Table of Contents

Chapter 24: Miskawaih

By Abdurrahman Badawi

Life

Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Ya`qub, surnamed Miskawaih, is also called Abu 'Ali al-Khazin. It is yet undecided whether he was himself Miskawaih or the son of (ibn) Miskawaih. Some like Margoliouth and Bergstrasser accept the first alternative; others, like Brockelmann,1 the second.

Yaqut says that he was first a Magi (majusi) and was later converted to Islam. But this might be true of his father, for Miskawaih himself, as his name shows, was the son of a Muslim father, Muhammad by name.

He studied history, particularly al-Tabari's “Annals,” with Abu Bakr Ahmad ibn Kamil al-Qadi (350/960). Ibn al-Khammar, the famous commentator of Aristotle's, was his master in philosophical disciplines. Miskawaih engaged himself too much in the study of alchemy, together with Abu al-Tayyib al-Razi, the alchemist. From certain statements of Ibn Sina2 and al-Tauhidi,3 it seems that they had a poor opinion of his aptitude for speculative philo­sophy. Iqbal, on the other hand, regarded him as one of the most eminent theistic thinkers, moralists, and historians of Persia.4

Miskawaih lived for seven years in the company of Abu al-Fadl ibn al-'Amid as his librarian. After the death of Abu al-Fadl (360/970) he served under his son Abu al-Fath `Ali ibn Muhammad ibn al-'Amid, surnamed Dhu al­-Kifayatain. It seems that he also served 'Adud al-Daulah, one of the Buwai­hids, and later some other princes of that famous family.

Miskawaih died on the 9th of Safar 421/16th of February 1030. The date of his birth is uncertain. Margoliouth gives it to be 330/941, but we think it should be 320/932 if not earlier, because he used to be in the company of al-Muhallabi, the vizier, who rose to the office in 339/950 and died in 352/963, by which time he must have been at least nineteen.

Works

Yaqut5 gives a list of thirteen books attributed to Miskawaih. These are: 1. Al-Fauz al-Akbar.
2. Al-Fauz al-Asghar.
3. Tajarib al-Umam (a history from the Deluge down to 369/979).
4. Uns al-Farid (a collection of anecdotes, verses, maxims, and proverbs).
5. Tartib al-Sa`adah (on ethics and politics).
6. Al-Mustaufa (selected verses).
7. Jawidan Khirad (a collection of maxims of wisdom).
8. Al-Jami`.
9. Al-Siyar (on the conduct of life).

Of the above works al-Qifti 6 mentions only 1, 2, 3 and 4 and adds the following:

10. “On the Simple Drugs” (on medicine).
11. “On the Composition of the Bajats” (on culinary art).
12. Kitab al-Ashribah (on drinks).
13. Tahdhib al-Akhlaq (on ethics).

Numbers 2, 3, 13 are now extant and have been published. We also have five others which are not mentioned by Yagiit and al-Qifti. These are:

14. Risalah fi al-Ladhdhat w-al-Alam fi Jauhar al-Nafs (MS. in Istanbul, Raghib Majmu`ah No. 1463, f. 57a-59a).

15. Ajwibah wa As'ilah fi al-Nafs w-al-`Aql (in the above-mentioned Majmu`ah in Raghib, Istanbul).

16. Al-Jawab fi al-Masa'il al-Thalath (MS. in Teheran - Fihrist Maktabat al-Majlis, II, No, 634[31]).

17. Risalah fi Jawab fi Su'al 'Ali Ibn Muhammad Abu Hayyan al-Sufi fi Haqiqat al.'Aql, (Meshed Library in Iran, I, No. 43[137)).

18. Taharat al-Nafs, (MS. in Koprulu, Istanbul, No. 767).

Muhammad Baqir ibn Zain al-'Abidin al-Khawansari attributes to him also some treatises written in Persian (Raudat al-Jannah, Teheran, 1287/1870, p. 70).

