The Soul–Body Problem In The Philosophical Psychology Of Mulla Sadra And Ibn Sina
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This text is a comparison between the approaches of Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina in regards of the issue of the soul–body problem, the Islamic philosophical psychology and the philosophical investigation of the soul.

**Abstract**

This paper will partly compare the approaches and ideas of two pioneers in Islamic philosophy in relation with the soul–body problem: the philosophical psychology of Mulla Sadra (Sadr al–Muta‘allihin Shirazi 975–1050/1571–1640) and that of Ibn Sina (370–428/980–1037). Investigating the issue of the soul–body problem in the works of Mulla Sadra compared with those of Ibn Sina, we need firstly to gain a general perspective of their respective approaches to Islamic philosophical psychology. Such a perspective could help us to arrive at a more precise understanding of what each has contributed in this area and their differences.

Although psychology occupied a vital role in Ibn Sina School of philosophy and his theories in this regard were of great importance in the history of Islamic thought, some major differences nevertheless separate...
his psychological doctrines from those of Mulla Sadra that appeared in the post–Ibn Sina period. These differences are significant even if we admit that Ibn Sina writings were not merely an imitation of the Aristotelian tradition. His ideas, indeed, provided the ground for the later developments of the Iranian mystical philosophy or gnosis (‘irfan). This transformation of falsafah is rooted in the philosophical investigation of the soul, or perhaps in the implications that psychological doctrines have yielded for all areas of philosophical inquiry.¹

Key Terms: Philosophical psychology, soul–body problem, duality of soul & body, soul–body relationship.

Introduction: How Did I Start This Study?

I have tried to share some of my findings out of my master thesis in this paper. In 1995, I wrote my master thesis at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. Those days, I was seriously concerned with some questions in the Islamic philosophical psychology. Comparing the viewpoints of the two Muslim philosophers, namely Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra made me busy to get involve with the arguments and discussions of these two philosophers in the field of philosophical psychology.

The origination of human soul, the duality and the relation of the soul and the body into one another, the trend and the process of the development of the body the soul while they are related, and the departure of human soul from its runner were some main aspects that I have investigated in my master thesis. In this paper, I have studied dimensions of this concern. The characteristics of the philosophical psychology of Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina, their terminological differences in this field, their discussions around the explanation of the duality of the soul and the body and also the relationship of these two, are the main facets of this survey.

Philosophical Psychology of Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina

(Characters)

Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina differ from one another in a way that each established his own type of school of philosophical psychology. While Ibn Sina following Aristotle, considered the science of the soul (‘ilm al-nafs) as a part of natural philosophy, Mulla Sadra placed it under metaphysics, complementary to the science of the origins of the things². This specific metaphysical world–view led him to view the universe as an ordered whole. In this unified world–view, he considered everything in terms of its metaphysical origin. This might be also why he never reduced the human soul to a collection of mental states or mental processes, as some modern psychologists have done. Instead, he traces the metaphysical roots of everything, establishing a doctrine in terms of which he investigates metaphysical characteristics such as creation, immateriality and immortality³.

Although Mulla Sadra put forth this new formulation by emphasizing the physical origin of the soul, which
would seem to be a more properly discussed in natural philosophy, this position was due to the fact that our philosopher believed that 'ilm al-nafs is, in fact, a preliminary step toward knowing God and being aware of what will happen in the other world as far as the gathering (hashr) of individual souls and bodies is concerned. These goals would be achievable if we considered the soul as a being that survives and leads us to God both in its generation (huduth) and its survival (baqa').

Ibn Sina in some of his writings believed that the term "soul" does not refer to the substance of the soul as such, but to the soul as it relates to the body and governs it. Considering it as something which bears a relationship to matter and, consequently, to movement, he takes the body to be an element in the soul's definition and says, following Aristotle, that the soul is the form or the first perfection of the body.

In this sense, therefore, the most appropriate place for discussing the soul is natural philosophy. Nevertheless in another attempt he states that although the soul is the form or the first perfection of the natural body, it is an incorporeal substance that emanates from the world of intellects.

Rejecting Ibn Sina apparent self-contradiction and modifying the Aristotelian definition of the soul as well, Mulla Sadra states that when the soul comes into existence it is nothing other than something which relates to the body and will only change substantially when it passes through substantial motion. At the same time, Sadra also mentions that my emphasis on the soul’s related mode of existence at its early stage does not imply Ibn Sina idea that the soul is a rational concept and not a substantive one. So there will not be any unknown substance for the soul separated from its relation to the body at its early existence. However, he insists that no one is able to discover the soul's essence (dhat); all we can relate, in fact, are various facts about its faculties and the lower mental and intellectual levels (quwa wa manaziliha al-nafsiyyah wa al-'aqliyyah).

Mulla Sadra also departs from Ibn Sina on some other psychological points, such as the eternity and createdness of the soul, the immateriality (tajarrud) of the imaginative power, and the effective role of the soul in relation to its faculties, through which it exists in all its uniqueness (al-nafs fi wahdatiha kull al-quwa). Going beyond Ibn Sina and other previous Muslim philosophers who followed Aristotle in attributing immateriality only to universal intellect, Mulla Sadra asserted that the faculty of imagination is also a given immortal and independent existent. Regarding this doctrine, he followed certain Sufi and Hermetic teachings that established an opposite school of thought vis-à-vis the Peripatetics.

