Discourse One: Theological Studies
The life after death and the life Hereafter (hashr) of creatures is among the tenets of all Muslims. The question is set forth by the theologians as to whether animals’ life will end by worldly death, or like humans, they will transfer to the other world and enjoy an immaterial life, too.
This is among the most important epistemic (religio-philosophical) questions, because human beings have been wondering since long ago if they can compare themselves with other creatures, especially with animals, and despite the structural disparity that they have with them, if they will find a way to prove an essential similarity between themselves and animals.
Bringing up the issue of animal’s Resurrection in the religious texts provided a suitable ground for rational endeavors, which are discussed in the best way possible by Muslim exegetes and theologians in exegetical and theo-philosophical sources.
In aya 38 of Surat al-An‘am, the Holy Qur’an first brings up the similarity between humans and animals, and then draws the conclusion that the animals also have Resurrection:
﴾There is no animal on land, nor a bird that flies with its wings, but they are communities like yourselves. We have not omitted anything from the Book. Then they will be mustered toward their Lord.﴿1
Therefore, we can easily find out why the Holy Qur’an explicitly declares that animal’s hashr is among the definite signs of Resurrection:2
﴾when the wild beasts are mustered﴿.3
Before any talk about the resurrection (hashr) of the animals, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of the word hashr, then clarify what is meant by the similarity of man and animal (umammun amthalakum = communities like yourselves).
1.1. Semantics of Hashr
1.1.1. Lexical: The word hashr means gathering (mustering) in Arabic4 and thus the gathering place of people is called mahshar.5 Since gathering of people together requires their intermingling, the word hashr can be translated as ikhtilat (mixture), too, which is the concomitant of the lexical meaning.6
However, it is to be noted that in Arabic the word hashr is used to imply the meaning of gathering when this action is carried out with a kind of forcing and driving (al-jam‘ ma‘ al-sawq = gathering by means of driving);7 thus, this word is also used to describe the forced migration of people from their inhabiting place.8
Perhaps it is with such consideration that Allah Almighty has used the two words baththa (scattered) and jam‘ (to gather) in the meaning of scattering and gathering in Surat al-Shura in order to show the presence of the animals in the Hereafter, and takes upon Himself the gathering of animals and to actualize it He uses the word Ghadir (Able, All-Powerful).9
﴾Among His signs is the creation of the heavens and the earth and whatever creatures He has scattered in them, and He is Able to gather them whenever He wishes.﴿10
2.1.1. Connotative: What is meant by hashr in religious texts is “to bring out the dead from the graves and to drive them toward the place of reckoning (judgment).”13 Some theologians, however, have applied this word to the first stage of the Resurrection Day, i.e. bringing the dead to life.14
2.1. Communal Life of Animals: The statement ﴾There is no animal on land, or a bird that flies with its wings, but they are communities like yourselves﴿15 denotes that from the viewpoint of the Holy Qur’an animals, like human beings, are communities (umam).
In Qur’anic terminology, umma is group of people that a single cause, such as religion, path, time, or place has gathered together;16 thus, the people who believe in a prophet are regarded as that prophet’s umma.17
From the viewpoint of the Holy Qur’an, all people were a single united community, who separated from each other due to the differences arising among them, a difference that can be resolved through obeying divine prophets.18
Since the Holy Qur’an has regarded animals as umma, we are to accept that there has been a kind of identity and unity among the animals in understanding the world of being, reaction to the Creator of being, the quality of life, and the finality and the purpose of life, and this has prompted the application of umma to them.19
3.1. Similarity of Animals and Humankind: It is implied from the phrase umamun amthalukum (communities like yourself) that the hashr of animals is the corollary of their similarity with human beings. Therefore, the question remains to be asked as to what the animals and human beings are identical in that they should be resurrected like human beings.
Although the term amthalukum suggests similarity of animals to humans, it is to be noted that this similarity is not in all aspects (states and affairs), for, it is not possible to ignore the structural and behavioral differences of animals and humans.20 Therefore, we are to be looking for a kind of likeness between them.
In explanation of the likeness between animals and humankind, some probabilities are set forth:
1. Being divine creatures and denoting their Creator21
2. Needing someone to manage them in different aspects of their life22
3. Enjoying the capability of recognizing God, accepting the Oneness and worshipping of God23
4. Capability of grouping and having intra-group likeness and communication24
5. Stating different aspects of their lives in the Divine Scripture25
6. Resurrection on the Day of Judgment and gaining one’s rights26
7. God’s dispensing justice to them27
8. Tendency to accept inter-group training28
9. Existence of some ethical similarities between a group of human beings and animals.29
Although each one of these probabilities per se can be true in explaining likeness of animals to human beings, it does not seem necessary to translate this likeness as a specific behavior or feature common among them; rather, we have to accept that this similarity can be in any area that can be realized in the real world.30
1.4. Summing Up: Using the word umma about animals as well as amthal to explain the relation between man and animal signifies two points:
Firstly, the animals may be called umma only when a common goal in life can be found for them, whether they themselves have chosen this goal (optional) or the laws of nature have imposed it on them (compulsive). Thus, simply having a proper name and being classified on that basis – as some have claimed31 – is not sufficient for regarding animals as umma.
Secondly, the likeness of animals and humans is to be viewed at from the perspective that the animals enjoy the same circumstances that lead to human resurrection.
For this reason, the similarities of animals and humans cannot be summarized in their common biological characteristics; rather, we have to step beyond this and claim that the same criterion for human resurrection, namely, a kind of consciousness and rational-inner perception that brings about felicity and wretchedness, is also found in animals. Thus, due to their availing of this blessing, their life would not end with death and upon departing from the material world, they would enter an immaterial world called Hereafter.32
This is the amazing aspect of animals’ life that the Holy Qur’an enjoins us to comprehend:
﴾And in your creation [too], and whatever animals that He scatters abroad, there are signs for a people who have certainty.﴿33
As we noticed, according to religious doctrines, animals have resurrection (hashr), that is, their life would not end with death and, like humans, they would begin a new life in the world to come (the immaterial world after death). It is to be figured out whether we can prove it as true on the grounds of theo-philosophical fundamentals.
1.2. Rational Potential of Animal Resurrection: In the process of death – as we feel it – the physical life of a living being stops. That is to say, as soon as its body activities come to a halt, it would give no response to any of the external stimuli. But according to the religious doctrines, death is a gradual process, which is associated with the acceptance of an immaterial dimension (soul). For this reason, death means the disconnection of the soul from the body, which is either the result of the ceasing of physical activities or the cause of it.
As life is defined by the connection of the soul to the body, so also death is defined by the final and permanent disconnection of the spirit from the body. Fakhr al-Rizi wrote in this respect:
Human soul is comprised of a luminous spiritual essence that if connected to the body, its luminosity permeates all organs of the body, and that is [called] life. Then, we say, at the death time its relation would indeed be cut from the outer and inner aspect of the body, and this is [called] death.34
According to the theo-philosophical doctrines, separation of body from soul would take place in two conditions: 1. Perfection (actualization) of the soul, 2. Decay (ruined condition) of the body.
When entered the physical world, human soul is purely potential; it actualizes its hidden excellences during the worldly life through the body and by acquiring knowledge and practicing. Naturally, by actualization of the inner human faculties, the soul no longer needs the body, separates from it, and the person dies. On the other hand, when the body loses its capability to hold the soul as a result of ruined condition, the soul departs from the body and the person dies, although the soul has not achieved its full actualization yet.
Sadr al-Din Shirazi describes the first type of death as follows:
The basis of this (natural death) is the soul’s getting independence due to its essential life and gradually giving up using bodily apparatuses until it is fully separated and totally leave the body so as to turn into an actual entity.35
Similarly, Imam al-Sadiq (A.S.) states in response to Hisham b. Hakam concerning the second type of death:
Blood causes freshness of the body, radiance of the skin, fineness of the voice, and increase of laughter. When the blood circulation stops, the soul will leave the body.36
Such a belief about death is ascertained through the Qur’anic teachings. In describing death, the Holy Qur’an frequently uses the word wafaya and its derivatives, which includes such meanings as full grip (taking full hold of something) and a kind of separation (complete disunion), a separation that sometimes God directly ascribes to Himself and sometimes to the angel of death (malik al-mawt):
﴾Allah takes the souls at the time of their death, and those who have not died in their sleep. Then He retains those for whom He has ordained death and releases the others until a specified time. There are indeed signs in that for a people who reflect37﴿.
﴾Say, "You will be taken away by the angel of death, who has been charged with you. Then you will be brought back to your Lord."﴿38
According to the religious doctrines, when death happens and the worldly life ends, the eternal life of man starts in two stages of purgatory and Resurrection.
Purgatory or barzakh, which lexically means the buffer between two things, applies to a stage in the otherworldly eternal life lying between the present world and the Resurrection. When gradual physical death occurs, human beings keep living in the world without their physical body but influenced by the physical world until the last of human beings dies and departs from this world. With the termination of human life on earth, the physical world is shattered and the human beings make themselves present to God for reckoning; this stage is Resurrection.
Despite the viewpoints of some Sunni theologians, two views are set forth about the circumstances of Resurrection:
1. Resurrection of the soul: the advocates of this view believe that only the non-physical and spiritual aspect of human beings will be present in the Hereafter life.
2. Resurrection of the body: the Resurrection of the body or physical Resurrection, by its widely known definition, is that man’s physical body, which is decomposed due to death and passage of time, is revived again and stand [before Allah] for reckoning.
However, from the viewpoint of Sadr al-Din Shirazi, what is meant by physical Resurrection is the presence of the soul with a non-physical and ethereal body in the Hereafter life.39
Anyway, if we accept that what the Holy Qur’an means by the Resurrection of animals and their equality with human beings in this respect is their presence in the Hereafter, we should be able to prove that the animals do have souls (nafs)40, a soul that after death and its departure from the physical world, starts its journey toward the Hereafter. Nevertheless, do animals have souls?
