Deviated analyses regarding the silence of Amirul Momineen (‘a) can be divided into three categories:
One of the most important deviated consequences of this conjecture is release of Abu Bakr’s regime from the circle of usurpation and granting legitimacy to his Caliphate.
This partiality in the sources of Ahlul Sunnat has succeeded in giving false coverings based on ‘immediate Bay’at’ of His Eminence, to Abu Bakr.
By the same argument, sometimes instead of ‘Letting go of Caliphate linked with consent’ they talk about ‘Willful Bay’at of Amirul Momineen (‘a) to Abu Bakr’ and that also in the initial period of his Caliphate!
Style Of Criticizing The First Category Of Conjectures1
Absurd claims of ‘Willing renouncement of Caliphate’ can be reviewed on the basis of two kinds of authentic documents2:
A) Documents indicating ‘efforts of Amirul Momineen (‘a) in bringing down the usurped caliphate of Abu Bakr’.
B) Documents indicating ‘Forced demand of Bay’at’ and ‘severe opposition of Amirul Momineen (‘a) from accepting it’.
Second Category: Conjectures that claim ‘Detachment of Amirul Momineen (‘a) from Caliphate and overlooking it, after six months of Abu Bakr’ Caliphate’
One of the most important evil results of these doubts is forgetting the historical documents regarding attack on the house of Fatima (s.a.).
Because in this deviated partiality that talks of the allegiance of Amirul Momineen (‘a) to Abu Bakr after some months they have very cleverly put a lid on the oppressions and plots that were the highlights of the initial period of Abu Bakr’s rule.
In the same way among the other deviated repercussions of this conjecture is that it becomes the basis to subsequent claims of ‘good relations of Ali and Caliphs’. This also goes a long way in making all forget the terrible crimes committed by usurpers of Caliphate in the initial period.
Absurd claim of ‘gradual withdrawal of Amirul Momineen (‘a) from Caliphate and overlooking it’ although after passing of some months in the Caliphate of Abu Bakr can be evaluated in the following two ways:
A) Criticism and analysis of ‘False narrations about the willful allegiance of Amirul Momineen (‘a) to Abu Bakr after six months’.3
B) Criticism and analysis of ‘Conjectures regarding the co-operation of Amirul Momineen (‘a) with Caliphs’.4
Third Category: Conjectures That Claim ‘Absence Of Plan Of Right Of Caliphate And Not Proving The School Of Imamate’.
These conjectures, sometimes are posed in an indirect way and under the ‘conjectures of two previous categories’ and sometimes also regarding ‘refusal to prove the Alawi Imamate and Wilayat’.
The aim of posing such types doubts is ‘To invite Shias to observe silence from planning discussions related to Caliphate and Successorship of Amirul Momineen (‘a)’.
Absurd claims of ‘Refusal of Amirul Momineen (‘a) from plan of the right of Caliphate and his remaining silent from explaining the School of Imamate’ can be criticized on the basis of ‘debates of Amirul Momineen Ali (‘a)’ with support of ‘statements of His Eminence (‘a) in the matter of his severe struggle of having his claim recorded in History’.5
Analyses of unity-seekers regarding the political and social stances of Amirul Momineen (‘a) after passing away of Prophet are quite untrue and far from reality because they have compared it to ‘silence’.
The prime aim of those who inject this suspicion about the silence is to interpret it to effect of foregoing his right and overlooking to demand it. They sketch in a way that the reader concludes that His Eminence (‘a) did not take any action against usurpation of his right. He also impeded others to take any action in this respect.
The scope of these conjectures has spread to such an extent that they claim:
“Caliphate was the very first issue on which Imam Ali (‘a) maintained silence in his attitude towards it. He did not allow anyone to make Caliphate a ground for difference in the Ummah or utilize the situation to their own benefit.”!6
To check and scrutinize this suspicion first it is necessary to see that the conjecture-coiner has so misused events of history that he has reached to this deviation:
“He did not allow anyone to make Caliphate a ground for difference”!
Study of historical events that occurred after Saqifah Bani Saada show that:
“When Abu Sufyan became aware of the event of Saqifah. He voiced national and racial motives and said to Ali: Extend your hand so that I may pay allegiance to you. I swear by God if you want I will fill up Medina with warriors and horses…Ali rejected the offer. By this he showed that in his political school it was not correct to take advantage of everything for the sake of aim. Ali had no doubt that the right was his. But to reach it he did not see proper to use whatever means possible. So understanding Abu Sufyan’s intention, he refused him. The aim of Abu Sufyan was to create differences, corruption and battle among Muslims. Therefore Ali terms this act of Abu Sufyan as malefic and mischievous.”7
This is the only case where Ali has shown his disagreement with support expressed to him. So it seems that the suspect has based his suspicion thereat; and makes it a proof to support the idea. In fact the reaction of Ali was against military support of Abu Sufyan. It also was to defeat his intention of seizing complete power or taking share for Bani Umayyah.8
According to this analysis, the reaction of Ali cannot be attributed to his agreement to usurpation of Caliphate.
Why Ali did not show negative reaction (similar to one referred) to his friends’ support, had his purpose been silence against usurpation of his right? If the aim of Imam Ali (‘a) was silence what about the program that accompanied his claim to take back his right; what would it mean?
“Ali did not accept allegiance of Abu Sufyan. On the other hand he strongly refrained from paying allegiance to the new authority of Abu Bakr. So he showed his rejection.”9
“Acquisition of power and uniting his friends, were his other steps. When Bay’at of Abu Bakr took place, Ali (‘a) began to mobilize his friends, and in this matter he was morally and personally supported by his wife, Fatima, the daughter of Prophet (S).”10
“From this stage onwards the campaign of Ali appears more serious and ardent. It takes to itself a special feature against the new regime. The house of Prophet’s daughter defended him; Fatima herself came out as a powerful support to Ali. On some cases, she takes the initiative to express her opposition to the extent of physical brawl.”11
“In order to take back his lost right Ali even invited people to pay allegiance to him.”