It is necessary to mention that even though Mulla Sadra’s psychology covers a vast terrain, including the vegetative and animal souls, we have limited ourselves in this paper to the case of the human soul.

**Different Terminology**

Speaking of the soul and the mind, philosophers have traditionally proposed two basic orientations. Some believe that mind and soul are the same, others that mind is a part of the soul. A third group proposes that the mind and the soul are entirely different and what, in fact, exists is mind characterized...
by intellect and will. While philosophers have insisted on the existence of the soul as something which can survive after the death of the body independently or, better to say, without a corporeal body, modern defenders of the notion of the mind maintain the existence of the mind as something which is not immortal, but characterized by intellect and will 14.

According to the latter, the human mind is primarily the capacity to acquire intellectual abilities. Therefore, it is a capacity, not an activity. They argued that babies have minds even though they have not yet exhibited intellectual activities. In other words, infants possess a basic ability to acquire new abilities 15.

Beyond these views, some have gone further to state that no satisfactory account of our concept of the mind can be really offered. As Shaffer explains:

The only thing that we know of each person is a series of mental changes, mental states, and mental processes. Because of the inability to say what a mind is, many philosophers prefer to speak not of minds as such, but simply of mental properties or mental events 16.

Many modern psychologists have taken this line of thinking as the very basis of their field.

Trying to define ruh or nafs, some Muslim philosophers, on the other hand, have stated that no one can obtain or know the exact nature of ruh even if one is sure that there is, indeed, something like ruh 17.

According to D.B. Macdonald, ruh in Arabic is a primary noun that has become broadly equivalent in meaning to the Latin spiritus, or "breath", "wind", "spirit". From one end, it may even be related back to the most primitive folklore and, from the other end, it is closely linked, as in the Islamic use of the word "spirit," to the entire history of philosophy. In the course of its journey between these two extremes, the meaning of the term has been alternatively used in all theology and philosophy, from metaphysics to so-called superstitions 18.

In purely philosophical tradition, soul or nafs is sometimes considered as a form (surah) or perfection (kamal) or power (quwwah), implying the principle of affections and acts (mabda’ al–athar wa al–af’al). All these terms depend on certain considerations. If we regard it as the source of actions and effects in relation to the body, the soul is called quwwa 19. However, it could be the form of matter that carries it or something which completes matter and causes it to be actualized 20.

Switching to the technical meaning of the soul according to Ibn Sina school of thought, let us first present his point of view on the soul’s definition. In al–Najat it seems that he simply accepts the Aristotelian definition of the soul 21 and insists on the intellectual aspects such as thinking, inference, and the perception of universals 22. He considers the soul as the first perfection (kamalun awwal) of the natural body. However, he departs from Aristotle when he emphasizes the difference between perfection and form. Perfection according to Aristotle is equal to form (surah), which cannot stand by itself, while Ibn Sina believes that perfection and form are not interchangeable. Each form is equal to perfection but each
perfection is not a form. Using Aristotle's metaphor of the ship's captain\textsuperscript{23} to explain the difference, Ibn Sina states that the captain is a kind of perfection for the ship but is not its form. In the case of the soul, too, we must state that a transcendent perfection (\textit{kamalun mufariq}) is neither the form of matter nor is it located in it\textsuperscript{24}.

On closer examination, one may note a certain inconsistency in Ibn Sina words. On the one hand, he states that the soul is the first perfection of the body, which necessitates admitting the idea of being form. For, "first perfection" is something that causes matter to be actualized. Therefore, its relation to the body cannot resemble that of a captain to a ship, which are two independent existents. No one considers the captain as the "first perfection" of the ship. On the other hand, he considers the soul as a transcendent perfection (\textit{kamalun mufariq}), which is in fact the final not the first perfection of the body. This excludes the proposed definition.

Ibn Sina sometimes defines the soul by referring to its functions. In \textit{al-Shifa'}, he introduces the human soul as the source of nutrition, growth, sensation, motion, and intellection (\textit{masdar al-ghadha', al-numuww, al-ihhas, al-harakah, wa al-ta'aqqul}). These two said definitions are Aristotelian\textsuperscript{25}. In another attempt, Ibn Sina tries to combine Aristotle's position on one hand, and Plato's on the other hand. He states accordingly that although the soul is the form or the first perfection of the natural body, it is an incorporeal substance that emanates from the world of intellects\textsuperscript{26}.

Though Mulla Sadra quotes passages in his \textit{al-Asfar}, indicating that according to the philosophers, \textit{nafs} is nothing other than what is related to the body\textsuperscript{27} and which functions as a source of intellectual acts and universal perceptions, in his Mafatih, he states that all definitions of the soul which are presented by them as being essential definition are, in fact, nominal definitions (\textit{hadd bihasab-i al-'ism}) because \textit{nafs} is in its reality one of God's immaterial lights (\textit{nurun min anwar al-Allah al-ma'nawiyyah})\textsuperscript{28}.