Two different answers are given to this question in theo-philosophical texts:
First, no creature except man has immaterial soul.41 The proponents of this idea believe that although animals possess physical powers (faculties) like those of human beings, they do not have immaterial souls, because for them accepting such a dimension requires accepting the equality of man and animal in an immaterial reality (nature). This, in itself, is followed by equality in behavior, moral characteristics, and acquisition of knowledge, which is definitely not acceptable.42
Criticism: Although immateriality (tajarrud) is a negative concept and common between man and animal, it does not mean their equality in all essence (nature),43 since it can be assumed as a hierarchical concept in which human beings and animals have been placed in two different ranks.
Second, like human beings, animals also possess immaterial souls. The proponents of this theory have relied on rational reasons as well as some Qur’anic verses and sayings of the Holy Prophet (S.A.W.) and the Infallible Imams (A.S.) to prove the existence of immaterial soul in animals:
1. Out-religious (rational) reasons: Discovery of animal behavior indicates the dominance of a kind of rationality in them, as the animals cannot carry out certain well thought-out and calculated tasks without availing rational perception. Animals’ availing such a level of rational perception indicates that they possess an immaterial soul (rational soul) which controls (manages) their various material dimensions (body).
2. In-religious (narrated) reasons: Similarly, the religious texts also emphasize the animals’ ability to establish verbal communication as well as their understanding and ability to reason and draw inferences.
Although the animals’ degree of understanding and the ability to perceive is not comparable to that of the human beings, it does not mean that animals’ understanding in all cases is lower than that of humans. Scientific evidences indicate the reality that the difference between the physical structure of human beings and animals sometimes provides the ground for the animals to be more perceptive than humans. This scientific reality has not been neglected in religious texts, either. For instance, barking of dogs and braying of donkeys at night shows their awareness of some incidents that are going to take place. These texts warn against being heedless of them and emphasize that these reactions are the result of their perceiving something that the humans are not able to perceive.44
The existence of such an understanding in animals represents their possession of an immaterial soul. The Holy Qur’an points out this understanding in various instances.
- Glorification (of Allah Almighty) by the wise earthly and heavenly creatures:
﴾Have you not regarded that Allah is glorified by everyone in the heavens and the earth, and the birds spreading their wings? Each knows his prayer and glorification, and Allah knows best what they do.﴿45
There are two possibilities regarding what the glorification (of Allah Almighty) by animals is meant to be:
1. Non-verbal glorification: According to this hypothesis, every living creature praises the Lord and describes His characteristics in its own language based on its existential structure;
2. Verbal glorification: in this view, animals glorify their Lord using their power of understanding and faculty of perception with the use of speech and sounds.46
- Possibility of understanding the birds’ speech:
﴾… and he [Solomon] said," O people! We have been taught the speech of the birds, and we have been given out of everything. Indeed this is a manifest advantage.﴿47
Although, in the Holy Qur’an, understanding the speech of the birds is taught to some Divine Messengers, such as David and Solomon, according to what is related in some tradition texts, the Infallible Imams (A.S.) also possessed this understanding.
It is related that a perplexed and frightened sparrow came twittering near Imam al-Ridha (A.S.). The Imam (A.S.) said, “Do you know what it is saying?” “No”, they said. He said, “It is telling me that a snake is about to eat its offspring in the house. Stand up and take this rod, go to the house and kill the snake.” I [the narrator of the hadith] stood up, took the rod, and entered the house. I saw a snake moving around in the house and killed it.
The birds chiming in with David:
﴾Certainly We gave David a grace from Us: “O mountains and birds, chime in with him!”﴿48
Deep understanding of the birds:
﴾[One day] he [Solomon] reviewed the birds, and said, “Why do I not see the hoopoe? Or is he absent?” “I will surely punish him with a severe punishment, or I will surely behead him, unless he brings a clear-cut excuse.” He did not stay for long [before he turned up] and said, “I have alighted on something which you have not alighted on, and I have brought you from Sheba a definite report.﴿49
Perception of the birds:
﴾When they came to the Valley of Ants, an ant said, “O ants! Enter your dwellings, lest Solomon and his hosts should trample on you while they are unaware.”﴿50
Innate intelligence in the honeybee:
﴾And your Lord inspired the bee [saying]: “Make your home in the mountains, and on the trees and the trellises that they erect.”﴿51
The meaning of the sparrow’s song:
Abu Hamza al-Thumali said:
One day I was sitting with Imam ‘Ali b. al-Husayn (A.S.) when a flock of sparrows were flying overhead and making noise. Then he said to me, “O Aba Hamza! Do you know what these sparrows are saying?” I said, “No.” He said, “They are glorifying their Lord and pleading Him for their daily sustenance.”52
The existence of various types of cognizance in animals:
Whatever God has kept hidden from animals, there are four features that He has not kept hidden from them: knowing that they have a Creator, knowing how to look for livelihood, knowing the gender, and fear of death.53
2.2. The Objective of Resurrection of the Animals: Given the acceptance of the soul and resurrection od the animals, the question remains to be answered as to what objective God is pursuing for the presence of animals in the Hereafter and their resurrection.
The easiest answer is that either like Ibn Hazm we say, “I do not know”54, or like Qadhi ‘Adhud Iji we say, “God has no purpose for this.”55 However, if we seek to find a clear and convincing answer, we should notice that according to the principle of the similarity between man and animal regarding resurrection, the same reason or reasons that ascertain man’s resurrection would prove animal resurrection in the Hereafter, too.
Although taking this issue into consideration would pave the way to find the answer, it would create a new difficulty, too; because, according to the Qur’anic teachings, the human resurrection is aimed at receiving reward (thawab) and punishment (‘iqab) for the way they have acted in the world.
Although the world can be a place for rewarding or punishing human beings for their deeds, the material characteristics of the world create a kind of restriction that rules out the possibility to establish a perennial proportion between human function and the kind and degree of reward or punishment they receive. Therefore, the Hereafter, because of its infinite time and space, is a proper place for judging human actions.
﴾Indeed the Hour is bound to come: I will have it hidden, so that every soul may be rewarded for what it strives for.56﴿
The otherworldly reward or punishment in the world Hereafter is imaginable only if the person is obliged to follow or to abandon something (a duty) and enjoy a kind of legal responsibility with respect to his conduct. Obviously, this is exclusive to humankind and animals do not have this responsibility. Thus, it is no longer possible to seek a justification for the necessity of animal resurrection through principle of the similarity between man and animal.57
Anyway, given the propounding of animal resurrection in religious texts, nevertheless, the Muslim theologians by expressing various views have attempted to study its existence and the way it exists:
1.2.2. A Symbolic Move: Some theologians, such as Abu al-Hasan Ash‘ari perceive that the presence of animals in the world to come (Resurrection) is simply a symbolic move which is aimed at reminding humankind of the extreme accuracy in reckoning and fulfillment of justice.58
Naturally, in such a state, the animals no longer need to receive any reward or punishment for their deeds because they do not have any obligations.59
To prove this notion of resurrection of the animals, perhaps we can refer to this saying of the Noble Prophet (S.A.W.):
On the Judgment Day, all the rightful people will receive their rights, inasmuch as the horned sheep will be retaliated in qisas for butting the hornless sheep.60
It can be assumed that the hornless sheep is a symbol of being oppressed since it cannot fend off oppression; and the horned sheep is a symbol of being an oppressor as it has various means, including physical power, for harming others.61
2.2.2. Receiving Recompense: What is meant by recompense (damage) is the valuable benefit that if the animal had possessed understanding and had known that it had no way to obtain that benefit except through undergoing some maltreatments, it would have agreed to undergo it.62
Most of the theologians (Mu‘tazilites and Shi‘as) and exegetes believe, on the basis of the rational rule of “i‘adatu man lahu ‘iwadhun aw ‘alayhi ‘iwadhun” (returning of the one who claims a recompense or upon whom is a recompense)63, that animal resurrection is for the purpose of receiving the recompense and damage for the hardships and sufferings that they undergo in the world.64
Projecting this concept concerning the animal resurrection is dependent on accepting two issues:
First, maltreating animals (isal alam = causing pains) without having committed any wrong is evil.
Second, it is necessary for (incumbent upon) God to recompense animals for maltreatment and suffering they undergo in the world.65
It is clearly understood that this argument can be used concerning the necessity of animal resurrection when the animal has not received the recompense for the pains and sufferings that it has undergone in the world, otherwise, intellectually there is no need for their resurrection.66
Similarly, if we assume that an animal has not undergone any pain and suffering for availing a desirable living condition, there remains no need for its resurrection, since it has not been entitled to receiving recompense.67
Finally, it is obligatory upon God to recompense an animal only when He has a role in the maltreatment process of the animal, like when He permits to kill (slaughter) an animal to use its meat, or to kill (murder) it for hurting human beings as in case of the predators and harmful insects, or when he permits to use them in toilsome tasks such as transporting heavy loads. But, if man inflicts torment on an animal (tyrannizes it) without having rational or canonical (textual) permit, he is naturally responsible to recompense that animal in the Hereafter.68
Justification of the necessity of resurrection of the animals for receiving recompense, which is advocated by most of the Mu‘tazilite and Shi‘a theologians, is strongly opposed by the Ash‘arite theologians. Although not denying the resurrection of the animals, the Ash‘arites maintain that their resurrection can take place only by God’s will (dispensation) without its being necessary (incumbent) for God.
In other words, as religious texts emphasize the resurrection of the animals and there is no religious (canonical) or rational evidence for being wrong, it is to be believed; however, it should be noted that this resurrection does not need to be solely for the purpose of retribution (punishment) or receiving reward (recompense).69
They have relied on two issues to prove the necessity (incumbency) of paying recompense (damage) to the animals as false.
1. If something is incumbent upon a person, he or she has to be reproached for not fulfilling it, whereas God cannot be reproached if the animals are not resurrected.