Among the actions that Imam Ali (‘a) undertook was that he and wife kept visiting the gatherings of Ansaar and asking for their support.”12
In order to finalize his argument on Muslim and not to leave any room to posterity to interpret wrongly his silence as concurrence with new order and his withdrawal willingly from his right to lead Islamic Mission, he kept visiting the houses of Muslims in Medina. He reminded them about the words and recommendations of Prophet concerning succession after him. He insisted on them to give him a hand in returning Caliphate to its real and correct tract.”13
“In the very early days when the Ummah had gone astray and perverted he took his sons, Hasan and Husayn and his wife, Fatima and kept knocking door after door of Ansaar (Helpers). It is remarkable to mention here that he was blamed for being too greedy for Caliphate because of his persistence on his right, which he wanted history to record.”14
“Therefore from each step he took, it becomes evident that his uprising was against backward movement to days of ignorance prior to Islam.”15
“If actions of Imam (‘a) had not been there in this regard it might have happened that people would have doubted in his being immediate Caliph of Prophet and the possibility would have strengthened that the Messenger of Allah (S) has abrogated his insistence on Caliphate of Amirul Momineen (‘a).”16
“He knew very well that his silence might cause the people, under the influence of false propaganda of usurpers, to think that he was supporting the Saqifah matter hence in order to put into record his actual stance he broke his silence.”17
“In this matter the close friends of His Eminence (‘a) cooperated with him. And the close companions of Prophet like Abu Dharr, Salman, Khalid bin Saeed, Abu Ayyub Ansaari, Uthman bin Haneef, Baraa bin Azib – all these gathered in the mosque. They sincerely declared their support to Ali bin Abi Talib (‘a).”18
“They launched arguments and put forth such reasoning advocating the right of Ali that Abu Bakr could not dare to come out of his house for three days. Till on the third day his colleagues went to his house with naked swords and brought him out at the point of sword. They seated him at the pulpit of the Prophet. They threatened others by sword that no one had a right to talk about the subject. In modern terms a censorship was imposed.
From this point no one moved or spoke.”19
All these historical evidences show that the Imam did not leave any stone unturned in defending Alawi School and Imamate. According to conditions of those times, he did whatever was possible to him. He did not sit idle to see his right usurped. But Muslims had gone somnolent and sluggish. They stooped to wrong but did not erect their backs to support the truth.
Historical evidences regarding his sharp debates prove this point:
“Abu Bakr in the early days of Caliphate sent the following message to the Imam: Do comply with request of Caliph of the Prophet of Allah and pay allegiance to him. Imam told the messenger: How soon you attribute a lie to the Messenger of Allah (S). He and his supporters know well that Allah and His Messenger has not installed as Caliph anyone except me.20
When they took the Imam to the Mosque he began the dialogue and asked Abu Bakr: Did you not pay allegiance to me yesterday at the command of the Prophet of Allah?21
Then the Imam addressed the audience in the mosque reminding them of all that the Prophet had said about him. He also reminded them of the event of Ghadeer and the Prophet’s words regarding him on that occasion.
All agreed and acknowledged Ali’s veracity. Even Abu Bakr acknowledged having had paid allegiance to Ali.22
Zaid bin Arqam says that twelve tribal chiefs were present there who attested the words of Imam Ali (‘a). Gradually the argument got hotter and a row and din arose in the Masjid. Umar feared that people will go to Ali’s side. So he upset the gathering and people left the mosque.23”24
These historical documents show that His Eminence (‘a) in the most severe conditions; that is in the time when they demanded him to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr under threat to his life, argued the validity of his Caliphate and spoke in support of the School of Imamate and Alawi Caliphate. He tried to regain his usurped position in every way.
“Ali (‘a) always during the Caliphate of Caliphs never refrained from expressing the matter that Caliphate was a right linked to him.”25
Ali (‘a) did not refrain from expressing and demanding his rights and complaining against those who had usurped it. He was very vocal about his demands and he did not consider it to be an impediment to Muslim unity.”26
“To think that Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) did not mention anything about his rightfulness is a view opposed to historical reality.”27
Careful scrutiny of recorded narrations clearly shows that His Eminence never abandoned his rights and did not overlook them at all and he never left them to the discretion of the Caliphs and he was not at all silent about them. Although it is a matter of regret that they have altered the public debates of His Eminence (‘a) that took place among the Muslims. Thus it is said:
“Indeed during the period of Caliphs, in the consultant committees and among the special companions he debated about his rights, but he did not do so among the general populace of Muslims! Because he feared sedition and movement against the machinery of Caliphate and due to this in my personal view and confessions of some researchers of the story of Ghadeer, he remained silent about the divine right of the Wilayat of Ahlul Bayt.”!2829
On the basis of this conjecture, firstly:
Obvious steps and repeated public debates of His Eminence (‘a) are shown to be special and private discussions; as if His Eminence (‘a) did not lay the foundation of awakening of the people!
Absence of an open and widespread revolt of the Imam (‘a) and his refraining from a large scale attack on the regime is interpreted to be an effort for keeping the Caliphs safe!
Yes, this conjecture creates such a picture in the mind of readers that Imam (‘a) was never vocal in public about the divine right of his Imamate and Wilayat.
Now that if continuous and repeated efforts of the Imam in creating awareness had not been witnessed its evidence would have needed to be obtained from somewhere else (other than silence before the usurpation of Caliphate).
Certainly, it must be asked:
“Did the people of that time forget all that the Messenger of Allah (S) had told about his cousin, Ali (‘a)? And they were waiting for Ali (‘a) to remind and awaken them to honor his rights?
They detachment from Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) was not due to their complete ignorance about the moral status of His Eminence so that on hearing about his victimization they would wake up and rise up in his support.
His mission was not like the proclamation of the Messenger of Allah (S) in the beginning that he should be in search for supporters in his mission of spreading Islam.
In the days following the demise of the Holy Prophet (S) those who wanted made Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) their leader. They knew him as was necessary and those who followed others were not such that with a single call of Ali for help they would rise up in his support and harness the motives of his opposition.”
Interpretation of silence of His Eminence, Ali (‘a) by the partiality regarding ‘overlooking Caliphate and abandoning willingly and also absence of his expression of his right of Caliphate’ is against historical evidences and realities and evidences for protecting Islamic unity cannot conceal these types of deviations in analysis of historical events. Yet they claim:
“The Imam according to his own account held his hand and kindly let go of his right! Because the wellbeing and benefit of the religion necessitated his painful silence and abandoning! A right whose eligibility was confirmed in his own view as well by others”!
“When some people usurped the absolute right of Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a), he could have risen up against them in an armed uprising, but only for the sake of complete wellbeing of Islam and guarding the unity and integration of Muslims and that the fresh converts do not go back to their infidelity and the enemies of Islam may not get a chance to benefit from the situation and that the new faith of Islam may not be destroyed in the nascent stage, he overlooked his absolute right”!
“Ali (‘a) for the sake of Islamic unity abandoned his own right and that of his wife! He bore failures and hardships but in all his dealings preferred unity and oneness of Muslims and also made his wife and sons observe this.”!
“And in this way he renounced divine text (Nass) of his successorship, which his friends and relatives use as proof.”!