As to the chronological order of his works, we know only from Miskawaih himself that al-Fauz al-Akbar was written after al-Fauz al-Asghar, and that Tahdhib al-Akhlaq was written after Tartib al-Sa`adah.7

Miskawaih's Personality

Miskawaih was essentially a historian and moralist. He was also a poet. Tauhidi blames him for his miserliness and hypocrisy. He indulged in alchemy not for the sake of science, but in search of gold and wealth, and was most servile to his masters. But Yaqut mentions that in later years he subjected himself to a fifteen-point code of moral conduct.8 Temperance in appetites, courage in subduing the ferocious self, and wisdom in regulating the irrational impulses were the highlights of this code. He himself speaks of his moral transformation in his Tahdhib al-Akhlaq,9 which shows that he practised a good deal of what he wrote on ethics.

Philosophy

First Philosophy

The most important part of Miskawaih's philosophical activity is dedicated to ethics. He is a moralist in the full sense of the word. Three important books of his on ethics have come down to us: (1) Tartib al-Sa`adah, (2) Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, and (3) Jawidan Khirad.

Miskawaih's al-Fauz al-Asghar is a general treatise similar in conception to the earlier part of al-Farabi's Ara' Ahl al-Madinat al-Fadilah. It is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the proofs of the existence of God, the second with soul and its modes, and the third with prophethood.

For his treatment of philosophy, he owes much to al-Farabi, particularly in his effort to conciliate Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus. His historical turn of mind has been of benefit to him, for he generally refers precisely to his sources. For instance, at the end of Chapter V of the first part of al-Fauz al-Asghar10 he expressly acknowledges his indebtedness to Porphyry. He also quotes the commentators of Plato11 and Aristotle.12 His is the best expose (pp. 53-55) of Plato's proof concerning the immortality of the soul. He benefits especially from the book of Proclus entitled Kitab Sharh Qaul Flatun fi al Nafs Ghair Maitah.13

The first part of Fauz al-Asghar dealing with the demonstration of the existence of God is clear, terse, and solid. His argument here is that of the First Mover, which was most popular at the time. In that he is thoroughly Aristotelian. The fundamental attributes of God are: unity, eternity, and immateriality. Miskawaih devotes the whole of Chapter VIII to the problem of defining God affirmatively or negatively, and concludes that the negative way is the only possible way. He also shows Neo-Platonic tendencies noticeably in Chapter IX.

He says that the first existent which emanates from God is the first intelligence which (so says Miskawaih rather strangely) is the same as the active intellect. It is eternal, perfect in existence, and immutable in state, because “emanation is connected with it in a continuous way eternally, the source of emanation being eternal and wholly generous.” It is, perfect in comparison with beings inferior to it, imperfect in comparison with God.

Then comes the celestial soul inferior to intelligence; it needs motion as expression of desire for perfection in imitation of intelligence. But it is perfect in relation to natural bodies. The sphere comes into being through the celestial soul. In comparison with the soul, it is imperfect and so needs the motion of which the body is capable, i, e., the motion in space. The sphere has the circular motion which assures it of the eternal existence assigned to it by God. Through the sphere and its parts our bodies come into being. Our being is very weak because of the long chain of intermediaries between God and us. For the same reason it is changeable and not eternal. All classes of beings come to be through God, and it is His emanating being and permeating might which conserve order in the cosmos. If God abstains from this emanation, nothing will come into existence.

As. a true religious thinker, Miskawaih tries to prove that creation comes ex nihilo. He mentions that Galen said something against this view, but was refuted by Alexander of Aphrodisias in a special treatise.14 The argument given by Miskawaih is as follows: Forms succeed each other, the substratum remaining constant. In this change from one form to another, where do the preceding forms go?

The two forms cannot remain together because they are contrary. Secondly, the first form cannot go elsewhere, because motion in place applies only to bodies, and accidents cannot go from one place to another. There remains only one possibility - the possibility that the first form goes into nothing. If it is proved that the first form goes to Non-Being, then the second form comes and so the third, the fourth, and so on also from nothing. Therefore, all things generated are generated from nothing.

Aristotle conceived of the universe as a process of becoming. The “nature” of each thing is a potentiality which moves through a process of development to an actuality which is its final nature. The movement is towards an end immanent from the first in the subject of movement. An altogether different theory appears in the fiftieth “Epistle” of the Brethren of Purity (Ikhwan al-Safa), where the process of evolution has been shown to advance from the mineral to the human stage under the guidance of the spiritual urge for return to God.15

The Brethren of Purity used this theory to determine the status of prophet­hood. Miskawaih goes further and finds in it a stable basis for his moral theory as well.16 Like Aristotle he does regard happiness (sa`adah) as the chief human good, but unlike him he identifies it in the end with the realization of the vicegerency of God, the place which man occupies in the cosmic evolution by virtue of his specific attribute of rationality.