2. If hurting others is permitted for the recompense that they would receive later on, then it should be permissible to harm others without their wishing it and undertake to compensate. But, this act is not permissible and fair (good).70
2.2.3. Animals’ Demanding Justice against Animals: The possibility is set forth in some exegetical texts that the resurrection of the animals takes place for the sake of judging animals’ reciprocal conducts so that by means of retaliation (qisas)71 the oppressed animals can take revenge on the oppressive animals (intisaf = demanding justice).72
This impression is evidenced by an event that Abu Dhar al-Ghaffari, the famous companion of the Apostle of Allah (S.A.W.), recounts:
When I was with the Apostle of Allah (S.A.W.), two nanny goats were butting at each other with their horns. The Holy Prophet (S.A.W.) said, “Do you know why they are butting at each other?” I said I did not. The Holy Prophet (S.A.W.) said, “But Allah knows and will soon judge between them.” 73
Accordingly, the similarity of animals and human beings is in two things. One: resurrection, i.e., as a human being is resurrected, so also is an animal; second: qisas (retaliated punishment), i.e., as a human being will pay their penalties in the Hereafter, so also will an animal be responsible to its tyrannical conducts.74
With this explanation, it is clear that what is meant by qisas of the tyrannical animals is a kind of retaliation and requiting in kind, rather than a punishment for disobeying Divine commands, which is incompatible with the animals’ non-obligation principle.75
Also, there is no room for saying that if the oppressive animal deserves receiving a recompense from God, God would transfer it to the animal oppressed by that animal; otherwise, God would directly award this recompense to the oppressed animal.76 Because, with the reciprocal treatment, the injustice of the oppressive animal to the oppressed animal would be compensated for and there would remain no need for reparation (recompense).
Accepting the intra-group pleading for justice for animals is imaginable only when their conducts are based on a kind of common sense and understanding;77 because, so far as it is not possible to imagine a conscious behavior and criminal intention for the animal, it would not be possible to accept pleading for justice for one side and incrimination for the other, and judge for the necessity of (compensation) recompense.
2.2.4. Animal’s Appealing for Justice against Man: Although in theo-exegetical texts its probability is not taken seriously, but the result of the resurrection of animals may be viewed as their pleading for justice against cruel treatment of human beings and this pleading for justice may not need to be just for receiving recompense. Rather, it can be assumed that a sort of requitement or punishment will take place between man and animal; and this way, man will pay for their maltreatment of animals.
This requitement can be implied from the application of the word qisas in the following saying of Imam al-Sajjad (A.S.):
I was going on the Hajj pilgrimage along with Imam al-Sajjad (A.S.). His camel was moving along slowly. He aimed his stick at it, but [without hitting it] said, “If only there were no qisas [in the Hereafter, I would hit it]” and let down his hand.78
On this basis, stating the equality of man and animals concerning the Resurrection, the Almighty God intends to say that human beings are not permitted to treat animals cruelly, because God is their creator and on the Resurrection Day will protect them by dispensing justice.79
There are also evidences in religious texts confirming such an impression of the objective for the resurrection of animals. These evidences are divided into two groups in terms of content:
The first group, without referring to the punishment in the world of Hereafter for maltreating the animals, just points out the animals’ pleading for justice in the Hereafter.
The second group, without mentioning the pleading for justice, just refers to the punishment for maltreating the animals.
In a tradition, the Holy Prophet (S.A.W.) is quoted as describing the complaint of a sparrow as follows:
“Anyone who kills a sparrow in vain, it will cry for help from God on the Resurrection day, saying, ‘O Lord! This person killed me in vain without gaining any benefit from it and denied me of eating insects and reptiles of the earth’.”80
Similarly, he threatens the unjust camel-driver this way:
The Holy Prophet (S.A.W.) saw a camel whose feet were fastened while its load was still on its back. He said, “Where is its owner? He has no humanity; tomorrow [on the Day of Resurrection] he should be ready to face justice.”81
On his heavenly journey (mi‘raj)82, the Holy Prophet (S.A.W.) describes the condition of a woman who is being tormented in the Hell for her maltreatment of a cat:
On the night of mi‘raj, I saw a woman in the fire; I asked the reason for it, it was said, She had fastened a cat without giving it food and water and would not release it to eat vermin of the earth until it died. Therefore, Allah is punishing her because of that.83
In another description of the same story, the Holy Prophet (S.A.W.) said that that woman would be punished in the Hell by the same cat:
I saw in the Fire an owner of a cat whose cat was biting her on her front and back. She was a woman who had fastened her cat, neither allowing it to feed nor releasing it to eat from the vermin of the earth.84
It is to be reminded that in contrast to animal’s pleading for justice against man, man’s pleading for justice against animal is also imaginable; that is, the animal that has done an injustice to man in the world would come back to life in the Hereafter to pay for its injustice to man. However, we did not examine this hypothesis, as assumption of animal’s injustice to man is examinable only when it can be proved that animals enjoy judicious behavior resulting from a conscious choice, as well as comprehension and recognition of institutionalized affairs in them (instincts).
3.2. The Degree of Animals’ Presence in the Hereafter: Let us suppose that the resurrection of the animals is for the animals to receive recompense for the injustice they suffered in the world. If so, the question comes up as to whether their life will terminate (inqita‘ = cease to continue) in the Hereafter once they receive their recompense or they would live on (perpetuate) there to enjoy the Divine blessings as human beings do.
Three different answers are given to this question in theological texts:
1.3.2. Termination (Inqita‘): Some theologians believe that the necessity for the resurrection of the4 animals would terminate by receiving of recompense; and as there is no reason for them to be eternal, there remains no reason for the animals to continue to survive in the Hereafter.85
To prove the transitory presence of animals in the Hereafter, we can quote the following saying of the Holy Prophet (S.A.W.):
Allah will resurrect all His creatures (beasts, animals, birds, and any other creatures) on the Resurrection Day, then His Judgment will go as far as to restore the rights of the unhorned sheep from the horned one, and then tells them to turn to earth.86
2.3.2. Permanence (Durability): Abu al-Qasim al-Balkhi and his followers believe that since taking blessings back will hurt the animal again, Divine favor (tafadhdhul) will be bestowed on the animals to keep on living in the world Hereafter. Besides, with the recompense being compensated, death has to occur, and causing the animal to die again would in turn hurt it; this way we will encounter a chain of endless recompenses.87
3.3.2. Being Unclear: A third group of theologians also believe that making decision about the continuation or cessation of blessings in the world Hereafter is subject to God’s will; if He deems it fair, He would do it, otherwise, He would prepare the way for their extinction.88
Since the only source for examining this issue is the religious teachings and as there is no explicit explanation in the revealed verses and the sayings of the Infallible Household (A.S.) in this respect, we will put off judging about animal life in the Hereafter until some later time.
If we accept the similarity of man and animal in the Hereafter life and claim that the statement ﴾communities like yourselves﴿ concerns this similarity in all aspects, then we will be able to proclaim with certainty that the life of animals in the world Hereafter is also eternal like that of the humankind. However, if we do not accept the overall similarity of man and animal and claim that this similarity only concerns the principle of the existence of resurrection for animals, then there is no way for us to talk about the permanence (durability) and transience (cessation) of enjoying the Hereafter blessings.89
Nevertheless, it is implied from the sayings of the religious dignitaries and the Infallible Imams (A.S.) that at least some animals would enjoy kind of eternal otherworldly life:
There is no camel having stayed seven times in ‘Arafa during Hajj pilgrimage except that Allah has rated it among the animals of the Paradise and blessed its progeny.90
Any camel with which people go on Hajj pilgrimage three (seven) times, is rated as among the animals of Paradise.91
Choose healthy and strong animals for sacrificing, as they will be your riding mount on the Sirat (the bridge over Hell leading to Paradise).92
The horses of the soldiers in the world are considered as their horses in the paradise.93
4.2. The Type of Animals that will be Resurrected: One of the important issues discussed about animal resurrection is to determine which types of animals will enjoy otherworldly life. Will all the living creatures have the chance to be present on the Resurrection Day or just a group of them will enjoy this blessing?
To find an answer to this question, we have to refer to the Holy Qur’an. According to the statement ﴾There is no animal on land, nor a bird that flies with its wings, but they are communities like yourselves.﴿, the Holy Qur’an has mentioned two types of animals as dabba (beast) and ta’ir (bird) and regarded them communities (umam) like human beings.
Conceptologically, ta’ir has no ambiguity because it includes all living creatures that we call “birds” of the sky.
However, what type of animals is called dabba?94 It is a beast that moves on land.95 According to the division that the Holy Qur’an has made in Surat al-Nur, these animals are divided into three general groups:
﴾Allah created every animal from water. Among them are some that creep upon their bellies, and among them are some that walk on two feet, and among them are some that walk on four. Allah creates whatever He wishes. Indeed Allah has power over all things.﴿96
Therefore, we can conclude that all the birds of the sky and land animals have resurrection.97 However, no mention has been made of the aquatic creatures and the insects.
The silence of the Hply Qur’an about the resurrection of the aquatic creatures, despite their communal life, is perhaps because the Holy Qur’an has on three occasions viewed the merging of the seas and their being set afire and drying up as signs of resurrection:
It is worth mentioning that there are different possibilities set forth in the exegetical texts concerning the meaning of the above verses: 1. Merging of the fresh and salty waters, 2. Joining of the seas, 3. The seas being set afire, 4. The water of the seas drying up, 5. The seas filling up with fire, 6. Overflow of the seas and spreading over the land mass, 7. The water of the seas vaporizing with the fire entering them.101
With the extinction of the seas, no chance is left for the aquatic creatures to survive; thus, talking about their resurrection will lead nowhere. That is why the phrase “There is no animal on land…” is interpreted as “There moves no animal over the face of Earth…”;102 although the contrast between the sky and the earth and using fi (in, on) instead of ‘ala (over) in verse 38 of Surat al-An‘am could in itself indicate the presence of the aquatic creatures, as well.
However, we cannot deny that the justice-orientedness of the Hereafter necessitates that man should be called to account for doing injustice to the aquatic creatures.
The resurrection of the insects, however, has not received much attention from the interpreters, although Qatada and Ibn ‘Abbas have related it simply as a possibility,103 and we have no evidence for the inclusiveness of the resurrection of the creatures, even insects.
Following in the footsteps of Plotinus, Sadr al-Din Shirazi (Mulla Sadra) has divided the animals into two groups: ones that enjoy only sensual perception and the other that besides sensual perception enjoy faculty of imagination and the ability to remember images. He believes that only the second group of animals will be resurrected and have the possibility to be present in the lower levels of the Barzakh (purgatory) after their death and the destruction of their bodies while retaining their individual distinction. Losing their idiosyncratic advantage, however, the first group will transform into a single creature and return to their lord of species (rabb al-naw‘) and the rational sagacious.104
What is meant by “lord of species” in this theory is what has been set forth in philosophy by Plato onwards as the theory of exemplary ideas (muthul).