“Inspite of being obdurate on their rights till that time, they overlooked it.”!
Amirul Momineen Ali (‘a) from the aspect of fulfilling the duty entrusted to the position of Imamate and on the path of protecting religion that he had received from the Almighty30 assumed a special demeanor to react to the usurpation of Caliphate and the usurpers – especially after the attack on Fatima’s house31 – which is termed as silence.
Silence of the Imam was not in the sense to give up his right to Caliphs, or to refrain from making any claim. He remained silent only in the sense that he did not undertake an armed uprising against the usurped Caliphate – and that also after opposing vehemently for twenty days against usurpation of Caliphate and a widespread effort to announce illegality of Abu Bakr’s Caliphate.
“In every way Imam Ali (‘a) tried to bring Caliphate to its rightful place, but some Muslims were instrumental in assuring that the Imam does not achieve his purpose.
If His Eminence (‘a) had continued his opposition he would not have succeeded in sidelining Abu Bakr, rather his own life would have been endangered.”32
“A third point also exists and it was the awe and terror that the machinery of the ruler had imposed on Islamic society.”33
“After paying allegiance to Abu Bakr some people of Saqifah rose against Abu Bakr. Upon direction of Umar, a group of people kicked and crushed Habbab bin Mundhir under their feet. Dust was poured in his mouth and his nose was broken
Saad bin Ubadah was kicked until he reached the frontiers of death.
If anyone raised his voice, immediately his mouth was filled with dust.
On the return route of Muhajireen to Mosque, associates of Umar stopped everyone and pulled each of them and touched his hand to Abu Bakr’s as a token of paying allegiance to him and then left him.
In that scuffle Bani Aslam tribe of desert-dwellers entered Medina as the chief of Muhajireen had promised to give plenty of provision to them if they helped. They started beating the people with canes, sticks and lances without a pretext or a warning unless they paid allegiance to the new Caliph.
Umar often used to say: I became sure of our victory only on arrival of Bani Aslam in Medina.
They were in a pact with Emigrants. They were so many that lanes and streets of Medina were blocked.”34
“The fact is that their efforts imbued with tyranny and torture had gone so far as to prepare the old category of Prophet’s companions to discard Ahlul Bayt of Prophet including the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, Ali, from government. Such was their determination. Imam Ali (‘a) was not ignorant of this reality. This too was among the reasons that discouraged Ali to take a practical step towards taking back what was usurped from him.”35
On the basis of this:
“His Eminence keeping in view the political realities of that Muslim society considered it better to remain patient because every action needed power and he believed that at that time he was not having such a power.”36
“His Eminence, Muhammad (S) had told Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) about such circumstances and said that…the people after his passing away would cheat him. ‘If you get supporters you stage an uprising and if not you remain silent.’”37
“In our view silence of the Imam denotes refraining from armed uprising. And if not, His Eminence never refrained from raising his claim throughout period of Caliphs and after that also he always referred to it.”38
“There is no doubt that if the son of Abu Talib before he did that called people to help him his opponents would have tried more to trample his rights and the rights of the family of the Prophet.”39
Under conditions that developed, any kind of armed uprising would only have resulted in bloodshed of His Eminence (‘a).
It is natural that such a thing would have served as an excellent opportunity for fulfillment of the wishes of senior righteous persons! For which they had spent years around the Prophet put on a show of piety in a hypocritical manner.
Following the martyrdom of the son of Abu Talib – which would also have been accompanied by the martyrdom of his few loyal companions – the Emigrant hypocrites would have removed their veil of piety that had concealed their real faces. Not only were they capable of bloodshed of the Imam by ‘public deception’ they would have got a free hand to uproot the faith of Islam. The stages of deviation would have been crossed more swiftly and in a short time no trace of real teachings of Islam would have remained.
On the other hand the Umayyad party under the leadership of Abu Sufyan, seeing the field empty from the real supporter of religion of Islam (Ali Ibn Abi Talib) and his loyal Shias, would have again resumed their struggle to regain power and they would have gradually taken the Muslim society to idol worship and apostasy.
In other words, within a short period of martyrdom of Amirul Momineen (‘a) the religion of Islam would have been completely destroyed.
Therefore with one glance of impartiality without any historical emotionality we will realize that the safety of Islam from being destroyed was directly linked to the security of the life of Amirul Momineen (‘a).
The proof of abstinence of Imam (‘a) from Jihad that required martyrdom, the secret of bloodied supports and defenses of Hazrat Zahra (s.a.) for the life of Amirul Momineen (‘a) and also initiatives of Hazrat Zahra (s.a.) in the period of confrontation with the tyrant ruler should also be searched in this same point.
Absence of silence of Amirul Momineen (‘a) against usurpation of Caliphate and the level of correctness of the claim of ‘kindly leaving his right to the Caliphs’ can be seen in the incident of attack on Fatima’s house and the severity of His Eminence (‘a) against paying allegiance to Abu Bakr.40
“Abu Bakr and Umar with complete knowledge about the rights of Ali (‘a) and the special reverence he enjoyed among Prophet’s companions, invited him to the mosque to pay allegiance to the Caliph to avoid any reverse reaction from old companions, which was a great source of fear to them. But His Eminence (‘a) clearly refused to go to the mosque and in reply said:
I have more right to Caliphate; I will not pay allegiance to you and you should come and give Bay’at to me…
But Umar bin Khattab told Ali (‘a): Unless you don’t pay allegiance we shall not let you go. Umar was most active to obtain Ali’s allegiance and was directing the affairs. Ali told him: Milk the she-camel because there is a share in it for you. You try to strengthen Abu Bakr because Caliphate goes to you tomorrow. Thus he tried to reject the allegiance of the ruler in every way…”41
Even then it is claimed:
“Ali, with a lofty nature and enduring sacrifice for this religion and with utmost care that not the smallest difference should arise between the companions, without any hesitation pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr!... Ali in reply said… If I did not consider Abu Bakr worthy of this matter! I would never have left the Caliphate to him…Hazrat Ali gave allegiance one or two days after the passing away of the Prophet! And only this is a fact…”!42
“Following Ali’s oppositions, he and his companions gathered in Fatima’s house. Umar who followed the policy of force, advised Abu Bakr to make haste in getting Ali’s allegiance lest things take a turn. Therefore he surrounded the house with armed men and threatened to burn the house if they do not come out and pay allegiance to Abu Bakr. This shows how much Ali’s disapproval to the new regime was critical. Umar in order to fulfill his threat got ready with the elementary things. Fuel wood was gathered. He was about to set fire when he was told that Fatima was inside. He said: So what?