In order to remove this ambiguity, Mulla Sadra declares that the human soul has a unique existence which is continuously in essential motion and does not have any static essence or particular stage of existence like other existents located in the natural, psychical and intellectual realms. Consequently, it would be very hard to perceive its essence as it is. All we say about the soul can only indicate the levels of its existence in relation to the body and refer to its accidents of perception and motion (\textit{'awarid al-idrakiyyah wa al-tahrkiyyah})\textsuperscript{29}. Therefore, philosophers usually define "\textit{nafs}" as the first perfection (\textit{kamalun awwal}) of the body. This definition simply reflects a kind of relation (\textit{idafah}) existing between the soul and the body, whereas the soul is indeed a substance (\textit{jawhar}). It is like when we define a builder (\textit{banna'}) as a person who constructs buildings, which defines him as a builder not qua human being\textsuperscript{30}.

One may note a kind of contradiction between this account and what he offers in his \textit{al-Asfar} that clearly shows that Mulla Sadra considers the soul at its very early existence as something relating to the body without having any other transcendent essence\textsuperscript{31}. 
Again, in an attempt to define nafs (soul), Mulla Sadra asserts that each active power (quwwah fa'iliyyah) capable of causing different effects is called nafs. This definition refers to the soul as an active power. The soul’s simple essence (dhatiha al-basitah), on the other hand, has another definition that cannot be dealt with in natural science, he says.

In Mulla Sadra writings, one can barely tell that he explicitly distinguishes between nafs and ruh. Although he often applies nafs to refer to that which is related to the body, he also sometimes uses ruh as an alternative. In his 'Arshiyyah, he uses ruh to refer to something he calls nafs in other works.

The Distinction is perhaps clearer when Mulla Sadra adds suffixes to the term "ruh". He distinguishes between vaporous spirit (al-ruh al-bukhari) and immaterial spirit (al-ruh al-mujarrad) in his writings. The former, according to him, is a subtle, hot body (jism harr latif) that is made up of four tempers (akhlat arba'ah) which carries perceptual powers and runs in the body. The latter, on the other hand, has an incorporeal existence that can only be known by perfect men through the intuition (binurin ashraf min al-'aql). Al-ruh al-bukhari could be investigated in natural science through experiment and deduction with the view to maintaining body’s health. Al-ruh al-mujarrad must be known through intuition as a way of knowing God.

There is one case in which Mulla Sadra maintains that ruh and nafs are two levels of the soul. Comparing the soul's levels to those of the Qur'an's meanings, Mulla Sadra enumerates seven degrees of existence for the soul. These degrees are the following: nature (tabi'ah), soul (nafs), intellect ('aql), spirit (ruh), secret (sirr), hidden secret (khafi), and the most hidden state (akhfa) which is that of perfect union with God. According to this point of view, nafs and ruh are not two independent things, but rather two levels of one reality that unfolds through substantial motion.

As we noticed, one can hardly arrive at a clear understanding of the terms. The whole terminological ambiguity is, of course, related to the history of these terms. There are at least four different layers to be distinguished, and each has its own ambiguity:

a) Qur'anic application (nafs, ruh with very different meanings according to various contexts).

b) Mystical usage (basically as in the Qur'an).

c) Medical meanings (ruh may be used as referring to blood, life, etc.).

d) Philosophical notion (ruh means psyche, particularly rational soul “al-nafs al-natiqah”)

The Duality Of The Soul And The Body

Basic to any investigation of the soul–body relationship is the idea that man consists of two distinct things, namely, the soul and the body. Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina discussed this duality in similar ways, sometimes overlapping the discussion on the immateriality of the soul. The evidence presented by Mulla
Sadra for the distinction between the soul and the body may be categorized into two main groups. He sometimes employs introspection as a way of helping the person to realize that there is something other than his body. Otherwise he uses conceptual analysis to indicate that the soul has a distinct existence.

As an example of the first group, he mentions self-consciousness, which all individuals experience in all states. One can easily see that both Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra assert the existence of this kind of knowledge about the self (dhat), whether in sleep, drunkenness or unconsciousness. According to Mulla Sadra, even during sleep, drunkenness (al-sukr), and unconsciousness (al-ighma) no one forgets himself. Now, if the soul were nothing other than either the whole body or a part of it, it would, in fact, be forgotten, for, we know that we sometimes forget our body in its entirety or some part of it. Moreover, for most people, the internal parts of the body –like the heart and brain– are known only through instruction (al-ta’lim) or dissection (tashrih). Therefore, by contrast, the soul is something of which we are always aware.

Trying to clarify the distinction between the soul and the body, Ibn Sina offers an interesting argument that E. Gilson calls that of the "Flying Man/Homme Volant".

While his other arguments are mostly borrowed from the previous Peripatetics, Ibn Sina himself puts this one together. In Farabi’s Kitab al-Jam’ Baina Ra’ayat al–Hakimain, 4th ed., a similar argument is attributed to Aristotle, although its real author was Plotinus in his Enneads through the Theology. Plotinus applied introspection to draw attention to the soul, while the body and both its external and internal parts are forgotten. According to this argument, it is impossible to know the soul except when we unite with the intellectual world. Ibn Sina in this argument asks each individual to go through introspection and to concentrate on himself by supposing that he is just created, equipped with a healthy intellect and neither his body nor any part of it will attract his attention. In this state he forgets everything but himself. This knowledge reflects something that is not his body. A well-organized form of this argument is offered in Kitab al–Shifa’.

