Jāmiʻ al-Tawārikh (710/1310) only point out that Tusi predicted that the Mongol leader would replace the caliph.[33]

 

One of the main goals of the Mongols from the early period of their dominance was to open the gates of Baghdād. They attempted to invade Baghdād several times, but they were defeated. Manku Qā’ān came to power during the period that the Crusaders were fighting the Mamluks in Egypt and Syria.  Having received complaints from both Mongolian commanders and some of the ʻulamā who were under the pressure of Ismāʻili terrors and the ill treatment of the Abbāsids, the great Khān asked his brother Hulāku to invade the Islamic lands. Moreover, an agreement with King Hethum I of Armenia motivated the great Khān to expand his conquest to include Egypt and Syria.[34]

 

According to Cahen, Hethum I, had acted as the precursor of the Mongols on the shores of the Mediterranean against the Muslims of Syria and Asia Minor. His actions were, in fact, the result of favorable impressions sent to him by his eastern co-religionists.[35]

 

Hulāku began his mission by attacking the forts of the Assassins. Once he had invaded the Assassins, he moved toward Baghdād with Tusi as his consultant. Whether Tusi himself decided to be in the court of the Mongols or whether the Mongols forced him to do so is still disputable. In addition to the external threats, the Abbāsid caliphate had its internal problems rooted in the weakness and the corruption of the caliphate.[36]

 

Although Tusi did not accept the Abbāsid caliphate as legal authority, why would he prefer the secular authority of the Mongols? Did not Tusi, by encouraging Hulāku, actually participate in killing Muslims and destroying Muslim centers?

 

Attributing the fall of the caliphate to a single cause or a single person is a simplified interpretation of a complicated situation. Tusi witnessed the pre-Mongol conflicts and realized that the Mongol invasion of the Islamic world was inevitable.

 

Considering the internal and external situations of the Islamic world, the Mongols had already reached the conclusion that they had to start implementing their policies to conquer the world. The last and the most necessary choice that remained for the scholar was a limited and carefully planned cooperation with the Mongol troops.

 

Through his association with Hulāku, he could obtain a high position in the Ilkhān’s court and play a constructive role in his policies. By using his influence with Hulāku, Tusi hoped to persuade the Mongol leader to act in the interests of the Muslims. Alone among Muslim scholars, Tusi noticed that the Mongol invasion was not ideological.

 

The Mongols invaded the Islamic lands in order to spread their power over a vast territory. Since their religion, which combined both pagan and shamanistic beliefs, was not likely to be an alternative to Islam, scholars like Tusi were able to use their presence as an instrument to save Islam. Vladimir Minorsky remarks that since the Mongols’ beliefs were vague and primitive, there was no chance for their propagation among the conquered population. Hence they were tolerant toward the other religions.[37] Dawson also maintains that during the reign of Chingiz Khān, it was a part of his law that all religions were to be respected without favouritism.[38]

 

After the fall of the Ismāʻilis and the Abbāsid caliphate, the flexible atmosphere allowed people a free choice in religion. Tusi’s position at the court of Hulāku attracted the Muslim scholars from many places to one center and led to the revival of the Islamic sciences. Although Tusi paid special attention to the Imāmi sect and immediately after the fall of Baghdād visited Hilla, the very center of Imāmi scholarship, his main attempts were never limited to a particular group.

 

He not only invited the scholars of all sects to cooperation together at the school of Marāgha, but also spent Awqāf (endowments) to sponsor all Muslim scholars.

 


Notes:

[27] Rashid al-Din, Jāmiʻ, 2, p. 718.

[28] Hā’iri 1968, p. 37.    

[29] Āqsarā’i 1943, Musāmara al-Akhbār, pp. 47-48.

[30] M. Zanjāni 1335s., p. 35.

[31] M. Razavi, Yādbud-i Haftsadumin, p. 16.

[32] Kutubi, Fawāt 1973, p. 252.

[33] Hairi 1968, pp. 42, 95.

[34] M. Zanjāni 1335s., p. 43.

[35] Cahen, Ency. of Islam, Vol. 1, p. 639.

[36] M. Zanjāi 1335s., pp. 41-45.

[37] Minorsky 1959, p. 191.

[38] Dawson 1955, pp. 23-24.