But nothing of this compelled Ali to come out for paying allegiance. This shows Ali’s obstinacy against usurpation of rulership.
Umar once more recommended Abu Bakr to get Ali’s pledge of allegiance at any rate. Therefore Abu Bakr once again summoned Ali (‘a) but Ali (‘a) in reply to the message that the Caliph of the Messenger of Allah (S) is calling you said: How soon you have attributed falsehood to the Messenger of Allah (S).
But Umar did not give up. Again he insisted on Abu Bakr that he must not give any respite to Ali (‘a) and Abu Bakr again sent Ali the request to give allegiance but Ali once more rejected it absolutely and said: You are claiming something which is not yours. Umar could not bear this. Therefore taking support of the political situation of that time and with drawn sword he surrounded the house of Ali (‘a) and demanded that he pay allegiance and warned that if he desisted he would be killed and ultimately Ali was forced to come out and was taken to the mosque.
This event nicely proves how strongly Ali opposed them and the usurpation of Caliphate.”43
Inspite of this they claim:
“He surrendered Caliphate to Abu Bakr and Umar for the sake of Muslim unity.”!44
“He surrendered Caliphate to Abu Bakr for the well being of Muslims, for religious solution of the problem and to attract the hearts of common Muslims.”!45
Ali, with his own will and not submitting to the circumstances remained at the side of Abu Bakr’s Caliphate; gave his complete assistance! And always kept himself at the disposal of the Caliph to solve difficulties.”!46
If such was the case why he was so obstinate? Why he was so much restive? On the other hand why he was threatened? Why Fatima’s house was set on fire? The door was opened by force under flames. Fatima was behind the door. The hurt resulted in the martyrdom of Mohsin and then her martyrdom later. What does it all show?
Do these claims not aim to exonerate the Caliphs from crimes they committed against Ahlul Bayt (‘a) of Prophet where Divine Revelations descended with the Archangel?
Obviously it is only this; because inspite of evidences that History has recorded it is still claimed that:
“Ali by his silence of some years put a stamp of approval on Caliphate of all three Caliphs.”!47
To gauge the level of correctness of the last conjecture it is sufficient that we do not forget what the answer of the Imam was to proposal of Abdur Rahman bin Auf in the six-person Shura committee for appointment of Caliph after Umar.
“With all the same precaution that Imam had taken, in the period of Shura for Caliphate, he did not agree to the conditions of Abdur Rahman bin Auf for acceptance of Caliphate…this was an open rejection of the Imam (‘a) of the practice and behavior of Abu Bakr and Umar.”48
“This shows that Ali did not attach any religious legitimacy to Caliphate of Abu Bakr and Umar. And in order to explain it he announced his opposition to their policies and ruling practices.”49
In the same way after the assassination of Uthman and public allegiance to Ali we witnessed that:
“A man was insistent that besides Quran and traditions of Prophet he (Ali) should also follow conduct of the two – i.e. Abu Bakr and Umar. But the Imam did not agree and he said:
Even if Abu Bakr and Umar did not act on anything except according to Quran and Prophet’s tradition they were not right.”50
On the basis of this even after passage of some years, not only did Amirul Momineen (‘a) not put a stamp of approval on their regime, rather with complete openness he pointed out the illegality of their Caliphate and declared them to be foundation of falsehood; even then it is claimed that:
“He found many proceedings of Umar similar to his own attitude.”!51
Perhaps in a first glance it is pictured that Amirul Momineen (‘a) did not display any reaction and took no step against the usurpation of Caliphate and he did not take any step against the illegal regime of Abu Bakr.
While historical evidences clearly show that His Eminence (‘a) cleared his stance by starting scathing debates and protests against the tyranny of the ruler – and that also from the Prophet’s mosque.
These firebrand speeches were delivered on Monday and Tuesday; that is the day of the demise of the Messenger of Allah (S) and the next day; that is the first day of the Abu Bakr’s illegal regime to get back his right of Caliphate.
Amirul Momineen (‘a) in the background of these scathing protests spoke about his usurped rights in the most open manner. And he emphasized on the illegality of Abu Bakr’s Caliphate and showed that it was usurped.
Following the efforts of the regime for taking forced allegiance from the people of Medina which was helped by the intervention of Bani Aslam tribe on the first day of Abu Bakr’s Caliphate (Tuesday), the residence of Amirul Momineen (‘a) and Fatima (s.a.) [house of Fatima] became the fort of some people who refused to give allegiance to the Caliphate of Abu Bakr. Opponents who were armed according to some clear historical evidences.
Movement of ‘opponents of Abu Bakr’s Caliphate’ to and fro the house of Fatima and their taking asylum in it was not unknown to the Caliph and his supporters.
So much so that some historical documents mention dominant factors of Caliph’s supports in the gathering of the refugees and also mention the presence of potentially dangerous personages like Talha and Saad bin Abi Waqqas.
In the end the fort of this group was broken down when the Caliph’s men surrounded Fatima’s house and Umar threatened to burn it down.
With attention to some points it can be said that: This asylum was in force for a maximum period of three days at the end of which when the house was surrounded by Umar’s men and they put the door to fire this was finally over on Friday (fourth day after the Prophet’s demise). And only Ali (‘a) remained in security from the attackers with the special support of Hazrat Zahra (s.a.).
Although this barricade was broken by the threats of Umar to burn down the house the small gathering of opponents of Bay’at of Abu Bakr was disintegrated. But this terrible incident did not in the least weaken the resolve of Amirul Momineen (‘a) and Hazrat Zahra (s.a.) to bring down Abu Bakr’s regime.
The city of Medina on the fifth day after the passing away of the Messenger of Allah (S) witnessed new steps from Amirul Momineen (‘a) and Hazrat Zahra (s.a.).
The first important incident during these days (from the fifth to the seventh after the passing away of the Messenger of Allah) were of soliciting help at night.
According to some authentic historical documents, Amirul Momineen (‘a) accompanied by Hazrat Zahra (s.a.), for three continuous nights to visit the houses of Emigrants and Helpers asking them for their support in bringing down the Caliphate of Abu Bakr.
Along with these nightly seeking of help – which was in fact a call for Jihad – Hazrat Zahra (s.a.) began her propaganda to expose the real face of Caliph by protesting against the usurpation of her monetary rights.
These monetary demands – which continued for many days by the help and support of His Eminence, Ali (‘a) – first of all included the demand of her inheritance and share of relatives of the Prophet. Monetary demands of Hazrat Zahra (s.a.) fell like a hammer on the head of the Caliphal regime – the culmination of which on the tenth day after the passing away of the Messenger of Allah (S) was the fiery sermon of Hazrat Zahra (s.a.) in the Prophet’s Mosque, called the Fadak sermon.