Miskawaih's theory of evolution is basically the same as that of the Brethren of Purity. It consists of four evolutionary stages: the mineral, the vegetable, the animal, and the human. Coral (marjan), date-palm, and ape (qird) mark the transition from the mineral to the vegetable, from the vegetable to the animal, and from the animal to the human kingdom, respectively. The prophet, in the end, completes the circle of Being by imbibing the celestial soul within him.

Psychology

Miskawaih's psychology is based on the traditional spiritual­istic doctrine laid down by Plato and Aristotle, with a predominant Platonic tendency. He treats the subject in al-Fauz al-Asghar and Tahdhib al-Akhlaq. In the first of these works he discusses the problems more thoroughly. But he repeats himself on many points in both the books; in both we have the same arguments, the same examples, and nearly the same words.

Against the materialists he proves the existence of the soul on the ground that there is something in man which admits different and even opposed forms at the same time. This something cannot be material, for matter accepts only one form in a determinate moment.

The soul perceives simple and complex things, present and absent, sensible and intelligible. But does it perceive them through one and the same faculty, or through many faculties? Soul has no parts; divisibility applies only to matter. Does the soul, in spite of being one and indivisible, perceive different things with different faculties and in different ways? In answering this question, Miskawaih gives two different solutions: that of Plato, who says that similar perceives similar, and that of Aristotle who says that soul has one faculty that perceives complex material things and simple non-material things, but in different ways. In this connection Miskawaih mentions Themistius and his book “On Soul.”

On the question of the immortality of the soul, Miskawaih gives at first17 Aristotle's doctrine. Then he gives (Chapter VI) three arguments of Plato; referring first to Plato himself, then to Proclus' “Commentary on Plato's Doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul,”18 and finally to something that Galen said on this question.

Miskawaih says that Plato's doctrine is too long and needs a commentary; therefore, he attempts to summarize it as clearly as possible, with the help of Proclus' “Commentary.” In this and the following chapters (VII, VIII) he is a thorough Platonist and makes a special mention of Plato's Laws and Timaeus.

Plato says that the essence of the soul is motion, and motion is the life of the soul. Miskawaih explains and says: This motion is of two kinds: one towards intelligence, the other towards matter; by the first it is illuminated, by the second it illuminates. But this motion is eternal and non-spatial, and so it is immutable. By the first kind of motion, the soul comes near to intelligence which is the first creation of God; by the second it descends and comes out of itself. Therefore, the soul comes nearer to God by the first motion, and goes farther by the second. The first leads to its salvation, the second to its perdition.

Quoting Plato19 he says that philosophy is an exercise of voluntary death. There are two kinds of life: life according to intelligence, which is “natural life,” and life according to matter, which is voluntary life. The same applies to death; therefore, Plato says. If you die by will, you live by nature. Here “will” is taken in the sense of “passion.”

But Miskawaih at once corrects himself by saying that this voluntary death does not mean renunciation of the world; that would be the attitude of those who know nothing about the objects of this world and ignore that man is civil by nature and cannot live without the help and service of others. Those who preach renunciation are iniquitous, because they want the services of others without rendering any service to them and this is complete injustice. Some pretend that they need very little, but even this very little needs the services of a great number of people. Therefore, it is the duty of every human being to serve others fairly: if he serves them much he can demand much; and if he serves them little, he can ask for little.

This is an important aspect of Miskawaih's philosophical view, and explains his great interest in ethics.

Moral Philosophy

Moral philosophy is so connected with psychology that Miskawaih begins his big treatise on ethics Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, by stating his doctrine of the soul. Here his expose is less philosophical but richer in detail.

The point of transition from psychology to ethics is given on pages 18 to 21 where, following Plato, be draws a parallel between the faculties of the soul and the corresponding virtues.20 The soul has three faculties: rational, coura­geous, and appetitive, and correspondingly three virtues: wisdom, courage, and temperance. By the harmony of these three virtues, we have a fourth one, namely, justice. The Greek temperament being theoretical and speculative,21 Plato could go no farther than this.