In the third part (al-namat al-thalith) of his al-Isharat, Ibn Sina states that the existence of the soul and its perception are self-evident and need no proof. It is the first and clearest knowledge that one can have. So, he starts to offer his proof in order to draw our attention (tanbih) and then comes to the conclusion that this kind of knowledge cannot be achieved through any essential definition (hadd), description (rasm) or proof (burhan). As a final word, he adds:

Here I am and I know myself even if I do not have any knowledge about my hand or my foot or any other of bodily limb being internal or external.

Since the idea of dualism provides the basis for any further discussion about the soul–body relationship, Ibn Sina like his predecessors devoted much space in order to deal properly with this issue. In one of his treatises devoted to the human soul, he offers another argument, based on the knowledge that each person has about his unique personality throughout his life. He points out that although the body is in a
continuous process of change, each individual at every moment has the same understanding of himself as the one he had as a child. This uniqueness that helps us to remember our early childhood reflects the existence of something else beside the changeable body\textsuperscript{43}.

One may suppose that both Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra have probably relied on this form of evidence, on introspection and knowledge by presence, hoping to trigger an awareness of ourselves through a concentration on the "self", which happens to be beyond even of our mental forms. Following Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra, S. M. H. Tabataba’i says that we all have a permanent and correct understanding of ourselves throughout the life, but we perhaps make a mistake when we want to interpret or conceptualize it\textsuperscript{44}.

According to M. T. Misbah Yazdi, It should be mentioned that although the self–knowledge may be acquired by each person who is able to concentrate on his ego, it has different levels of lucidity which develops along with the development of the soul itself. Therefore, in its initial appearance, it would be almost unconscious or possess a very low level of lucidity. Even after years it may not be much clearer or, at least, not clearly interpreted by the mind. Often it is mistaken for the body. Whenever the soul becomes more perfect or acquires a higher level of immateriality, self–knowledge becomes clearer, until it perceives itself as an entirely transcendent being. But only a few people who have reached the highest level of spiritual development acquire this kind of knowledge. Most require other types of evidence before they can acquire self–conscious knowledge of themselves\textsuperscript{45}.

However, it remains unclear how we can be aware of ourselves in the cases of unconsciousness, drunkenness or sleep. The assertion is conceivable only when we are healthy and conscious.

Supporting Mulla Sadra’s idea regarding the presence of self–knowledge even in the case of unconsciousness or drunkenness, Tabataba’i states that what one may say after each of those two unusual situations is that he is not aware of what has happened for him during that period or better to say he is not able to remember it, but he cannot say that he did not have any knowledge of himself when he was drunk or unconscious. We have heard of some people, who suffered from unconsciousness or drunkenness, that they had experiences such as what we may have in our usual dreams during sleep\textsuperscript{46}.

In his \textit{al–Asfar}, Mulla Sadra adduces more arguments that may be categorized as samples of the second group. Here he follows Peripatetic tradition by listing the soul’s functions and analyzing their relation to the soul. The soul is said to be an active power that causes various voluntary effects, such as intellect, sensation, motion, feeding, growth, reproduction. He argues that these kinds of effect can neither be derived from matter nor from physical form, not even from the whole body as a combination of matter and corporeal form. This is because matter, on the one hand, is a pure receptivity (\textit{qabiliyyah mahdah}) having no function or effect. Form, on the other hand, cannot be considered as a source of these effects, since it is common to all bodies (\textit{ajsam}), although we observe these effects emanating from some types of bodies. So, there must be another source beyond the body, in order to explain those effects we see in some bodies. This source is what we call the soul (\textit{nafs})\textsuperscript{47}. The evidence here
presented is similar to what Ibn Sina offers in Kitab al-Shifa', and is borrowed from Plato and Aristotle.

In his explanation concerning the distinction between the soul and the body, Mulla Sadra sometimes refers to the capacity of the soul and the body to acquire forms and to deal with them independently. Following Ibn Sina and Suhrawardii, he maintains that the body can bear only one form or quality at a time; and, if it loses a quality, it cannot regain it without an external cause. But the soul can independently preserve, remember and reproduce any intelligible form at any time. It is like a board containing various sciences and knowledge of innumerable objects. He also argues that man is capable of conceiving universals and intelligible forms that cannot be formed in the body. This is because the body is infinitely divisible, whereas an intelligible form is indivisible.

Continuing his argument, Mulla Sadra maintains that another evidence for the duality of the soul and the body is their "opposite directions" in the process of development. While continuous and intense intellectual activities eventually lead the body to weakness, which may end in death and dissolution, they produce mental perfection and intellectual maturity. It is evident that it would be impossible for the same thing to be the cause of both the perfection and the destruction of a thing at the same time. Therefore, the soul or the mind is something other than the body. Criticizing this evidence, Mulla Sadra adds that what is, indeed, impossible is that one cause creates both perfection and dissolution in the same thing and at the same time. However, one may think of the possibility of a cause that leads to the occurrence of perfection and dissolution in one thing but at two different times or based on two different considerations.