In the same way according to some historical evidences, Imam Ali (‘a) also on the ninth day after the demise of the Messenger of Allah (S) delivered a speech and again in the evening addressed the Emigrants and Helpers for the fourth time, urging them to render help to dethrone Abu Bakr.
Although these solicitations also like the previous ones remained unanswered and only a few companions volunteered to come forward and help the rightful successor of the Messenger of Allah (S).
This sluggishness and sloth in helping Amirul Momineen (‘a) was so bitter and painful that Hazrat Zahra (s.a.) in some of her addresses in the Prophet’s Mosque in particular flayed the Helpers by quoting the Quranic verse of ‘then fight the leaders of unbelief…”54 and again urged them to help them against the tyrant regime.
We can dare say that the ten days (after the Prophet’s passing) were days of culmination of helplessness, solitude and victimization of the Family of Revelation (‘a).
Among the painful events of the days following was the confiscation of Fadak Orchards which most probably occurred on the fifteenth day after the Prophet.
That Amirul Momineen (‘a) and Hazrat Zahra (s.a.) were not unaware of the intention of the Caliph to confiscate Fadak is obvious from some statements of Umar bin Khattab. Therefore Hazrat Zahra (s.a.), immediately after demanding her inheritance set out to prove her ownership of Fadak Orchards and demanded that they be restored to her.
On one hand the support and backing of His Eminence, Ali (‘a) and on the other the terror of the regime of awakening the people’s thinking leading to ousting of Abu Bakr from power, especially after the speeches of twelve prominent companions of Amirul Momineen (‘a) in the Prophet’s Mosque, compelled the Caliph and his supporters to enact the siege of Fatima’s house and force Ali (‘a) to pay allegiance.
Therefore, we see that the first fortnight of Abu Bakr’s Caliphate began with direct orders of the Caliph to subdue Ali (‘a) and force allegiance from him and it ended with the blood-filled defense of Hazrat Zahra (s.a.).
That which is most worthy of attention in these events is the determination of Amirul Momineen (‘a) against paying Bay’at in spite of the obstinacy and ferocity of the Caliph’s party men.
Severe opposition of His Eminence, Ali (‘a) from accepting the demands of Caliph’s attackers and his determination against their request, which was accompanied by the blood-smeared defense of Hazrat Zahra (s.a.); tell us about the height of Ahlul Bayt’s opposition to the regime.
A delicate point that is noticed in the above events is hopelessness of Amirul Momineen (‘a) from the possibility of deposing the usurped Caliphate of Abu Bakr, especially ten days after the Prophet. Because during the ten days all the petitions of Amirul Momineen (‘a) and Hazrat Zahra (s.a.) to the people had not produced any results. And there was no chance of armed uprising.
Once again it is worth noting that:
Armed Jihad for deposing Abu Bakr’s Caliphate would have made sense only if His Eminence (‘a) had sufficient power to confront the regime.
Because the aim of armed uprising was not only confronting the tyrant rule, rather it should really succeed in deposing the tyrant ruler and putting Amirul Momineen (‘a) in the seat of power and in control of circumstances.
Therefore if it did not result in deposition of Abu Bakr and accession of Ali (‘a) it was very much likely that it would have brought the martyrdom of Ali (‘a) and his companions or their absolute defeat. And this would not have resulted in anything but deviation and destruction of Islam.
As we have said before, if in this uprising, His Eminence, Ali (‘a), due to the paucity of supporters had reached martyrdom, the aged companions of Prophet, who had made a show of piety all these years, would have got all the chance to strengthen their position and initiated the distortion of Islamic values as result of which in a short time no trace of original Islam (Shiaism) would have remained.
Although another possibility was there that after the martyrdom of Ali (‘a) the Bani Umayyad party under the leadership of Abu Sufyan would have renewed their efforts to regain their lost power as a result of which following the downfall of Islam people would have reverted to idol worship and ignorance.
In the same way it must be remembered that even if the Imam and his men had succeeded in defeating Abu Bakr and his supporters but failed to take control of the situation, it might have developed into civil war and maybe furthered by Bani Umayyah and Abu Sufyan thus resulting in utter chaos and even the martyrdom of Ali (‘a) at the hands of Umayyads.
In other words, on one side the fervor of Imam’s companions and on the other the determination of the Caliph’s party to retain their hold on power would have resulted in complete disorder ending in the destruction of Islam in only fifteen days of Prophet’s demise. Hence the security of Islam was very much linked to the security of the life of Amirul Momineen (‘a).
It was for this reason that after the first fortnight Amirul Momineen (‘a) contained his aspirations of deposing Abu Bakr’s Caliphate and he directed his efforts in supporting the demands of Hazrat Zahra (s.a.). In other words Hazrat Zahra (s.a.) began her efforts to demand her rights from Abu Bakr after the first week of his Caliphate.
On the basis of this after feeble response of people to help him, Ali (‘a) decided to follow the second half of the will of the Prophet and that was to observe patience.
It is obvious that patience was dictated by demands of action and not of belief. And it could not be equated with armed uprising, that also without sufficient supporters. But this patience could also not be construed as ‘surrendering Caliphate’ or ‘refraining from espousing the right of Caliphate and abstaining from explaining the School of Imamate’. It cannot be analyzed in this wrong way.
On the whole it can be said:
The link between ‘safety of Islam’ and ‘security of Imam’s life’ appeared in the beginning period of the Caliphate of Abu Bakr.
With the difference that in the initial days Amirul Momineen (‘a) was in opposition to Abu Bakr while Hazrat Zahra (s.a.) acted as his protector and defender, but after one week, when there was no response from the people and the severity of Caliph’s men also increased to subdue him, (day signaling the beginning of the period of patience and silence) Hazrat Zahra (s.a.), in addition of the responsibility of protecting the life of Amirul Momineen (‘a) also assumed the role of opposition to the tyrant regime. His Eminence, Ali (‘a) intentionally took up the defense and support of Hazrat Zahra (s.a.) in her steps and this continued to the last.