Equipped with a personal code of moral conduct, Miskawaih determined seven species of wisdom, viz., acuteness of intelligence, quickness of intellect, clearness of understanding, facility of acquirement, precision of discrimination, retention, and recollection; eleven species of courage, viz., magnanimity, collectedness, loftiness of purpose, firmness, coolness, stateliness, boldness, endurance, condescension, zeal, and mercy; twelve species of temperance, viz., shame, affability, righteousness, conciliatoriness, continence, patience, contentment, sedateness, piety, regulari­ty, integrity, and liberality (which is further divided into six sub-species) ; and nineteen species of justice, viz., friendship, union, faithfulness, compassion, brotherhood, recompense, good partnership, fair-dealing, cordiality, sub­mission, resignation, devotion to God, forgetting of enmity, abstention from speaking ill of others, discussing the character of the just, ignoring the account of the unjust, and abstention from trusting the ignoble, the mischief­-monger, and the flatterer.22

We, however, cannot determine exactly whether these sub-divisions and distinctions are all Miskawaih's own. Surely he bene­fited himself much from his predecessors, and especially from the school of Abu Sulaiman al-Sijistani al-Mantiqi, the echo of whose works we find in Tauhidi's Muqabasat.

So far Miskawaih has been Platonic, but from page 29 onward he begins to be Aristotelian, and takes virtue as a mean between two vices. He applies this doctrine of the mean to the four cardinal virtues, and with this he ends the first chapter.

In the second chapter, Miskawaih goes on to discuss the question of human nature and its original state: whether it is born good or bad. He states the opinion of the early Greeks who say that nature can never be changed, but rejects it. Then he takes up the view of the Stoics who think that men are created good but become bad by their inclination to bad appetites and by keeping bad company. There is also a third opinion that men are created bad and they become good only by education. Galen rejects the last two views and says that men are of three kinds: some are good by nature, others are bad by nature, and a third class is intermediate between the two.

Finally, Miskawaih states the opinion of Aristotle as given in the Nicomachean Ethics, and gives his own view that “the existence of the human substance depends on God's will, but the amelioration of it is left to man and depends on man's will” (p. 46).

Perfection attainable by man is of two kinds: the first is theoretical and the second practical. By the first he attains perfect science, by the second perfect character. Human faculties are three; the highest is reason, the lowest is appetite, and between the two lies courage. Man is man by the first. There­fore, perfection belongs especially to the rational soul. In each faculty there are many degrees, which Miskawaih enumerates in detail. Here (pp. 67-78) we find a long chapter on the education of children and youth.

The essential part of Miskawaih's ethics begins from the third chapter (pp. 90 et sqq.). In the first place he follows Aristotle as commented upon by Porphyry. It seems that he depends entirely on the commentary of Porphyry on Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics, which was translated into Arabic by Ishaq ibn Hunain, in twelve books.23 Unfortunately, this commentary is lost both in Greek and its Arabic translation. But we can gather something of its form from Miskawaih's Tahdhib al-Akhlaq.

Following Aristotle, Miskawaih says (p. 90) that the good is that at which all things aim. This definition, which is supposed to be perhaps that of Eudoxus (c. 25 B. C.), is given in the very beginning of the Nichomachean Ethics.24 Miskawaih goes on then to say that what is useful to this end may also be called good, i. e., the means as well as the end can be called good. But happiness or well-being is a relative good - good for an individual person. It is only a kind of good and has no distinctive and autonomous essence.

Miskawaih, like Aristotle,25 gives a classification of happiness but adds more details, perhaps taken from Porphyry's commentary. This classification com­prises (1) health, (2) wealth, (3) fame and honour, (4) success, and (5) good thinking.

After giving Aristotle's doctrine of happiness, Miskawaih states the views of Hippocrates, Pythagoras, Plato, the Stoics, and some physicians who believed that body is a part and not an instrument of man, and so held that happiness of the soul is incomplete if it is not accompanied by happiness of the body.