This is similar to what is offered in the classical argument in the Peripatetic tradition. They argue that intensive sense-perception eventually weakens the body, while intellectual activity brings the mind to maturity.

In spite of his eagerness to prove a clear duality of the soul and the body, Mulla Sadra attempts to show that an intimate and metaphysical link exists between them. He goes so far as to assert that the body and the soul are two levels of one existent. The body is the state or stage (martabah) of hardness and heaviness for that being, whereas the soul constitutes a degree of lightness and subtlety. Here, one may ask how these two distinct existents come to be so intimately linked together. Leaving it unanswered, saying that it is a divine secret, Mulla Sadra nevertheless gives an example. He states that just as the material of the wick gets ready to accept fire and then gradually becomes red and bright until it becomes luminous and burning, so the human sperm gets physically ready to accept the rational soul, which is a spark from heaven and then develops until it unites with the active intellect. As we shall see, Mulla Sadra attempts to demonstrate that although the soul is an immaterial being, and quite distinct from the body, its creation is based on a corporeal origination.
In the previous section, we investigated whether or not there was something incorporeal beside the body, considering what Mulla Sadra and Ibn Sina have put forward in this regard. In the present section, we will first deal with the issue whether the soul has an eternal pre-existence (qadim), or whether it is created in time (hadith) just like the body. If it is said to be a created existence, one may ask again whether the soul joins the body as a physical thing, which then changes into an incorporeal existent, or it joins the body as a created but incorporeal thing. We must deal with these issues before we can determine what were the basic philosophical foundations of soul–body relationship in the psychology of Mulla Sadra.

By way of an introduction into these questions, we may briefly consider a classification of all the doctrines concerning the soul's eternity and createdness into four groups, which has been proposed by the 19th century philosopher and mystic Mulla Hadi Sabzawari.

According to his classification, a group of theologians held the idea that the soul is always corporeal (jismani) both in its createdness (huduth) and its persistence (baqa'). Peripatetics (Mashsha'i'in), the second group, took the opposite stand stating that the soul is immaterial in both its createdness and immortality (huduth wa baqa'). But this immateriality belongs only to its essence, since it needs to be united with the body in order to perform its functions and to perfect itself. Connection with the body, they assert, is in the form of a relation (ta'alluq) not imprint (intiba'), so that the soul is immaterial even when it relates to the body. The third group consists of mystics, followed by Mulla Sadra, who maintained that the soul is physical only in its createdness, but changes gradually into immaterial quiddity after it has been created in the body.

The fourth group took a view opposite to Mulla Sadra's, stating that some souls were immaterial upon creation and were related to the body, but became corporeal after they joined with the body. Metempsychosists (ashab al-tanasukh) hold that when the soul relates to the body, it will be deeply affected by the body. They also say that through its relation to the body, the soul becomes corporeal (jismani), not the body (jism) itself, because there is a big difference between being corporeal (jismani) and being a body (jism). Even though Sabziwari concurred in general with Mulla Sadra, it seems that he tended to believe in the idea of the fourth group, adding further that this is what all investigators believed in (hadha shay'un yaqulu bihi al-kull min ahl al-tahqiq).

According to Mulla Sadra, the debate on the eternity and createdness of the soul goes back to Plato and Aristotle's period. Plato upheld the idea of its eternity, whereas Aristotle believed in its createdness. He himself refutes the idea of eternity with a number of arguments. For example, he declares that it is impossible for the soul to be eternal, since then it must pre-exist either in form of the soul or the intellect ('aql). If it pre-exists in the form of the soul, it must be inactive (mu'attal) waiting to connect to a body. If it rather pre-exists as an intellect, how can it bear any new accident when it is actual, without having...
any potentiality. The problem, according to Mulla Sadra, starts when we believe that the soul pre-exists in the same manner as it is related to the body. The soul before joining with the body would be a pure immaterial and actual existent that possesses immediately all it can attain. Therefore, it would have no potentiality to be actualized in cooperation with the body. If it is an eternal and thus perfect being, how is it possible for a perfect being to become contaminated by corporeal powers and instruments which are vegetative or animal and imperfect?

The other problem is that of plurality. Here, he just maintains that the pure immaterial thing cannot be more than one, since it does not have any individuating matter. Like Ibn Sina, Mulla Sadra argues that if the soul existed before the body, then there would have to be either a plurality of souls or one soul. A plurality of souls is impossible. For in their prior existence these souls are immaterial and since matter is the individuating principle, these souls cannot be many.