The above analysis was done on the basis of following sources:
1 – Allamah Muhammad Baqir Majlisi: Biharul Anwar, (Vols. 28-29)
2 – Abduz Zahra Mahdi: Darasata wa Tahleel Haul Al-Hujoom Alaa Bait-e-Fatima
3 – Shaykh Abbas Qummi: Baitul Ahzaan fee Massaib-e-Sayyidatun Niswaan
4 – Sayyid Muhammad Baqir Musawi: Al-Kauthar fee Ahwaal-e-Fatima binte Nabi al-Athar
5 – Sayyid Ja’far Murtadha Amili: Maa Saa az-Zahra (s.a.) (Vols. 5-6)
6 – Sayyid Mahdi Hashmi: Fatima Zahra Dar Kalaam-e-Ahlul Sunnat (Vol. 2)
7 – Adnan Darakhshan: Uboor az Tareeki
8 – Masoodpur Sayyid Aaqaai: Hoor Dar Aatish
9 – Muhammad Dashti: Tahleel Hawaadis Naagawaar Zindagaani Hazrat Zahra (s.a.)
It is a point worth considering that silence of Imam Ali (‘a) has a limit as everything else. Beyond that it has gone beyond tolerance and control. In that case, it could rest at sword alone. Caliphs too were aware of this fact.
Historical documents indicate:
“One day in a gathering, Umar asked: If we turn you back to what you are denying now, that is idol worship, what would you do?
The narrator says: All were silent. Umar repeated these words thrice. Then Imam Ali (‘a) got up and said: O Umar! In that case we will ask you to repent and if you repent we will accept.
The Caliph asked: And what if I don’t repent?
Imam said: In that case I would cut off your head.”55
This is another conjecture attached to his practical conduct and his stand with regard to Caliphs’ government. They say that Imam maintained silence regarding his Imamate and Guardianship (Wilayat). Thus they say:
“Ali (‘a) refrained from expressing his view and increasing differences among the people about his Imamate. And it was a prominent part of his attitude to the Caliphs, in their times and in his own period.”!56
It is indeed strange that according to what they claim, His Eminence (‘a) himself did what he prohibited others.
History proves his actions stood in contrast to claims being made about him.
“Sources indicate that Ali did not retire to isolation when his right was usurped from him.
He believed in the holy text, which establishes his right. At every opportunity, he used to complain to his adversaries and opponents about his right that was snatched from him. He used to remind people about his right. Besides, he used to tell his friends and associates not to give any excuse to them. He did this so that things remain clear to judge on truth and facts. So how can he himself not act on what he preached to others?”57
“Some friends of Amirul Momineen (‘a) also resorted to divine text (Nass). Some Emigrants and Helpers in the very initial days of Abu Bakr’s Caliphate went to the mosque and each of them standing separately flayed him for usurping the Caliphate, scolded and advised him and mentioned their proofs on the rightfulness of Amirul Momineen (‘a)…that were clear due to the existence of divine texts (Nass).”58
In this chapter, our aim is to make clear some of the efforts of Imam Ali (‘a) to prove his usurped right and revive his Imamate and Guardianship that was being forgotten. And also to criticize the stance of some who believe that Imam Ali (‘a) did not allow his friends to remind people about his Guardianship and Imamate!!
He used to recite this couplet among companions of Prophet even in the presence of Caliphs:
The Prophet made me leader and Imam of people on the day of Ghadeer Khumm.
Woe! Woe be on one who will meet God on Judgment Day with his hands polluted with tyranny to me.
When they wanted to take him by force to the mosque to take allegiance for Abu Bakr, he reminded them about Ghadeer and this time they acknowledged it. Just as in the incident of Shura that was instituted by Umar for successorship after him and also during Uthman’s Caliphate he argued on the basis of Ghadeer.
Imam Ali (‘a) says in Nahjul Balagha: They have the will.
Does it mean that the Prophet (S) appointed his Ahlul Bayt as his successors or he willed the people to take care of them or was it advice of the Prophet to take Ali (‘a) as their leader after him? Paying attention to this same sermon we can derive the above meaning. In the preceding sentences Imam (‘a) has shown Ahlul Bayt (‘a) to be superior to all the people and considered leadership to be their right and that only they were fit for leadership of Islamic Ummah.
In the later sentences Imam Ali (‘a) says: Now the right has returned to its rightful owner. It has found its correct location wherefrom it was driven out.
This speech is during his own Caliphate. He considers Islamic government his moral and practical right. He again stresses that the previous Caliphs had usurped his clear and absolute right.
While the government of Islam becomes Imam’s right only when there exists a statement from the Prophet.61
Here we refer to some statements of His Eminence, Ali (‘a) in which he has considered leadership after the Prophet to be his immediate right and considered its usurpation an oppression against himself:
…since the time of Prophet’s death always my established right had been taken away from me.62
From the audience a person got up and said: Son of Abu Talib, you are greedy for Caliphate. Imam in reply said: No, you are greedier than me while with regard to its conditions you are too far from it. I am nearer to it and more deserving. I am demanding any own right. You want to stop me from reaching to my right and want to stand in between.63
…in the same sermon, the Imam complains to God against Quraish. He says: They want to revolt against my own established right.
Likewise, in the Shura committee he told the people: Islamic government is my right. If it is given to me I will take it…
Thus the Imam considered Caliphate his own right. He regards Caliphs usurpers of his absolute right.
He regards Caliphate to be his right without a gap, in such a way that he considered the rejection of his leadership as oppression of Quraish to him and usurpation of his rights…
Imam is not complaining why he was discarded and others took his place. This is not painful to him. His complaint is that his established and acknowledge right was usurped from him. He used to base his claim on Ghadeer.
Imam considered himself and Ahlul Bayt (‘a) as standard-bearers of truth. He also made it clear that the right that Prophet has left to them and in every way their precedence belongs to Ahlul Bayt and separation from them is departure from faith.64”65
On reading these traditions we derive an important point: Amirul Momineen (‘a) sees only himself deserving for Caliphate and considers rulership as a right vested by God to him. It is a distinction particular to him. When others come in between, they are usurpers. No one is chosen for succession to Prophet except Ali. So if others come in they are transgressors on the right which is not theirs. Its origin is divine. Therefore Imam Ali (‘a) regards himself the only deserving candidate by divine choice.
Amirul Momineen (‘a) in some other statements introduced himself as ‘most fit’ and ‘foremost’ for Caliphate. Thus it is mentioned in Nahjul Balagha that: ‘I am more eligible for it than others’66 or he said: ‘You are more liable to pay allegiance to me’.67
The important point to understand in this statement is that the two qualities of ‘most eligible’ and ‘liable’ have two meanings in the dictionary. In the book, Misbah al-Muneer this meaning is indicated: ‘His statement is more truthful than such and such.’ It is used in two ways. One is to particularize a thing with another without their being any commonality in it; like the statement: ‘Zaid is most eligible for his money’. It means that except for Zaid no has the right to his money. And the second is in the meaning of commonality with the other and it is proved in the sense of precedence among others.68
On the basis of this terms of ‘most eligible’ and ‘liable’ are common and their special connotation must be seen in the style of the sentence. When we see the style of the statements of Amirul Momineen (‘a) we find that he is talking of ‘truth’ against ‘falsehood’.