Miskawaih discusses these different doctrines and concludes by saying that we should reject the doctrine according to which happiness can come only after death and affirm that it is possible also in this world. No happiness is possible except by searching for the good in this world and the world to come. Here he affirms anew his two-fold Anschauung. But as a true religious man he gives preference to the next world.

In support of this, he refers to the translation by Abu `Uthman al-Dimashqi of a treatise called “Virtues of the Soul” attributed to Aristotle. We find this treatise attributed to Aristotle nowhere else. There are two kinds of happiness, one according to this world, the other according to the next, but no one can have the second without passing through the first (p. 111), because, as Aristotle said, divine happiness, notwithstanding being higher and nobler, is yet in need of worldly happi­ness; otherwise, it would remain hidden.

The fourth chapter deals mainly with justice and explains in detail what is meant by it. Here again he follows the corresponding parts in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.26

In the fifth chapter he goes on to speak about friendship and love. A striking passage in this part is about two kinds of love: (a) love of man for God, and (b) love of disciple for master. The first is too high to be attained by mortal beings, and is reserved only for a few. As to the second kind of love, Miskawaih draws a parallel between the son's love for his parents and the disciple's love for his master, and says that the latter is nobler and more generous, because masters educate our souls and by their guidance we obtain real happiness. The master is a “spiritual father and a human lord; his goodness for the disciple is divine goodness, because he brings him up on virtues, feeds him with high wisdom, and conducts him to everlasting life in eternal blessing” (p. 175).

Friendship, in general, is most sacred and useful to all human beings. He who betrays it is more wicked than a counterfeiter of coins. A good man is a friend to himself and other people are also friends to him; he has no enemy except the bad. The happy man is he who gains friends and tries his best to be of use to them.

Miskawaih quotes Aristotle saying that man is in need of friends in good as well as in bad circumstances. Even a king is in need of friends because he cannot know his people's needs except through sincere friends, especially because they supply him information and help in execution of his orders. Man should do his best to please his friends and to be always on good terms with them without hypocrisy and flattery.

Miskawaih's treatment of justice ('adl) is largely Aristotelian, although for him this virtue is a shadow of divine unity,27 the true equipoise. The knowledge of the mean or the limit that moderation would set in each particular case is a prerequisite of justice, but, unlike Aristotle, he assigns this function to the divine code rather than to reason or prudence.28 The king as the deputy of God can exercise royal discretion in minor details according to the exigencies of time and place, without violating the spirit of the divine code.

Aristotle recognized benevolence vaguely in the imperfect form of liberality which for him meant giving to “proper persons, in right proportion, at right times.” With Ibn Miskawaih, it is such an excess over the just award as would eliminate all possibility of under-estimation in justice, provided that its prejudicial effects are confined to the rights of the benevolent person himself only and the recipient himself is a worthy choice for it. Charity, thus, is a form of justice which is safe from disturbance.29

Similarly, love, according to him, is not an extension of self-love, as held by Aristotle, but a limitation of it and love for another. He regards affection (mahabbah) as an inborn capacity for associating with mankind in general, but confines friendship (sadaqah) to a few individuals, basing it on the considerations of profit, pleasure, or good as conceived by Aristotle. Love (`ishq) being the excessive desire for pleasure or good - the consideration of profit is alien to love - cannot extend beyond two individuals.30

The object of animal love is pleasure and that of the spiritual love is virtue or goodness. The former is condemnable, the latter praiseworthy. He makes a specific mention of the love of man for God, of disciple for teacher, and of son for his parents in a graded series, as pointed out earlier. Justice, he concludes, is brought about through fear and force, but affection is a natural source of unity, so that justice is not required where affection reigns supreme. Affection, thus, is the sovereign; justice is the vicegerent.

As in al-Fauz al-Asghar, so in Tahdhib al-Akhlaq (pp. 195-96) Miskawaih is against all forms of ascetic life, because ascetics “sever themselves from all the moral virtues mentioned above. How can he who retires from men and lives in isolation be temperate, just, generous, or courageous? Is he anything other than something inorganic and dead?” 31 Divine happiness is the ultimate goal and the good of man. It belongs to man's divine part. It is pure good, while reason is the first good.