But the supposition of the pre-existence of one soul is equally impossible. For then the soul of an individual like Ali would be identical with the soul of an individual like, asan. This is absurd. Nor can it become many after having been one, for the soul is not divisible. If, then, in the supposed prior existence there can be neither a plurality of souls nor one soul, the prior existence of the soul to the body is impossible. The soul cannot exist before the body but must exist with body. Mulla Sadra also insists that if we believe that the soul is an eternal and immaterial substance, we must also believe that a material being came out of the combination of an immaterial and a material thing. It would also be absurd. In his al-Asfar he argues:

The soul is the entelechy (completion, tamam) of the body, [which means that] a perfect corporeal species comes out of the connection of the bodily matter and the soul. But it is impossible (to see) a natural material species emerges from the connection of a material and an immaterial being. Then, if the consequent is wasted, the antecedent is wasted, too. Accordingly it is clear that as far as the soul's individual existence is concerned, its association with the body and its disposal in it is an essential affair for the soul (amrun dhatiyyun laha). Hence, the soul's relation to the body is its constituting differentia (muqawwimah laha). However, it does not imply that the soul is a type of correlation (min bab al-mudaf) or it is out of the definition of substantiality (hadd al-jawhariyyah). Rather it implies that the soul is out of the definition of intellectuality (hadd al-`aqliyyah).

So, the soul must be a material form in its initial existence as it becomes associated with the body. This is the point, as we shall see, at which Mulla Sadra departs from Ibn Sina's position and proposes that being a material form and relating to the body is essential for the soul. Therefore, the soul cannot possess first its own immaterial essence, and then relate to the body. In its early existence, the soul must be a physical form, because it joins matter in order to actualize it.

It should thus be consistent with the quiddity of matter, which is the same as its form. So, when matter is corporeal, its form also must be corporeal. However, this form has the capacity of becoming an intellectual form.
Although Mulla Sadra makes serious efforts to refute the idea of eternity of the soul, he adds that what he is seeking to refute is the eternity of the soul's existence before the body, as a proper and independent existence when it joins with the body. The soul has another type of existence, God's knowledge, and is as eternal as His knowledge is eternal. The only reasonable possibility of existence for the soul before the body is to be sought in God's knowledge, which, of course, cannot be an independent and a proper existent as it is with the body. And this doctrine, he says, may be what Plato (or more precisely Neo-Platonists) and his predecessors had intended by the divine archetypes (al-muthul al-ilahiyyah) or intellectual forms (al-suwar al-aqliyyah). This kind of existence, he says, does not have any problematic consequences and is a quite basic of Imamiyyah philosophers. Since each perfect cause cannot be separated from its effect, the soul as an effect exists for its cause before the body as its cause does. So when the cause exists, it contains the perfection of its effects.

One may, however, argue that this type of being is not the soul as such. It is indeed its cause (active intellect or any other immaterial cause) and its immediate perfection. What depends on the body does not have this form of existence. When the soul emanates from its cause in order to acquire new kinds of perfection, it relates to the body as the soul that is distinguishable from its cause. One can easily distinguish between these two types of levels of existence. Under one consideration, the soul has a separate or incorporeal existence (al-wujud al-mufariq), but under another it is a relative existence (al-wujud al-ta'alluqi).

One harsh attack could be addressed to both Mulla Sadra, who upheld a particular type of eternity, and all who believed in the soul's eternity as such. If the soul existed before the body through a separate existence, why does it become related to the body and appear in a lower mode of existence? On this question, Mulla Sadra quotes from Shaykh al-Ishraq in his Hikmat al-Ishraq where he had previously asked how it was possible for an existent being in the "world of lights" to relate to bodies in "world of darkness"? No one can imagine any change that might occur in the world of immateriality. In addition, one may ask what justifies the relation of a soul to a particular body. Why does a soul become related to this body but not to another?

Explaining the soul's emanation from the realm of intellects, Mulla Sadra states that what may be said about the connection of the soul to the active intellect after death can also be asserted about the emanation of the soul. It is also worth mentioning, he says, that even though the soul has a higher type of existence when it is in the intellectual realm, there still remains some goodness (khayrat) and perfections which can be acquired only when the soul become associated to the body. Moreover, Mulla Sadra can answer that the emanation of the soul from its cause is not, in fact, a change. There is neither increase nor decrease in the case of emanation.

It may be argued that if "existent" beings in the intellectual realm are purely perfect beings then why should they seek to acquire new perfections. However, it may be proposed that they are perfect beings in terms of the perfections of that realm. There may remain other perfections that could be attainable.
only by entering into a new world using the body.

But Mulla Sadra still has to respond to some further questions concerning his theory about the eternity of the soul. According to him, the eternity of the soul is its presence before its cause. So, what indeed is eternal is its cause, not the soul as such. But could it be asserted that souls before and after association with the body do not have an independent existence and are equal to the intellects themselves? Mulla Sadra believes that the soul in its upward travel unites with the active intellect. This union requires a kind of duality between the soul and active intellect; otherwise there will not be any connection. If Mulla Sadra believes that unification of the soul with active intellect is the very essence of the connective ('ayn al-rabt) between the cause and effect, one can say that the latter always exists even when the soul becomes related to the body and is limited neither to a particular realm nor to any kind of soul. All souls being either devilish (shaytani) or godly (rahmani) must be related to their cause. But Mulla Sadra states that only divine souls can be related to the active intellect. Moreover, it would be reasonable if, after death, the soul changes into an independent intellect like its cause. But if it unites with its cause, it would be like its existence before the body. In this case, the creation of the soul must be meaningless. Whereas the intellects ('uqul) before and after the relation to the body are permanent, the souls are created with the body and will be corrupted by it. In conclusion, the soul may exist before the body as perfection with its cause, but will be an independent being like its cause after death and this ought to be the true meaning of unification with active intellect.