There are so many statements of His Eminence (‘a) of these type in his debates and speeches advocating the supremacy of his divine appointment and the declaration of Ghadeer. In addition to other divine texts (Nass) in his favor and his other steps in reminding about his appointment as successor and Caliph, that we can say that:
“Steps of Imam Ali (‘a) himself, for propagation of ‘divine Imamate’ was the best proof of propagation of Shiaism in the period of Caliphate of His Eminence and later.”69
“It is notable that in the beginning Amirul Momineen (‘a) based his eligibility on divine text (Nass) as this went on to prove the following:
- It passed that when the followers of Imam (‘a) protested on the basis of divine text (Nass); Abu Bakr was not able to reply and his men threatened people on the point of the sword so that no one else could utter these words and this threat was effective. On the other hand, Amirul Momineen (‘a) was also threatened with death many a times…
- The period between Ghadeer and Saqifah was only two months. The divine text (Nass) is reminded when it is not heard by the people or buried in oblivion due to length of time. But the text was still alive in memories of the people because being recent enough people themselves had heard the text from Prophet and witnessed the whole event of Ghadeer.
Therefore the Imam less reminded about the holy text and spoke more of his eligibility. But after some years and death of many eye-witnesses we see that His Eminence again stressed on the holy text.
- The best style of argument is to follow the exigency of debate. That is to debate with something a part of which had already been accepted. Claimants of Caliphate argued with the Ansaar saying that they were more eligible because of their relationship with the Messenger of Allah (S) and they mentioned their excellences. Imam (‘a) also argued in the same style.
- Sometimes mention of ones excellences is necessary…it was because someone asked the Imam: How did they sideline you when you were most eligible?”70
It is interesting that the manner of Imam Ali (‘a) was to remain silent and not to go into religious discourses about Imamate and Wilayat as we have seen:
The attention of Imam towards Shiite Imamate was so much that:
“In a detailed letter, which Imam wrote to Muawiyah, he has explained this issue in detail. The letter contains interesting points with respect to Imam’s share in dissemination of Shiite Wilayat…”71
Anyway, the severity of emphasis done from the side of Amirul Momineen (‘a) regarding his right of Caliphate and Imamate can be gauged from the fact that those who create such conjectures are pushed a step backward and they are compelled to confess that such steps of Imam (‘a) is a struggle to correct the deviated beliefs of the people and the meaning of Imam’s statements is to establish his particular personal right which was based on divine text (Nass) and which had been usurped by particular persons. And in one matter they are absolutely silent that who is the owner of this right and who are the usurpers.
In such a way that in this interpretation of unity-seekers Imam (‘a) has spoken that Islam is having rulership and Caliphate (subject to special conditions and rules). But he never mentioned that the owner of that post was he himself and that Caliphate was a right related to him alone. So how can it be said that he talked of the usurpation of Caliphate and about the usurpers. Thus they falsely claim:
“Did Ali (‘a) while overlooking the demanding of his personal rights for the sake of Muslim unity and protection of Islam awaited to explain the great pillar of Islam which is the surety of Islam and he resorted to silence?”!72
“These statements should not be borne as personal defense and chance historical narration, it would be better to consider them as having a divine message and revelation of a wasted right till it remains in History.”!73
“Ali (‘a) according to the divine responsibility wanted to propagate one of the pillars of Islam which was very good for the future of Islam and Muslims and it was one of the divine rights that had been trespassed and forgotten…and he wanted to accomplish this without creating disunity among the rows of Muslims.”!74
These conjectures are so complicated and confusing that one who reads them wonders whether those who have coined them have forgotten what they had claimed previously?!
But it must be said: These types of expressions were also propagated directly with the previous conjectures and only for concealing numerous historical evidences (all of which show discussions of guardianship and Imamate and plan of usurped right of Amirul Momineen (‘a) from His Eminence (‘a) himself).
Such plans put the readers into such confusion that it is not understood Amirul Momineen (‘a) in fact was reviving which subjects?! A Caliphate absolute and ambiguous that is not understood…
Or a personal right and specified that itself has an application that is introduced and also its usurpers are exposed…
Although it must be understood that showing such unlikely analyses from the biography of Amirul Momineen Ali (‘a) from the previous beliefs based on the separation of ‘rulership in Islam’ from ‘eligibility of Amirul Momineen (‘a) as a rightful Caliph, immediately after the Messenger of Allah (S)’.
Thus it is said:
“In my view one who says today that there is no politics and rulership, his deviation from Islam is more than one who says for example that Ali was not the immediate Caliph due to the fact that this issue in relation to that one is branch issue and they have separated the principles of religion from politics which is a very dangerous thing and his deviation is also more; that is it can be said that they have denied a necessary matter, but with regard to the deniers of immediate Caliphate Ali (‘a) it cannot be said that they have denied a necessary matter of Islam…”!75
It is interesting that in the way of attributing separation between the position of Caliphate and Imamate and also in concealing all the debates of Amirul Momineen (‘a) they still claim:
“Imam instead of stressing on the Caliphate of Ahlul Bayt, he has emphasized on their knowledge, intelligence and their scientific and spiritual centrality.”!76
It is in the circumstances that the makers of these statements themselves have exhibited a contradiction in speech when they claimed that:
“Imam severely prohibited the people excess regarding himself which may in contradiction to what perception the general public holds about him.”!77
Not only this is contradicting their own statements, it is also against their publicized claim regarding the attitude of His Eminence (‘a); because firstly:
Statements of His Eminence (‘a) regarding the moral positions of Ahlul Bayt (‘a) are opposed to what the general public thinks! Because they have themselves confessed that after the Prophet (S),
“The majority chose the method of selection and the Imam and his supporters stressed on divine text (Nass).”!78
On the basis of this confession most of the people had not accepted the special status of Imam (‘a) and in fact it must be said that they even denied and ignored his recognized position; on the basis of explanation of essay writers, stressing on knowledge and intellect and scientific and spiritual centrality of the Imam (‘a) in such conditions would be accepting of a position and status opposed to public perception about the His Eminence (‘a)!
Secondly it must be noted that:
“Actions of Amirul Momineen (‘a) in reviving the knowledge centrality of Ahlul Bayt (‘a)79 in emphatic way should be considered to be a right contained in his Caliphate and not viewed as aimed to dispense with public perception about Alawi Caliphate.