Stemmed from the root ma tha la, the word muthul means similar and parallel and in Plato’s terminology it applies to the creatures similar to the material creatures. To Plato, everything has two existences: material and immaterial, because, according to the principle of inconsistency of matter, the little material creatures are exposed to change, transformation, decadence, and destruction; despite this, however, the typical nature of every species would sustain to survive.
The survival of any creature is dependent upon that which protects its species and may not undergo any change and transformation. Therefore, any material object has an immaterial existence, which manages the individuals of that species and our cognition belongs to it.105
Although the theory of exemplary ideas (muthul) was severely criticized by Aristotle and his Muslim followers such as Avicenna, philosophers of illumination like Suhrawardi and sages such as Mirdamad, Mirfindiriski, and Sadr al-Din Shirazi made great attempts to prove this theory with justifications.106 Mirfindiriski portrays his viewpoint about muthul as follows:
Such a comment on the resurrection of animals results from the idea that in his view, the world Hereafter is an immaterial world whose pleasures and torments are the outcome of the perceiving and imagining the pleasant and unpleasant forms that are created in man due to his worldly acts.
It is with this consideration that in philosophical texts perception is regarded as involved in creating pleasure and pain and is defined as follows:
Pleasure is the perception of the desirable because it is desirable and pain is the perception of undesirable because it is undesirable.108
Normally, according to this type of approach to the Hereafter, so long as an animal does not enjoy the faculty of imagination, it cannot enjoy its presence in the world Hereafter.109
Faculty of imagination is one of the inherent faculties of humankind, which is also referred to as musawwira (representative faculty). This faculty protects images existing in man’s interior being, which, in philosophical and mystical texts, is divided into two sections: conjoined imagination and separate imagination (restricted and absolute).
Giving a definition of this faculty of man’s inherent faculties, al-Farabi says:
It is a force that retains the descriptive definitions of the sensible objects after being concealed from the domain of the sense; and, both in sleeping and waking states, it proceeds to combine a part of those descriptive definitions of the sensible objects with another part or to separate some from other.110
Among debated issues in theology (science of kalam) is the rationality or religiousness of the recognition of the value of human deeds and conducts, which is referred to as rational or legal good and evil. Theologians have set forth the question as to whether maltreatment of animals is something regarded by intellect as indecent and evil or the recognition of such an issue is subject to examining the divine (the lawmaker’s) commands, in which case an action can be permissible or impermissible when different laws are passed on it.
Violating animals’ rights and maltreating them is among the issues that few people doubt about its indecency and ugliness. Even those considered as pioneers of violating animals’ domains and those treating them cruelly, on most occasions do not deny this reality, and view their profiteering or pleasure seeking as the reason for perpetrating such behavior.
Accordingly, the Muslim thinkers are facing the question as to what is the origin of such judgment? Why is cruel treatment of animals considered as undesirable and indecent to people?
In theological explorations, we find three different answers to this question:
On the basis of their intellectual approach to the theological issues, the Mu‘tazilite and Shi‘i theologians claim that the objects and actions have real expedience and evil or benefit and loss (inherent good and evil) despite any external matter, and that human intellect has the ability to perceive it (rational good and evil) without needing any factor for help.
What is meant by inherent good and evil is that the act of any learned and able creature that freely chooses its work is either essentially beautiful or essentially ugly; i.e., the intellect would discern its beauty or ugliness without getting help from other sources (al-mustaqillat al-‘aqliyya = rational independents).111
Such an approach paved the way for setting forth the thought among the Mu‘tazilites and the Shi‘as that the impermissibility of maltreating animals results from the independent perception of the intellect of its evil. This judgment of the intellect is so transparent and decisive that some have regarded it as among the intellect’s inherent judgments,112 and regarded its denial the same as denial of the intellect’s essential judgment.113
As a result of accepting this rational judgment, any act leading to the maltreatment of animals is permissible when we have a specific reason – rational or legal – for its permissibility.114
In response to the question as to why God has on some instances permitted man to maltreat animals in order to utilize them despite the explicit judgment of intellect on the impermissibility of maltreating them, the Mu‘tazilite and Shi‘i theologians have pointed out three justifications:
1.1. Expenses Rendered by Human Being: There is no doubt that keeping animals would cost much for a person, because by agreeing to take care of an animal – as it will be explained later – that person undertakes to provide food, water, sanitation, treatment, and a place for keeping it.
Since man has no essential obligation to animals for providing these expenses and services, he is normally entitled to use the animal for his own benefit in return; however, the amount of services that man provides to the animals is much more than the benefits he gains from utilizing them. Thus, by recognizing this human entitlement, common sense gives man permission to utilize the animals, even though this utilization would lead to their maltreatment.115
1.2. Hereafter Reward: According to theological doctrines, God grants benefits to His creatures through one of the following three states: granting benefits without (the creature’s) doing good (tafdhil = favoring); granting benefits for the unpleasant events (recompense); and granting benefits for obeying the commands (reward).116
As per the theory of “recompense in the Hereafter”, which is the most prevalent theory in Islamic theological texts, God will reward (recompense) animals in the Hereafter for the maltreatment they suffer from being utilized by human beings. Thus, God would recompense in the Hereafter the injustice, which He prepared the ground for in this world by creating the creatures.117
1.3. Evaluative Comparison: According to a group of theologians, to determine the evil of maltreating the animals, the amount of the profit that this maltreatment would entail for man or for the animal itself has to be taken into account. Then judgment is to be made about the good or the evil of the action through an evaluative comparison between the profit and the maltreatment.
On this basis, if the amount of the profit that a person gains from using an animal exceeds the amount of the damage or maltreatment that the animal suffers for it, or if the amount of the benefit that the animal gains from human treatment or it is more than the amount of the maltreatment that the animal suffers from that same treatment, then this type of use or treatment is rationally sound and permissible118 and the religion approves it.
One day, in my presence, a man asked Imam al-Sadiq (A.S.) about cutting off a sheep’s testicles. The Imam answered: “There is no prohibition against cutting them if you may improve your belonging thereby.”119
1.4. Imagining the Ultimate End: According to this theory, for the maltreatment of animals and the judgment on its rational permissibility, we have to look for the goal and ultimate result of such an action.
If one follows a rational purpose in maltreating animals, the intellect regards such a maltreatment as proper and permissible; but if one maltreats animals aimlessly (in vain) or for an irrational purpose (playfully), the intellect would similarly assert its judgment as to the impermissibility and indecency of such an action.120
This kind of imagining the ultimate end can be found in the sayings of the Holy Prophet (S.A.W.), too; because he regards the killing (slaughtering) of a pregnant or nursing animal as abhorring only if it is with no reason.121
Similarly, in rejecting the saying of Abu Hanifa who regarded the ish‘ar125 of a camel as a kind of torture and hence impermissible,126 ‘Allama Hilli and Ibn Qudama argue that although this action would hurt the camel, it is proper and permissible because it is motivated by a proper purpose (hurting for a true intention).127
Although ish‘ar in the laws of Hajj rituals and its relation to maltreatment of animals is a legal rather than theological issue, some points need to be taken into consideration. Firstly, ish‘ar is applicable only to camels and not to cattle or sheep;128 secondly, the ish‘ar of camel is permissible only when it has a hump, that is to say it has fat tissues which lack pain sensors, so a camel that does not have a hump may not be marked through ish‘ar.129 Thirdly, doing ish‘ar on the cows lacking humps is debated among the jurisprudents.130
With this explanation, both Abu Hanifa’s statement and the responses by ‘Allama Hilli and Ibn Qudama do not sound right, because in both cases the issue of maltreating a camel by practicing ish‘ar is taken for granted; whereas the fat tissues of the camel’s hump lack pain sensors and the camel does not feel any pain by receiving ish‘ar so discussion about the maltreatment of animals and having a proper intention for it do not rise.
In some theological texts, this kind of imagining the ultimate end in the permissibility of maltreatment of animals is referred to as lutf (favor). The rule of lutf, as one of the significant theological rules, is based on the indecency of [presuming] violation of intention by the All-wise Allah. Accordingly, since maltreatment of animals without recompense is injustice and maltreating them in return for recompense but without any goal is pointless and none of which is permissible to God, maltreatment of animals in the context of human beings profiting from them would be permissible according to the dictates of intellect.131
When comparing these two theories, we should note that according to the third theory the sum total of the benefit and loss of the action, regardless of the impact of the agent’s motivation, is the criteria for the correctness and incorrectness of hurting the animal. In the fourth theory, however, the agent’s motivation, irrespective of the degree of the benefit or loss, delineates the correctness and incorrectness of the torture of the animal.