Concluding Remarks

Despite its long history that goes back to early Greek thought, philosophical psychology took on a specific character among Muslim philosophers. Like philosophy itself, Muslim philosophers in a new atmosphere and through different ways synthesized philosophical psychology. Some parts were left unchanged since their formulation in Greek tradition, others elaborated with more advanced proofs. Some were introduced for the first time.

The immateriality of the animal soul (al-nafs al-haywaniyyah), the immateriality of the imaginative faculty of the human soul, the corporeality of the human soul in its generation, the uniqueness of the soul and the body as two levels of an existent, the uniqueness of the soul and its faculties in spite of their plurality – all these exemplify the unique nature of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy. We lack enough evidence as to whether Plato or Aristotle ever attempted to prove the immateriality of the human soul, except those ideas which in a way imply the duality of the soul and the body or involve a view of the soul as a separate substance.

Considering it as one of the most important subjects in the philosophical psychology, Muslim philosophers devoted an explicit attempt to establish the immateriality of the human soul. Both Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra dealt with this problem in almost all of their writings. In his al-Asfar and al-Mabda’ wa al-Ma’ad, Mulla Sadra offered fourteen reasons demonstrating the immateriality of the soul. In his al-
Shawahid, Mulla Sadra mentions that he devoted a significant part of *al-Mabda’ wa al-Ma’ad* to demonstrate the immateriality of the soul.\(^7^4\)

Misbah Yazdi has classified all the evidence concerning the immateriality of the soul or the duality of the soul and the body into three groups. Dreams and interpretation of them, hypnotism, summoning the spirits, strange acts performed by ascetics, are psychological or parapsychological bases that can be used as complementary data in a group of evidence. In the second group, physiological data alongside the psychological findings are usually used. For instance, some philosophers, including Mulla Sadra himself argue that since, on the one hand, we know that all physical organs made up of cells are in a gradual and continuous process of change, and on the other side, we all experience a unique self-knowledge throughout the life, we surely come to the conclusion that the center and source of this feeling must be something other than the body which we call the soul.

Thirdly, some philosophers believe that beyond all other evidence, we can rely on purely philosophical. This is divided into two groups. Some are mainly based on analyzing the self-knowledge that is available to most people in form of knowledge by presence and has been pointed out by Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra. Some, are based on the immateriality of psychological phenomena, such as perception, will (*iradah*) and love. If these phenomena are immaterial, undoubtedly the source of them must be immaterial.\(^7^5\)

Since he believed that knowing the soul is the very key to knowing God and belief in the other world (particularly belief in gathering of the souls and the bodies), Sadr al-Muta'allihin Shirazi accorded a specific place to philosophical psychology in his whole philosophy.\(^7^6\) Trying to show Sadr al-Muta'llihin Shirazi's contribution in this field, I limited my study to the issue of the soul–body problem. The corporeality of the soul in its generation and its spirituality in its survival, the principle of oneness (*wahdat*) of the soul with its numerous faculties, and union of the soul with the active intellect are some examples of Mull Sadra’s new findings in philosophical psychology, each needing a separate investigation.\(^7^7\) All these issues have a decisive role in explaining the soul–body problem.

The issue of the soul–body problem started with the question of whether the soul and the body are two different existents with two different natures or are the same. Considering them two different existents, one may ask how they relate with another? Even Aristotelian theory of form–matter, has to explain the problem of the relation between two types of existence.

Although in both Islamic and Western traditions there is a marked tendency toward dualism, no one could successfully explain the nature of the soul–body relationship. Extreme forms of materialism or idealism were two kinds of reaction against this. In Islamic tradition the Peripatetic school of thought has always come under harsh attack when it tries to illustrate the material/immaterial relationship.

Utilizing his new findings in philosophy, Mulla Sadra argued that there is a new way to explain the soul–body relationship. He firstly asserted that beside external, accidental, and observable motions that occur
in the corporeal world, there is another form of motion that is internal, substantial and unseen. The latter, he found constituted the very basis of the former. According to Mulla Sadra, substantial motion is an alternative doctrine to the generation/corruption theory (al-kawn wa al-fasad) offered in Peripatetic tradition to explain the emergence and evolution of corporeal species.

Based on the theory of substantial motion, the matter gradually and continuously moves toward perfection and immateriality. So, there is no boundary separating a distinctive border between the materiality and immateriality. Each being leaves, through a continuous course of substantial change, the stage of imperfection to the level of perfection and transcendence. Hence, the course of change in the material world is continuous and perfectional rather than in form of generation/corruption.

**Selected Bibliography**


5. Unlike the above-mentioned argument, in his al-Risalah al-Adhawiyah Fi Amr al-Ma’ad, Ibn Sina emphasizes that the word “ana” which reflects the soul refers to something beyond the body or any part of it. See Risalah adhawiyah fi amr al-ma’ad, al-Tab’a al-Ula Published 1949 by Dar al-Fikr al-’Arabi in Misr, edited by Sulayman Dunya, (Cairo, 1949), pp. 94–95.