Spiritual Medicine

The last two chapters of Tahdhib al-Akhlaq are devoted to what may be called spiritual medicine, a phrase which we find for the first time as the title of Muhammad ibn Zakariya al-Razi's famous book: al-Tibb al-Ruhani. Miskawaih uses the phrase Tibb al-Nufus (p. 205), but the re­semblance in the general treatment of the subject is, obvious. This implies that Miskawaih is undoubtedly acquainted with al-Razi's treatise, although he does not mention him by name.

The two begin by saying that the master­ing of one's passion is the essential foundation of spiritual hygiene. Both refer to Galen's book “On Knowing One's Own Defects.” (This work was translated into Arabic by Thuma and revised by Hunain.32) But, whereas al-Razi contents himself with what Galen says in this respect, Miskawaih contends it by saying that there does not exist a friend who can find for you your defects, and that an enemy is more useful in this respect than a friend (p. 200) because he is more aware of your vices and would have no hesitation in revealing them to you.

In this connection Miskawaih recommends the study of another of Galen's treatise: “That Good People Benefit from Their Enemies,” which deals with this topic and is also mentioned by al-Razi.33 Miskawaih then refers to al-Kindi, who, in effect, said that the man who is in search of virtue should realize that the images of his acquaintances are mirrors in which are reflected the evils arising out of pains and passions.

In the end, Miskawaih speaks of remedies for the diseases of the soul. He enumerates the most important diseases - anger, vanity, contentiousness, treason, cowardice, vainglory, fear. and sadness - and deals with their treat­ment. Some of his chapters correspond with some chapters in al-Razi's Tibb, namely, those on vanity, sadness, and fear of death. He also reproduces some passages from al-Kindi's treatise “On the Rejection of Sadness” (p. 256).

Why does not Miskawaih mention Muhammad ibn Zakariya al-Razi? It is because al-Razi's conclusions and method of treatment were quite contrary to his own. Al-Kindi, on the other hand, was a kindred spirit. Al-Razi was bold, rationalistic, and abstruse, whereas al-Kindi was moderate, pious, and more accessible.

We have all along been showing what Miskawaih owes to his Greek pre­decessors, but we should not forget that Islamic culture also has an important influence on him. In supporting some ideas which he expounds, he very often quotes the Qur'an, traditions (ahadith) of the Prophet, sayings of Ibn Abi Talib and al-Hasan al-Basri, besides Arabic poetry.

Philosophy of History

Miskawaih is essentially a historian and moralist. His ethics is genetic34 (being based on the place and position of man in the cosmic evolution), religious, and practical in character. He even felt it necessary to reform himself morally before writing his Tahdhib al-Akhlaq.35 In history, his point of view is philosophical, scientific, and critical. Anticipating the modern outlook, he determines both the function of history and the duties of the historian as follows.

History is not an amusing tale about the royal personages, but a mirror of the politico-economic structure of society in a particular age. It is a record of the rise and fall of civilizations, nations, and States.36

In order to realize this end, the historian should scrupulously guard himself against the common tendency of mixing up facts with fiction or pseudo-events. He should not only be factual but also critical in collecting his data.37

Above all, he should not be content with the mere descriptions of facts, but, with a philosophic insight, should interpret them in terms of the underlying “human interests,” their immediate causal determinants.38 In history as in nature, there is no room for chance or accident.

History, thus, is no longer a collection of static and isolated facts, but a dynamic process of creative human hopes and aspirations. It is a living and growing organism, whose structure is determined by the basic ideals and the ideals of nations and States. It not only binds together the facts of the past into an organic whole, but also determines the shape of things to come. The very title of his monumental work, Tajarib al-Umam (The Experiences of the Nations) is itself suggestive of its aims and method, which, in the words of Leon Caetani, are “much akin to the principles followed by Western and more modern historians.”39

Bibliography

A. Works

Tahdhib al-Akhlaq wa Tathir al-A'raq, Cairo, 1347/1928 (also many previous editions); al-Fauz al-Asghar, Beirut, 1319/1901, Cairo, 1325/1907; Jawidan Khirad, edited with a long introduction (in which one finds a comprehensive bibliography with indication of manuscripts and sources) and the commentary by Abdur­rahman Badawi, Cairo, 1372/1952; Tajarib al-Umam wa Ta'aqub al-Himam, Vols. I, V, VI, ed. Leone Caetani, Gibb Memorial Series, No. 7. The last part was edited by H. F. Amedroz and D. S. Margoliouth with translation and commentaries, Oxford, 1920, 1921.