Anyway, the reconciliation of the last two theories can bring us to the conclusion that the maltreatment of animals is impermissible in two cases. First, when it is injustice, i.e., when there is neither benefit, nor it may prevent from further loss. Second: when it is pointless, i.e., when it is lacking a recompense of equal weight to it or more beneficial, it does not fend off any loss, causes depravity (i.e., it brings along evil and distracts from good). In contrast, hurting of animals is regarded as a permissible act only when it is beneficial or prevents from a greater loss.132
In contrast to the Mu‘tazilites and Shi‘as, the Ash‘arite theologians, denying the existence of the intellect’s innate perceptions (inherent good and evil), believe that human wisdom is too weak to judge on the good and evil of actions; rather, it is the religious teachings that we should turn to for perceiving it.133 (Good is what the lawmaker regards good and evil is what the lawmaker considers evil).134
Accordingly, the Ash‘arites have discussed about the maltreatment of animals, maintaining that hurting the animals is not rationally indecent. They argue that if a conduct is impermissible according to the dictates of intellect, it should be so everywhere and for everybody as the inherent does not change; whereas, God has allowed human beings in some cases to treat animals in such a way that may hurt them.135
In view of the Ash‘arites the best reason for the maltreatment of animals not to be rationally impermissible is the differences among the intellectuals in this respect, for this disagreement results from the lack of rational necessity in the evil of such an act.136 Supposing we accept that the intellect considers maltreatment of animals as evil, but since God has given man permission for such behavior, the intellect has to give in by accepting God’s Omniscience and consider animal maltreatment as permissible, as well.137 Therefore, maltreatment of animals is rationally evil so long as God has not permitted man for it, but after that, it is no longer evil.138
Some Ash‘arite theologians have gone beyond this and claimed that even where the intellect – presumably – deems animal maltreatment as impermissible, it is because God has in those instances prohibited us from performing it; otherwise, the intellect has no capability to understand its evil.139
Conclusion: According to the Ash‘arites, God can persecute the animals with no crime and may not give them reward in the world and in the Hereafter without its being called “injustice”; for, God is the absolute master and possessor of the world of being and its creatures and injustice is imaginable only when a person takes possession of another person’s property without permission.140 However, the wisdom and the true reason of such treatment by God is not clear for us and we do not know He has created the world of being in such a way that a group of creatures would suffer so much torment and persecution in their life.141
Now that such treatment by God in maltreatment of animals is not unjust, He can also give permission to mankind to maltreat animals in the best of their interest without such treatments being considered as indecent or injustice.142
In contrast to the two rationalistic Mu‘tazilite-Shi’ite and irrationalistic Ash‘arite theological trends, there are certain renowned philosophers such as Ibn Sina, Khawja Nasir al-Din Tusi, Qutb al-Din Razi, ‘Umar b. Sahlan al-Sawi, and Muhaqqiq Isfahani (Kompani) who maintain that the difference of the theologians in the perception and imperception of good and evil is based on accepting the principle that judgment about the good or evil is among the judgments of the theoretical reason; whereas, [the judgment concerning] the good and evil of the objects and actions includes in judgments of the practical reason. Thereupon, such propositions as “justice is good” or “injustice is evil” are beyond certainty and regarded as among the generally accepted (mashhur) uncertain propositions.143
The corollary of such a thought is that judging on the evil of maltreatment of animals is not a judgment based on intellectual perception but it results from certain human tendencies and inner qualities such as kindness and compassion.
A Critical Review: Although critically reviewing the reasons of the Mu‘tazilites and Ash‘arites for accepting and denying the intrinsic good and evil of actions, particularly the maltreatment of animals as an example of that general precept, demands another chance to deal with, it is to be noted that ilam (inflicting pain) is not evil simply for being ilam; because nothing would be characterized as evil (qubh) because of its own essence (genus).144 Therefore, maltreatment of animals can be evil (qabih) only when it is characterized by “injustice”, just as it can be good (hasan) if characterized by “justice”.145
Parity of good and evil with justice and injustice, hence, the lawfulness and unlawfulness are among the issues that the Holy Qur’an has emphasized in its various verses.
﴾Say, “My Lord has only forbidden indecencies, the outward among them and the inward ones.”﴿146
﴾Indeed Allah enjoins justice and kindness and generosity towards relatives, and He forbids indecency, wrong, and aggression.147﴿
﴾…who bids them to do what is right and forbids them from what is wrong, makes lawful to them all the good things and forbids them from all vicious things.﴿148
﴾When they commit an indecency, they say,” We found our fathers practicing it, and Allah has enjoined it upon us.” Say, “Indeed Allah does not enjoin indecencies.”﴿149
Consequently, if an animal is utilized in accordance to its creation, no injustice is perpetrated rationally so that the judgment of religion for the permissibility of using that animal in that respect be a breach of the judgment of intellect as to the evil of maltreatment of animals. In other words, the exclusions in the intellectual judgments is an unreal presumption, as the lawmaker, by virtue of intellect and his behavior based on intellect, would never make a judgment contrary to reason (whatever reason judges, the canonical law – shar‘ – would judge, too). As a result, we would not encounter any law in the Islamic rules and ordinances that, contrary to the intellectual judgment of the impermissibility of maltreating animals (ilam and ta‘dhib), would permit man a conduct that would cause the maltreatment of animals.150
Notice the context of the following verse:
﴾He created the cattle, in which there is warmth for you and [other] uses and some of them you eat…. And they bear your burdens to towns which you could not reach except by straining yourselves. Indeed your Lord is most kind and merciful. And horses, mules and asses, for you to ride them.﴿151
In this verse, God has pointed out some ways man can use animals: 1. Using their hide and wool for clothing, 2. Using their meat for food, 3. Carrying loads, and 4. Riding.
Thus, killing (slaughtering) animals for their hide or meat as well as transporting goods or people by them is not injustice; rather, it is using them in line with their creation. So, the judgment by religion as to the permissibility of slaughtering the animals or the like cannot be regarded as a judgment contrary to the judgment of intellect or an exception to it.
For this reason, the Muslim jurists have asserted that drying silkworm cocoons by sun’s heat is permissible, as without which the intended purpose for the creation of silkworm will not be fulfilled, even though the worm may thus be killed.152
Normally, if this utilization is in line with the animals’ creation, maltreatment no longer applies to it; however, it does not mean that the animal never gets hurt and pain through human utilization.
Therefore, some theologians’ claim that the denial of pain in animals is pointless153 or denial of God’s intervention in maltreating animals is a denial of an evident matter154, cannot be true, because God has made the animals’ bodies in such a way that human beings can use them to their benefit and if they perform it in the right way, the animal would not undergo any pain. For this reason, some believe that the method proposed by Islam for slaughtering animals would not entail any pain for the animal, because by the abrupt cutting of the [four] arteries and the sudden outflow of the blood from its body the animal’s nervous system stops working and no pain is felt thereafter.155
This issue, to be discussed later on in our legal deliberations, has unfortunately been neglected in both Mu‘tazilite and Ash‘arite theological trends. They have, in their negligence, attempted by raising various theories to either justify animal maltreatment in line with Divine justice like the Mu‘tazilites, or bring up the issue of precedence of faith over reason and deny the reason’s perception in the good and evil of the matters like Ash‘arites.
- 1. Q. 6:38.
- 2. It is worth mentioning that in some philosophical texts, animals’ Resurrection has been translated as the Resurrection of human beings in the form of certain animals according to the type of bestial life that they have had in their worldly life; which is, therefore, off the subject; see: Shirazi, Sadr al-Din Muhammad, Mafatih al-Ghayb, ed. Muhammad Khawjawi, Cultural Studies and Research Institute, Tehran, 1363 sh/1984, p. 640-641.
- 3. Q. 81:5.
- 4. Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-ʿArab, 15 vols. Adab al-Hawza, Qum, 1405/1985, 4/190; also, see: Tabari, Muhammad b. Jarir, Jamiʿ al-Bayan ʿan Ta’wil Aya al-Qur'an, ed. Sidqi Jamil al-ʿAttar, 30 vols. Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1415/1995, 30/84; Ibn Jawzi, ʿAbd al-Rahman b. ‘Ali, Zad al-Masir fi ʿIlm al-Tafsir, 8 vols. Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1407/1986, 3/26; Ibn Kathir Qurashi, Ismaʿil, Tafsir al-Qur'an al-ʿAzim, 4 vols. Dar al-Maʿrifa, Beirut. 1412/1992, 4/508.
- 5. Harbi, Ibrahim b. Ishaq, Gharib al-Hadith, ed. Sulayman Ibrahim Muhammad al-‘Ayir, 3 vols. Dar al-Ma‘rifa, Jaddeh, 1405/1987, 1/283; Al-‘Ayn, 3/92; Lisan al-‘Arab, 4/190.
- 6. Jamiʿ al-Bayan ʿan Ta’wil Aya al-Qur'an, 30/84; Tafsir al-Qur'an al-ʿAzim, 4/508.
- 7. ʿAskari, Abi al-Hilal, Muʿjam al-Furuq al-Lughawiyya, Mu’assisat al-Nashr al-Islamiyya, Qum, 1412/1991, p. 188, No. 751; Turayhi, Fakhr al-Din, Majma‘ al-Bahrayn, ed. Sayyid Ahmad Husayni, 4 vols. 2nd edition, Maktab al-Nashr al-Thiqafat al-Islamiyya, 1408/1988, 1/516; Zubaydi, Muhammad Murtaza, Taj al-ʿArus min Jawahir al-Qamus, 10 vols, Maktibat al-Ihya, Beirut, n.d, 3/141; Faydh al-Qadir Sharh Jami‘ al-Saghir min Ahadith al-Bashir al-Nadhir, 1/57 (al-hashr: akhiru man yusaqu ila al-madina).
- 8. Ibn Athir, Al-Mubarak b. Muhammad, Al-Nihaya fi Gharib al-Hadith, ed. Tahir Hamd al-Zawi, 5 vols. Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, Beirut, 1418/1997, 1/374; Lisan al-‘Arab, 4/190; Taj al-‘Arus min Jawahir al-Qamus, 3/141.
- 9. Tabataba’i, Sayyid Muhammad Husayn, Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an, Ismaʿiliyan Institute, Qum, 1393/1973, 18/58.
- 10. Q. 42:29.
- 11. Tafsir al-Qur'an al-ʿAzim, 2/136 and 4/508; Al-Hakim al-Naysaburi, Al-Mustadrak ala al-Sahihayn, ed. Dr. Yusif al-Mar‘ashli, 4 vols. Dar al-Ma‘rifa, Beirut, 1406/1985, 2/515; Manawi, ‘Abd al-Ra’uf, Faydh al-Qadir Sharh Jami‘ al-Saghir min Ahadith al-Bashir al-Nadhir ed. Ahmad ‘Abd al-Salam, 6 vols. Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, Beirut, 1415/1994, 1/57; Jamiʿ al-Bayan ʿan Ta’wil Aya al-Qur'an, 7/249; Zad al-Masir fi ʿIlm al-Tafsir, 3/26; Qurtubi, Muhammad b. Ahmad, Al-Jamiʿ li Ahkam al-Qur'an, 20 vols. 2nd edition, Mu’assisat al-Ta’rikh al-ʿArabi, Beirut, 1405/1985, 19/229; Shawkani, Muhammad b. ʿAli, Fath al-Qadir al-Jamiʿ bayn Fanni al-Riwaya wa al-Diraya min ʿIlm al-Tafsir, 5 vols. ʿAlam al-Kutub, Beirut, n.d., 5/388.
- 12. Tusi, Muhammad b. Hasan, Al-Tibyan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an, ed. Ahmad Habib Qaysar ʿAmili, 10 vol. Dar Ihya’ al-Turath al-ʿArabi, Beirut, 1409/1989, 4/130; Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an, 7/83.