11. Going beyond Ibn Sina and other previous Muslim philosophers who followed Aristotle in attributing immateriality only to universal intellect, Mulla Sadra asserted that the faculty of imagination is also a given immortal and independent existent. Regarding this doctrine, he followed certain Sufi and Hermetic teachings that established an opposite school of thought vis-à-vis the Peripatetics. For more information refer to the M.A. dissertation written by M. J. Zarean entitled as Sensory and Imaginary Perception according to Mulla Sadra, (Montreal: Institute of Islamic Studies, 1994).


19. It should be noticed that quwwah has different meanings in philosophical texts, but is used in the above-mentioned discussion referring to the soul or basis of effects and the actions (mabd’ al-thar wa al-af’al).


32. Sadr al-Mut'allihin Shirazi, 'Arshiyyah, edited and translated by Ghulam Husayn Ahani, (Isfahan: Kitabfurushi-i Shahriyar, 1341 A. H.), p. 235. In the same page he uses the term "ruh" to refer to the highest level of the soul's development, and in another passage he uses the term to refer to the lowest stage of the soul's existence that is related to the body and is interchangeable with the term "nafs". This synonymy is found in Sadra's discussion in his Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Karim, accepted by Sh'as and Sunni alike, the Qur'an has seven levels of meaning the last known only to God.
38. In Farabi's Kitab al-Jam' Baina Ra'yay al-Hakimain. 4th ed., (Beirut: Dar al-Mashriq, 1985), a similar argument is attributed to Aristotle, although its real author was Plotinus in his Enneads through the Theology. Plotinus applied introspection to draw attention to the soul, while the body and both its external and internal parts are forgotten. According to this argument, it is impossible to know the soul except when we unite with the intellectual world. See al-Farabi, Kitab al-Jam', op. cit., p. 109.
43. Ibn Sina, "Risalah fi Marifat al-Nafs al-Natiqah," Ibn Sina wa al-Nafs al-Bashar'iyah, op. cit., p. 31. It should be added that the authenticity of this treatise is strongly doubted by J. P. Michot in his book La destine de L'homme Selon Avicenne, p. XXIX-XX. However, the idea is attributed to him based on his other writings. Prof. H. Landolt mentions that according to F. Rz this argument has been initially dealt with by Ghazali with the conclusion that "essence of man" (haqiqat-i adami) is not identical with his body. See L. Landolt, Ghazal and "Religionswissenschaft", Landolt 1991, some notes on the Mishkat al-Anwar, (Bern: Peter Long, 1991), p. 69, F. N. 205. The idea of a stable and unique personality, which is the characteristic of our spiritual realm has also been proposed by two modern psychologists, namely, Bergson and William James (Khulayf 1974, p. 106. He quotes from Madkur 1947, pp. 172 & 194).
49. Mulla Sadra, al-Shawahid al-Rububiyyah, op. cit., pp. 213, 214. See also Muhammad 'Abdul Haq, "The Psychology of


51. Mulla Sadra 1378 A.H., vol. 8, al-safar al-rabi‘, al-bab al-sadis, chapter 1, p. 295. Criticizing this evidence, Mulla Sadra adds that what is, indeed, impossible is that one cause creates both perfection and dissolution in the same thing and at the same time. However, one may think of the possibility of a cause that leads to the occurrence of perfection and dissolution in one thing but at two different times or based on two different considerations.


54. By mystics he probably means Ibn ‘Arabi and Rumi and all who followed their school of thought. As an example Sabzawari cites a poem from al-Shaykh Farid al-Din ‘Attar:

\[
\text{تن ز جان نیبود جدا عضوی از است}
\]

\[
\text{جان زکل نیبود جدا جزئی از است}
\]

In this line ‘Attar considers the body as an organ for the soul and the soul as a part of the whole.


57. It is noteworthy that the soul philosophically refers to something that is related to the body in order to govern it. So, if it pre-exists without dealing with the body, it will be inactive (mu’attal). See Mulla Sadra 1378 A.H., Al-Asfar, op. cit., vol. 8, al-safar al-rabi‘, al-bab al-sabi‘, chapter 2, p. 332.


61. Refuting the idea of plurality, Mulla Sadra argues that plurality derives either from form (al-surah) or from matter (al-maddah), or from the agent (al-fa’i’l), or from the final goal (al-ghayah). None of these possibilities pertain to the existence of the soul before joining with a body. The soul’s form is its essence, which is one and not many. Its matter is the body, which of course is absent before it has joined with the soul. What produces it is the active intellect, also one. The final goal is in God, who is undoubtedly one. Therefore, there will be no justification for plurality of the soul (Mulla Sadra, al-Mabda’ Wa al-Ma’ad , 1976, op. cit., pp. 310–11).

62. Based on Aristotelian theory of form–matter, actuality of all corporeal beings is due to their form. Since the soul is also form of the body, it actualizes the body.


64. Mulla Sadra, Maftih al-Ghayb, op. cit., p. 536.


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