B. Studies

T. J. de Boer, Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam, Stuttgart, 1901, pp. 116 et sqq. (very general);
Enzyklopadie des Islam, Vol.II, p. 429; Izmirli Im. Haqqi, in Ilahiyat Fak. Mecm. No. 10, 17/33, No. 11, 59/80, Miskawaih in Felsefi eserleri;
R. Waizer, “Some Aspects of Miskawaih's Tahdhib al-Akhlaq,” in Studi Orientali­stici in onore di Giorgio Levi della vida, Roma, 1956, Vol. II, pp. 603-21;
A. A. 'Izzat, Ibn Miskawaih, Egypt, 1946;
A. S. Nadawi, Hukama'-i Islam, Azamgarh, 1953, Vol. I;
D. M. Donaldson, Studies in Muslim Ethics, London, 1953;
S. M. Iqbal, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia. Luzac, London, 1908, also Bazm-i. Iqbal, Lahore, n. d.

  • 1. GAL (S), I, p. 582, n. i.
  • 2. Al-Qifti, Tarikh al-Hukama', ed. Lippert, p. 332.
  • 3. Al-Imta' w-al-Mu'anasah, Vol. I, pp. 35-36.
  • 4. M. Iqbal, The Development of Metaphysics in Persia, London, 1908, p. 26.
  • 5. Yaqut, Kitab Irshad al-Arib ila Ma'rifat al-Adib, Vol. II, pp. 88-96.
  • 6. Al-Qifti, loc. cit.
  • 7. Al-Fauz al-Asghar, p. 120
  • 8. D. M. Donaldson. Studies in Muslim Ethics, London, 1953, p. 123
  • 9. Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, Egypt, 1329/1911, p. 42
  • 10. Al-Fauz al Asghar, p. 120.
  • 11. That is Proclus and Galen; ibid., p. 54.
  • 12. That is Themistius; ibid., p. 42.
  • 13. Ibn al-Nadim, al-Fihrist, Cairo, p. 353.
  • 14. See A. Badawi, Aristu `ind al-`Arab, Cairo, 1947, Introduction, p. 56.
  • 15. Rasa'il Ikhwan al-Safa, Egypt, 1928, Vol. IV, pp. 314-19.
  • 16. Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, pp. 64-60; al-Fauz al-Asghar, pp. 78-83.
  • 17. Al-Fauz al-Asghar, Part II, Chap. V.
  • 18. Ibn al-Nadim, op. cit., p. 353.
  • 19. Plato, Phaedo, pp. 61, 64, 67.
  • 20. Republic. Book 1V.
  • 21. Briffault, The Making of Humanity, p. 191.
  • 22. Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, pp. 15-19
  • 23. Ibn al-Nadim, op. cit., p. 352.
  • 24. Nicomachean Ethics, 1094 a 3.
  • 25. Ibid., 1095 b 14-1096 a 10.
  • 26. Ibid. “Courage”: Book III A, Chaps. 6-9; “Temperance”: Book III, Chaps. 10-12, “.Justice”: Book V H, I-II; “Wisdom”: Book VI.
  • 27. Tahdhib al-Akhlaq, p.93.
  • 28. Ibid., p.95.
  • 29. Ibid., pp.108-109.
  • 30. Ibid., p.114.
  • 31. Ibid., p.198.
  • 32. Ibn al-Nadim, op. cit., p. 504.
  • 33. Opera Philosophica, Vol. I, ed. Kraus, Cairo, 1939, p. 35.
  • 34. A. A. 'Izzat, Ibn Miskawaih, Egypt, 1946, p. 232.
  • 35. It was translated into Urdu by Hakim Sayyid Zafar Mahdi in 1815.
  • 36. A. S. Nadawi, Hukama'-i Islam, Azamgarh, 1953, Vol. I, p. 271.
  • 37. Ibid., p.272.
  • 38. Leone Caetani, Preface to Tajarib al-Umum, Leyden, 1909, Vol. I, p.xii.
  • 39. Ibid., p.xi.