- 13. Muʿjam al-Furuq al-Lughawiyya, p. 189, No. 752. Muhaqqiq Lahiji has translated hashr as follows: “Hashr means to revive the dead and gather them in that station.” Fayyadh Lahiji, ‘Abd al-Razzaq, Gawhar Murad, ed. Zayn al-‘Abidin Qurbani, Ministry of Culture’s Printing and Publishing Organization, Tehran, 1372 sh/1993, p. 655.
- 14. “I‘adat al-khalq ba‘d al-‘adam wa nash‘atuhum ba‘d al-Ramam.”, “An tajtama‘ al-ajza’ al-asliyyatu ba‘da tafaruqiha, fatariddu ilayha al-nufus.”; Amidi, ‘Ali b. Muhammad, Ghayat al-Maram fi ‘Ilm al-Kalam, Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, Beirut, 1413/1992, p. 260; Takhti Sanandaji, ‘Abd al-Qadir b. Muhammad, Taqrib al-Maram fi ‘Ilm al-Kalam, with additional notes by Faraj Allah Kurdistani, lithography, Egypt, 1304/1886, 2/87.
- 15. Q. 6:38.
- 16. Majma‘ al-Bahrayn, 1/108; Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an, 7/72.
- 17. Farahidi, Khalil b. Ahmad, Al-‘Ayn, ed. Mahdi al-Makhzumi, 8 vols. 2nd edition, Dar al-Hijra, Qum, 1409/1989, 8/428.
- 18. Q. 10:19, 2:213.
- 19. Al-‘Ayn, 8/428, Majma‘ al-Bahrayn, 1/108; Al-Tibyan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an, 4/129.
- 20. Razi, Fakhr al-Din Muhammad b. ‘Umar, Al-Tafsir al-Kabir, 31 vols. 3rd edition, Dar Ihya al-Thurath al-‘Arabi, Beirut, n.d, 12/213.
- 21. Bihar al-Anwar, 7/255; Tabarsi, Fadhl b. Husayn, Majmaʿ al-Bayan fi Tafsir al-Qur’an, 10 vols. Dar Ihya al-Turath al-ʿArabi, 1379/1960, 4/129.
- 22. Bihar al-Anwar, 7/255-256; Majmaʿ al-Bayan fi Tafsir al-Qur’an, 4/48-49.
- 23. Al-Tafsir al-Kabir, 12/213. To verify this impression, we may refer to the verses in the Holy Qur’an that sets forth the issue of all creatures’ glorification, such as verse 44 of Surat al-Isra and verse 41 of Surat al-Nur, ﴾The seven heavens glorify Him, and the earth] too [, and whoever is in them. There is not a thing but celebrates His praise, but you do not understand their glorification.﴿, ﴾Have you not regarded that Allah is glorified by everyone in the heavens and the earth, and the birds spreading their wings. Each knows his prayer and glorification﴿;
- 24. Ibid, 12/213-214.
- 25. Ibid, 12/214.
- 26. Ibid.
- 27. Al-Tibyan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an, 4//127.
- 28. Zad al-Masir fi ʿIlm al-Tafsir, 3/26.
- 29. Al-Jamiʿ li Ahkam al-Qur'an, 6/420.
- 30. Fath al-Ghadir, 2/114.
- 31. Bihar al-Anwar, 7/255; Tafsir al-Qur'an al-ʿAzim, 2/135; Suyuti, Jalal al-Din, Al-Durr al-Manthur fi Tafsir bi al-Ma’thur, 6 vols. Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, 1403, 3/10.
- 32. See: Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an, 7/73-74.
- 33. Q. 4:45.
- 34. Al-Tafsir al-Kabir, 26/284.
- 35. Shirazi, Sadr al-Din Muhammad, Al-Shawahid al-Rububiyya fi al-Manahij al-Sulukiyya, ed. Sayyid Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani, 3rd edition, Bustan-i Kitab Institute, Qum, 1382 sh/2003, p. 105.
- 36. Tabarsi, Ahmad b. ‘Ali, al-Ihtijaj, ed. Sayyid Muhammad Baqir Khursan, 2 vols. Dar al-Nu‘man, Najaf, 1386/1966, 2/97.
- 37. Q. 39:42.
- 38. Q. 32:11.
- 39. For more information, see: Gawhar Murad, p. 631; Ibn Sina, Husayn ‘Abd Allah, Al-Shifa, Ilahiyyat, ed. Ibrahim Madkur, Al-Hay’at al-‘Ammat li Shu’un al-Matabi‘ al-Amiriyya, Cairo, 1380-1960, p. 423; Shirazi, Sadr al-Din Muhammad, Al-Hikmat al-Muti‘aliyya fi Asfar al-‘Arba‘at al-‘Aqliyya, 10 vols. Mashurat Mustafawi, Qum, 1378, 9/165; Bihar al-Anwar, 7/47; Dawani, Muhammad b. Hasan, Sharh al-‘Aqa’id al-‘Adhudiyya, 2 vols. Matba‘atu ‘Uthmaniyya, Istanbul, 1316/1898, 2/247.
- 40. Soul or the non-physical aspect of man has various names such as qalb, ‘aql, and nafs. Human soul is called qalb because it is transformed when encountered with different accidents. Soul is called aql because its duty is thinking (ta‘aqqul) and the brain is the only tool for thinking, that is why although after death the brain is not able to function with the failure of the body, the soul keeps on enjoying perception in the intermediate (purgatory) world (isthmus). Finally, the soul is called nafs when it is related to the material body, because man per se is nothing but a souled body or a body possessing soul.
- 41. Lexically, mujarrad means bare, which in philosophical discourses is taken to mean immaterial, as any object enjoys time and space and therefore if the object is not devoid of time and space, it will not be material.
- 42. Taftazani, Mas‘ud b. ‘Umar, Sharh al-Maqasid, ed. ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Umayra, 5 vols. Manshurat al-Sharif al-Radhi, Qum, 1409/1989, 3/252.
- 43. Ibid.
- 44. See: Bukhari, Muhammad b. Ismaʿil, Al-Adab al-Mufrad, ed. Muhammad Fu’ad ‘Abd al-Baqi, 2nd edition, Al-Kutub al-Thiqafiya Institute, 1401/1981, pp. 263-264, No. 1233-1235.
- 45. Q. 24:41.
- 46. See: Shaykh Baha’i, Muhammad b. Husayn, Miftah al-Falah fi ‘Amal al-Yawm wa al-Layla min al-Wajibat wa al-Mustahabbat wa al-Adab, Mu‘assisat al-A‘lami, Beirut, p. 101.
- 47. Q. 27:16.
- 48. Q. 32:10.
- 49. Q. 27:20-22.
- 50. Q. 27:17.
- 51. Q. 16:68.
- 52. Irbali, ‘Ali b. ‘Isa, Kashf al-Ghumma fi Ma‘rifat al-A’imma, 3 vols. 2nd ed. Dar al-Adhwa’, 1405/1985, 2/77.
- 53. Kafi, 6/539, No. 11.
- 54. Ibn Hazm al-Tahiri, ‘Ali b. Ahmad, Al-Fasl fi al-Milal wa al-Ahwa’ wa Nihal, 5 vols., Maktibat al-Khanji, Cairo, 1/74 and 3/74.
- 55. Jurjani, ‘Ali b. Muhammad, Sharh al-Mawaqif, 8 vols. Matba‘atu Sa‘ada, Egypt, 1325/1907, 8/296.
- 56. Q. 20:15.
- 57. Tusi, Muhammad b. Hasan, Al-Rasa’il al-‘Ashr, ed. Muhammad Va’iz Zada, Jami‘a-yi Mudarrisin, Qum, 1404/1984, p. 313.
- 58. Al-Tafsir al-Kabir, 31/67-68; Majma‘ al-Bahrayn, 1/517.
- 59. Mazandarani, Mowla Muhammad Salih, Sharh-i Usul al-Kafi, with additional notes by Mirza Abulhasan Shaʿrani, 12 vols. n.d, 10/186; Al-Jamiʿ li Ahkam al-Qur'an, 6/421.
- 60. Tabarani, Sulayman b. Ahmad, Musnad al-Shamiyin, ed. Hamdi al-Salafi, 2nd edition, Mu‘assisatu al-Risala, Beirut, 1417/1996, 2/301.
- 61. Bahrani, Maytham b. ‘Ali, Qawa‘id al-Maram fi ‘Ilm al-Kalam, ed. Sayyid Ahmad Husayni, 2nd edition, Ayatollah Marʿashi Library, Qum, 1406/1985, p. 120.
- 62. Al-Tafsir al-Kabir, 12/219.
- 63. Mufid, Muhammad b. Nu‘man, Al-Nukat al-I‘tiqadiyya, Jamiʿa-yi Mudarrisin, Qum, n.d, p. 46.
- 64. Bihar al-Anwar, 7/92, 256, and 276; Al-Tafsir al-Kabir, 12/218; Al-Tibyan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an, 4/129 and 10/281; Majmaʿ al-Bayan fi Tafsir al-Qur’an, 4/49 and 10/277; Tabarsi, Fadhl b. Hasan, Jawami‘ al-Jami‘, 3 vols. Muʿassisa-yi Nashr-i Islami, Qum, 1418/1997, 1/568.
- 65. Al-Tafsir al-Kabir, 12/219.
- 66. Ibid, 12/219.
- 67. Ibid.
- 68. Ibid; Mar‘ashi Najafi, Sayyid Shahab al-Din, Sharh Ihqaq al-Haqq wa Izhaq al-Batil, 33 vols. Ayatollah Mar‘ashi Library, Qum, 16/186.
- 69. Nawawi, Yahya b. Sharaf, Sahih Muslim bi Sharh al-Nawawi (Sharh-i Muslim), 18 vols. Dar al-Kutub al-ʿArabiyya, Beirut, 1407/1987, 16/136.
- 70. Ghazali, Abu Hamid Muhammad b. Muhammad, Qawa‘id al-‘Aqa’id, ed. Musa b. Nasr, 2nd edition, ‘Alam al-Kitab, Beirut, 1985, 1/205; Bihar al-Anwar, 61/7 (Al-Matalib al-‘Aliyya).
- 71. Etymologically, qisas means retribution and in terms of jurisprudence, it means penalty which God (the Lawmaker) has set for specific crimes; see: Fathullah, Ahmad, Muʿjamu Alfadh al-Fiqh al-Jaʿfari, Mtabiʿ al-Madukhal, 1415/1995, p. 153.
- 72. Suyuti, Jalal al-Din, Tafsir al-Jalalayn, ed. Marwan Suwar, Dar al-Ma‘rifa Beirut, p. 793; Fath al-Qadir, 5/388; Al-Jamiʿ li Ahkam al-Qur'an, 19/229; Majmaʿ al-Bayan fi Tafsir al-Qur’an, 10/277; Al-Tibyan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an, 10/281.
- 73. ‘Arusi Huwayzi, ‘Abd ‘Ali b. Jum‘a, Nur al-Thaqalayn, ed. Sayyid Hashim Rasuli, 5 vols. 4th edition, Isma‘iliyan Institute, 1412/1991, 1/715; also see: Hakami, Hafz b. Ahmad, Ma‘arij al-Qabul bi Sharh Sullam al-Wusul ila ‘Ilm al-Usul, ed. ‘Umar b. Mahmud Abu ‘Umar, 3 vols. Dar b. al-Qayyim, Al-Dammam, 1391/1971, 2/831.
- 74. Majmaʿ al-Bayan fi Tafsir al-Qur’an, 16/.
- 75. Sahih Muslim bi Sharh al-Nawawi, 16/137.
- 76. Al-Tafsir al-Kabir, 12/220.
- 77. Majma‘ al-Bahrayn, 1/517.
- 78. Mufid, Muhammad b. Nuʿman, Al-Irshad fi Maʿrifat-i Hujaj Allah ʿala al-ʿIbad, 2 vols. Al al-Bayt (ed.), Dar al-Mufid, Qum, 1413/1992, 2/144.
- 79. Biahr al-Anwar, 7/256; Tabarsi, Fadhl b. Husayn, Majmaʿ al-Bayan fi Tafsir al-Qur’an, 10 vols. Dar Ihya al-Turath al-ʿArabi, 1379/1960., 4/49.
- 80. Nuri Tabarsi, Mirza Husayn, Mustadrak al-Wasa’il wa Mustanbat al-Masa’il, 18 vols. Al al-Bayt Institute, Qum, 1408/1987, 8/304, No. 9507.
- 81. Bihar al-Anwar, 7/276; Nur al-Thaqalayn, 1/715.
- 82. Literally, mi‘raj means ladder; what it means in religio-philosophical terminology is the Holy Prophet’s (S.A.W.) journey from Masjid al-Aqsa in Jerusalem to the Heaven (the unseen world). In the first verse of Surat al-Isra, the Holy Qur’an describes it as follows, ﴾Immaculate is He who carried His servant on a journey by night from the Sacred Mosque (Masjid al-Haram) to the Farthest Mosque (Masjid al-Aqsa) whose environs We have blessed, that We might show him some of Our signs. Indeed He is the All-hearing, the All-seeing.﴿; for more information, see: Ibn Sina, Al-Shifa, Husayn ‘Abd Allah, Mi‘rajnama, ed. Najib Mayil Hiravi, 2nd edition, Islamic Research Foundation of Astan Quds Razavi, 1366 sh/1987.
- 83. Nawawi, Yahya b. Sharaf, Al-Majmuʿ fi Sharh al-Muhadhdhab, 20 vols. Dar al-Fikr, n.p., n.d, 18/319.
- 84. Tamimi, Nuʿman b. Muhammad, Da’a’im al-Islam wa Dhikr al-Halal wa al-Haram wa al-Qadhaya wa al-Ahkam ‘an Ahl-i Bayt-i Rasul Allah ‘Alayhi wa ‘Alayhim Afdhal al-Salam, ed. Asif b. ‘Ali Asghar Faydhi, 2 vols. Dar al-Ma‘arif, Egypt, 1383/1963, 2/468, No. 1666.
- 85. Al-Tafsir al-Kabir, 12/219; Al-Tibyan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an, 10/281.
- 86. Bihar al-Anwar, 7/256; also see: Tafsir al-Jalalayn, p. 167.
- 87. Al-Tafsir al-Kabir, 12/219; Bihar al-Anwar, 7/92 and 61/9; Al-Tibyan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an, 4/130; Majmaʿ al-Bayan fi Tafsir al-Qur’an, 10/277.
- 88. Al-Tafsir al-Kabir, 31/67.
- 89. Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an, 20/214.
- 90. Barqi, Ahmad b. Muhammad, Al-Mahasin, ed. Sayyid Jalal al-Din Husayni, 2 vols. Dar al-Kutub Islamiyya, 2/635-636, No. 133.
- 91. Saduq, Muhammad b. ‘Ali, Man la Yahdhuruhu al-Faqih, ed. ‘Ali Akbar Ghaffari, 4 vols. 2nd edition, Jami‘a-yi Mudarrisin, Qum, 1404/1984, 2/216, No. 2207.
- 92. Saduq, Muhammad b. ‘Ali, ‘Ilal al-Shara’i‘, 2 vols. Maktibatu Haydariyya, Najaf, 1386/1966, 2/438, chap. 179.
- 93. Al-Kafi, 5/3, No. 3.
- 94. Lexically, dabb is an beast that moves slowly with steps close together; see: Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an, 7/72; Fath al-Qadir, 2/113.
- 95. Bihar al-Anwar, 7/255; Faydh Kashani, Mawla Muhsin, Al-Safi fi Tafsir Kalam Allah, 5 vols. Dar al-Murtadha li al-Nashr, n.d, 2/118.
- 96. Q. 24:45.
- 97. Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an, 7/72; Al-Tibyan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an, 4/127; Majmaʿ al-Bayan fi Tafsir al-Qur’an, 4/48.
- 98. Q. 81:6.
- 99. Q. 82:3.
- 100. Q. 52:6.
- 101. For more details, see: Al-Tibyan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an, 10/282; Al-Durr al-Manthur fi al-Tafsir bi al-Ma’thur, 6/318-319; Raghib Isfahani, Husayn b. Muhammad, Al-Mufradat fi Gharib al-Qur'an, Daftar-i Nashr-i Al-Kitab, 1404/1984, p. 224; Tafsir al-Qur'an al-ʿAzim, 4/257 and 508; Tafsir al-Jalalayn, p. 793; Thaʿalibi, ʿAbd al-Rahman, Al-Jawahir al-Hisan fi Tafsir al-Qur’an, ed. ʿAbd al-Fattah Abu Sunna, Dar Ihya’ al-Turath al-ʿArabi, Beirut, 1418/1994, 5/555; Al-Jamiʿ li Ahkam al-Qur'an, 19/230 and 17/61-62; Jamiʿ al-Bayan ʿan Ta’wil Aya al-Qur'an, 30/85 and 27/25; Zad al-Masir fi ʿIlm al-Tafsir, 8/189; Fath al-Qadir, 5/94 and 388; Majmaʿ al-Bayan fi Tafsir al-Qur’an, 10/277; Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an, 19/7.
- 102. Majmaʿ al-Bayan fi Tafsir al-Qur’an, 4/48.
- 103. Al-Tafsir al-Kabir, 31./67; Tafsir al-Qur'an al-ʿAzim, 4/508.
- 104. Al-Shawahid al-Rububiyya fi al-Manahij al-Sulukiyya, p. 400; Al-Hikmat al-Muti‘aliya fi al-Asfar al-Arba‘at al-‘Aqliyya, 9/248-50.
- 105. See: Aflatun, Jumhuri, W.K.C. Guthrie, trans. Hasan Fathi, Fikr-i Ruz Publication, book six.
- 106. See: Al-Shifa, Al-Ilahiyyat, pp. 310-324; Suhrawardi, Shahab al-Din, Hikmat al-Ishraq, ed. and introduction by Henry Corbin, Humanities and Cultural Studies Resesarch Center, 3rd, Tehran, 1380 sh/2001, pp. 92-93; Al-Shawahid al-Rububiyya fi al-Manahij al-Sulukiyya, pp. 256-263; Al-Hikmat al-Muti‘aliya fi Asfar al-‘Arba‘at al-‘Aqliyya, 5/214, 2/77, and 3/504-505.
- 107. Bigdili, Lutf‘ali Baig, Atashkada-yi Adhar, edited and researched by Hasan Sadat Nasiri, Amir Kabir Publication, Tehran, 1338 sh/1959, 2/794-795.
- 108. See: Sharh al-Maqasid, 2/364.
- 109. Al-Hikmat al-Muta’aliya fi Asfar al-‘Arba‘at al-‘Aqliyya, 9/175; Shirazi, Sadr al-Din Muhammad, Al-Mabda‘ wa al-Ma‘ad, ed. Sayyid Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani, 3rd edition, Islamic Propagation Office, Qum, 1422/2001, pp. 524-526.
- 110. Siyasat-i Madaniyya, p. 76.
- 111. For further information, see: Rabbani Gulpaygani, ‘Ali, Husn wa Qubh-i ‘Aqli, Cultural Studies and Research Institute, Tehran, 1368 sh/1989, pp. 11-12.
- 112. In logic, inherent (fitri) is applied to the propositions that once the object of desire crosses the mind, the latter may confirm it without need for deliberation; see: Muzaffar, Muhammad Ridha, Al-Mantiq, 2 vols. 3rd edition, Matba‘atu Nu‘man, Najaf, 1388/1968, 2/322.
- 113. Hilli, Hasan b. Yusuf, Al-Rasai’l al-Sa‘diyya, ed. ‘Abd al-Husayn Muhammad ‘Ali Baqqal, Nashr-i Islami Institute, Qum, 1410/1990. Ayatollah Marʿashi Library, Qum, 1410/1989, p. 54.
- 114. Al-Sara’ir al-Hawi li Tahrir al-Fatawi, 3/490, 458; Al-Sharif al-Murtadha, Rasa’il Al-Sharif al-Murtadha, ed. Sayyid Mahdi Raja’i, 4 vols. Dar al-Qur’an, Qum, 1405/1984 2/372; Ahmad al-Murtadha, Sharh al-Azhar, 4 vols. Ghadhan San’a, 1400/1979, 1/26.
- 115. Rasa’il al-Sharif al-Murtadha, 2/373.
- 116. See: Sharh al-Mustalahat al-Kalamiyya, Majma‘ al-Buhuth al-Islamiyya, Mashhad, 1415/1994, p. 242.
- 117. Rasa’il al-Sharif al-Murtadha, 1/429 and 2/373.
- 118. For further details, see: Rasa’il al-Sharif al-Murtadha, 2/372-373; Shifa’ al-‘Alil, pp. 216-217.
- 119. Al-Kafi, 6/155-254.
- 120. Bihar al-Anwar, 61/299.
- 121. Da’a’im al-Islam, 2/177, No. 638.
- 122. Hilli, Hasan b. Yusuf, Mukhtalaf al-Shiʿa, 9 vols. Muʿassisa-yi Nashr-i Islami, Qum, 1412/1992, 5/12.
- 123. Sarakhsi, Shams al-Din, Al-Mabsut, 30 vols. Dar al-Ma‘rifa, Beirut, 1406/1985, 11/220-221.
- 124. ‘Asqalani, Ibn Hajar, Fath al-Bari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari, 13 vols. 2nd edition, n.d, 9/504.
- 125. It means creating a fissure on the right part of a camel’s hump and spreading the blood over its hump during the Hajj pilgrimage in order to specify that the camel is being taken to the Hajj ritualsfor sacrifice. See: Muʿjamu Alfadh al-Fiqh al-Jaʿfari, p. 54; ʿAllama Hilli, Hasan b. Yusuf, Tahrir al-Ahkam, 2 vols. Lithography, Al al-Bayt Institute, Mashhad, n.d, 1/107.
- 126. Kashani, Abu Bakr b. Masʿud, Bada’i‘ al-Sana’i‘ fi Tartib al-Shara’i‘, 7 vols. Al-Maktibat al-Habibiyya, Pakistan, 1409/1989, 2/162; Ibn Qudama, ʿAbd al-Rahman, Al-Sharh al-Kabir, 12 vols. Dar al-Kutub al-ʿArabi, n.d, 3/577.
- 127. Hilli, Al-Hasan b. Yusuf, Muntaha al-Matlab, 2 vols. Haj Ahmad Publication, Tabriz, 1333 sh/1954, 2/753; Hilli, Hasan b. Yusuf, Tadhkirat al-Fuqaha, 2 vols. Makyabat al-Radhawiyya li Ihya’ al-Athar al-Jaʿfariyya, n.d, 1/386; Ibn Qudama, ʿAbd Allah b. Ahmad, Al-Mughni, 12 vols. Dar al-Kutub al-ʿArabi, Beirut, n.d, 3/574.
- 128. Tusi, Muhammad b. Hasan, Al-Mabsut fi fiqh al-Imamiyya, ed. Muhammad Tqi Kashfi, 8 vols, Al-Maktabat al-Murtadhawiyya, Tehran, 1387/1967, 1/316; Shara’i‘ al-Islam fi Masa’il al-Halal wa al-Haram, 1/176; ‘Amili, Zayn al-Din b. ‘Ali, Masalik al-Afham ila Tanqih Shara’i‘ al-Islam, 15 vols. Mu‘assisat al-Ma‘arif al-Islamiyya, 1413/1992, 7/196.
- 129. Malik b. Anas, Al-Mudwwanat al-Kubra, 6 vols., Alsa‘ada, Egypt, 1/451; Al-Hattab al-Ru‘ayni, Muhammad b. Muhammad, Mawahib al-Jalil bi Sharh Mukhtasar Khalil, ed. Zakaria ‘Umayrat, 8 vols. Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, 1416/1995, 4/280.
- 130. Al-Dasuqi, Muhammad ‘Arafa, Sashiya al-Dasuqi ‘ala SharH al-Kabir, ed. Muhammad ‘Alish, 4 vols. 2/89, Dar al-Fikr, Beirut, nd.; Tahrir al-Ahkam, 1/107; Ibn Hazm Andulusi, Al-Muhalla, ed. Ahmad Muhammad Shakir, 11 vols. Beirut, Dar al-Fikr, 6/4, 7/99, and 7/112.
- 131. Halabi, Abu al-Salah Taqi b. Najm, Taqrib al-Ma‘arif, ed. Faris Tabriziyan, Maktaba Amir al-Mu’minin, Isfahan, 1417/1996, p. 135; Qawa‘id al-Maram fi ‘Ilm al-Kalam, p. 119.
- 132. Taqrib al-Ma‘arif, p. 135; Qawa‘id al-Maram fi ‘Ilm al-Kalam, p. 119.
- 133. Ibn al-Jawzi, ‘Abd al-Rahman b. ‘Ali, Al-Thubat ‘ind al-Mamamat, ed. ‘Abd Alla al-Laythi al-Ansari, Mu’assisat al-Kutub al-Thiqafiyya, 1406/1985, p. 60.
- 134. In various works of the Ash‘arites, different issues have been referred to for denying the rationality of the inherent good and evil and proving their legality. For further information about the Ash‘arites’ resaons as well as their critique, see: Husn wa Qubh-i ‘Aqli, pp. 81-110.
- 135. Ghayat al-Maram, p.322.
- 136. Amidi, ‘Ali b. Muhammad, Al-Ahkam fi Usul al-Ahkam, 4 vols. 2nd edition, Al-Maktab al-Islami, Damascus, 1402/1981, 1/85-86; Ghayat al-Maram, p. 238; Ghazali, Muhammad b. Muhammad, Al-Mustasfa fi ‘Ilm al-Usul, Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya Beirut, 1417/1996, p. 46.
- 137. Abu al-Faraj, ‘Abd al-Rahman b. ‘Ali, Talbis Iblis, ed. Dr. Al-Sayyid al-Jamili, Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-‘Arabi, Beirut, 1405/1985, p. 84.
- 138. Al-Baqalani, Abu Bakr Muhammad b. al-Tayyib, Tamhid al-Awa’il wa Talkhis al-Dala’il, ed. ‘Imad al-Din Ahmad Haydar, Al-Kutub al-Thiqafiya Institute, Beirut, 1981, pp. 141-142.
- 139. Tamhid al-Awa’il wa Talkhis al-Dala’il, pp. 384-385; al-Mustasfa fi ‘Ilm al-Usul, p. 46-47.
- 140. Qawa‘id al-‘Aqa’id, pp 204-205; Tamhid al-Awa’il wa Talkhis al-Dala’il, pp. 382-383 and 138; Ghayat al-Maram, p. 244.
- 141. Karami, Mar‘i b. Yusuf b. Abi Bakr, Raf‘ al-Shubha wa Gharar ‘amman Yahtajju ‘ala Fi‘l al-Ma‘asi bi al-Qadar, ed. As‘ad Muhammad al-Maghribi, Dar Harra’, Makkat al-Mukarrama, 1410/1989, p. 57.
- 142. Ibn Taymiya al-Harrani, Ahmad b. ʿAbd al-Halim, Kutub wa Rasa’il wa Fatawa-yi Ibn Taymiya fi ‘Aqida, ed. ‘Abd al-Rahman Muhammad Qasim al-Najdi, 7 vols. Maktiba Ibn Taymiya, 6/127; ‘Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad, Abu Sa‘id, Al-Ghunyatu fi Usul al-Din, ed. ‘Imad al-Din Ahmad Haydar, Mu‘assisat al-Khadamat wa al-Abhath al-Thiqafiyya, 1987, p. 149; Al-Fasl fi al-Milal wa al-Ahwa’ wa al-Nihal, 3/64.
- 143. Muzaffar, Muhammad Ridha, Usul al-Fiqh, 2 vols. 4th edition, Islamic Propagation Office, Qum, 1370 sh/1991, 1/208; it seems we can regard these types of propositions as among the “self evident” propositions which are evident; hence, no need to return them to the sensual affections; for more information, see: Husn wa Qubh-i ‘Aqli, pp. 49-66.
- 144. Taqrib al-Ma‘arif, p. 134
- 145. This claim is apt to come up with since moral good and evil refer to “justice” and “injustice”. See: Isfahani, Muhammad Husayn, Nihayat al-Diraya fi Sharh al-Kifaya, Lithography, Mahdavi Publications, Isfahan, 1418/1997, 2/128.
- 146. Q. 7:33.
- 147. Q. 16:90.
- 148. Q. 7:157.
- 149. Q. 7:28.
- 150. Al-Sara’ir al-Hawi li Tahrir al-Fatawi, 3/464.
- 151. Q. 16:5-8.
- 152. Bahrani, Yusuf, Al-Hada’iq al-Nadhira fi Ahkam al-ʿItrat al-Tahira, ed. Muhammad Taqi Iravani, 20 vols. Nanshr-i Islami Publication, Qum, 14014/1984, 25/143; Nawawi, Yahya b. Sharaf, Rawdhat al-Talibin, ed. ʿAdil Ahmad ʿAbd al-Mawjud, 8 vols. Dar al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, Beirut, n.d, 6/524; Najafi, Muhammad Hasan, Jawahir al-Kalam fi Sharh Shara’iʿ al-Islam, ed. Shaykh ʿAbbas Quchani, 43 vols. 3rd edition, Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyya, 1409/1988, 31/397; ʿAmili, Muhammad, Nihayat al-Maram fi Sharh-i Mukhtasar Shara’iʿ al-Islam, ed. Mujtaba ʿIraqi, 2 vols. Muʿassisa-yi Nashr-i Islami, Qum, 1413/1992, 1/491; Bahuti, Mansur b. Yunus, Kashshaf al-Qina‘, 6 vols. Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyya, Beirut, 1418/1997, 5/852.
- 153. Raf‘ al-Shubha wa Gharar ‘amman Yahtajju ‘ala Fi‘l al-Ma‘asi bi al-Qadar, 57.
- 154. Ghayat al-Maram, p 245.
- 155. Al-Ghazali, Muhammad b. Muhammad, Al-Maqsad al-Asna fi Sharh Ma‘ani Asma Allah al-Husna, ed. Bassam ‘Abd al-Wahab al-Jabi, Al-Jaffan wa al-Jabi, Cypress, 1407/1987, p. 85.