These steps, themselves are proofs that the eligibility for Caliphate was restricted to His Eminence (‘a);
So that it may become clear to all that:
“Their sciences and divine knowledge were from a divine source and all the other people are not fit to be compared with them. Therefore others must follow Ahlul Bayt.
His Eminence, Ali (‘a) has introduced Ahlul Bayt as follows:
They are the trustees of His secrets, shelter for His affairs, source of knowledge about Him, centre of His wisdom, valleys for His books and mountains of His religion.
With them Allah straightened the bend of religion’s back and removed the trembling of its limbs.
None in the Islamic community can be taken at par with the Progeny of the Prophet. One who was under their obligation cannot be matched with them.
They are the foundation of religion and pillar of Belief. The forward runner has to turn back to them while the follower has to overtake them.
They possess the chief characteristics for vicegerency. In their favor exists the will and succession (of the Prophet).
When the Imam (‘a) got the seat of Caliphate he said:
This is the time when right has returned to its owner and diverted to its centre of return.”80
Are Shias obliged to avoid discussion on Caliphate…?
One of the conjectures indirectly related to the conjecture of silence is that Shias urged silence. They must restrain to debate and discuss the subject of Caliphate and Imamate of Ali. They are expected to not reveal usurpation of Caliphate by preceding Caliphs. Their crimes have sought cover under a false obligation of their being secrets of progeny of Muhammad.
As we pointed out in the first volume of this book, these conjectures are in fact new statements of invitation to silence (and always overlooking differences of knowledge between two schools). Answers too in this respect are dealt with. In short, it is contradiction between secrets of knowledge and political secrets of Ahlul Bayt (‘a).
What we want to explain here is a new point towards answering this conjecture.
A thing, reality of which is hidden from people, is called a secret. Accuracy or keen attention in understanding a subject results in giving it entity of secrecy. Or foreign hands could have been at work that resulted in pushing it into secrecy.
In any case, a reality which can be exposed is hidden from public knowledge. When it is hidden with all proofs it becomes a secret.
In these circumstances there is no need if subjects of all proofs (personal, external or exigency) remain concealed from the people, it is always necessary to maintain its link with the subject matter and it must never be separated from it.
In other words, the responsibility of maintaining this link is a subject that is not only applicable to a secret. Because anything hidden from people and having characteristic of a secret is not always under necessity of remaining behind a curtain.
In fact, between to be concealed or to continue to remain concealed is an issue that does not have a requirement. Except that there be a necessity for it.
On the basis of this if something is secret it does not imply that it is prohibited, therefore it is not that a secret should always continue to be a secret.
There are many things which should be known to all, but the obstacle…! The tyrant governments or tyrants that hold power first spread dread and fear among people to hold them from reaching to facts. These very facts change to secrets with passage of time.
It is obvious that not only concealing of these facts is not necessary, rather if they could be useful in securing prosperity in the next world, or its knowledge is a necessity for happiness in that world to keep them secret would be fatal to us. Especially if there is a direct relation between these facts and matters of faith or these facts help us to separate guidance from misguidance. Therefore it is prohibited.
Now we return to matters called secrets of progeny of Muhammad. This term is actually used for traditions in book of Sulaym Ibn Qays Hilali and connected to incidents that occurred in the early stages of Islam and usurpation of Caliphate and seizing of rulership after the Prophet.
Now the question is: why these facts are called secrets?
Did these incidents automatically became secrets or they were made into secrets? Was there a special aim in keeping them secret?
In reply we say:
Those events occurred or better to say were committed in broad daylight – seen by all, at the surface of society. Now such an open thing is changed into a secret to protect usurpation of usurpers and to protect their government. After every revolution, endeavors are made to hide the tyranny that led to its success and continuity. It is treated as a crime for the coming generations.
That this type of information is called secret is in itself proof that it is told in tyrannical conditions and had remained far from knowledge of common people due to pressing circumstances that dominated the society. Besides, the narration of events had not gone from a generation to next. So now after a lapse of so many years it would be impossible to know those facts.
So the contents of the book of Sulaym called secrets are facts in their reality and originality.81 The tyrants that grasped Caliphate laid hands upon these facts making them confidential so that they could reach to anyone’s knowledge. The reader of the book of Sulaym comes across information about Caliphs, their attitudes and their life by its root. And it contains information that is not available anywhere else.
Such type of confidentiality cannot be a correct interpretation of the word ‘secrets’. Because secondly today the past tyranny is no more.
Of course there are certain points in Sulaym’s Book, which should not be told openly because they relate to particular time and place? It will be detrimental to make them public. The matter is such that it needs special precaution and care. But not all matters in the book are such.
Therefore the word of ‘secrets’ should not be interpreted to keep all the matters of the book of Sulaym confidential.
Suffocating circumstances some centuries ago ruled society and therein were a few particular persons instrumental in this. Those restrictions were effective at that time but how it can now be a ruling for this present generation?
This question must be asked from those who claim:
“This writer on the basis of all he has learnt of the biographies of Ahlul Bayt (‘a) has narrated most narrations that caused mischief and unrest and gives advantage to the enemies. They caused scuffles between Shia and Sunni and Muslim bloodshed entailed. Things took the worst turn. Dissimulation became necessary. The Impeccable Imams had to prohibit revealing the secrets of Muhammad’s House.”82
It is thus said that only because only calling some historical narrations as secrets does not mean that Imams have prohibited them. It must be seen what the obligation of a Shia is? To narrate events or not, should be decided by independent arguments. Can the word, secrets be applied or not? The answer must be found in Islamic rulings.
Although some correct applications of it indicate the same conjecture. However, careful attention must be paid because if secrets do not have any detrimental consequences, it is not necessary to keep them unrevealed.
In jurisprudence also revealing secrets has a bearing on condition of time and place. Some conditions could be fixed and unchangeable. Some may alter with change of time and place. Therefore decision depends upon their nature.
Propagator of this conjecture regards every secret confidential. To him detrimental consequences are enough to prove a secret as confidential. Within these milestones, he is groping his way between a secret and confidential matter. It is only to escape from narration of events which are shameful due to their criminal characteristics.
Even if we accept some information in early stages of Islam concerning events of Caliphate and division of the nation thereat are secrets. Still there remains a question if these events in their width and breadth found in books of Sunni sect or found in documents, are they still secrets or confidential?
There are libraries where historical books are collected, through them bitter events that occurred in the early period of Islam can easily be traced, hence these events can no more be secrets.
In the same way in the present age, analysis of events had become a science. Scholars and historians trace the track of past nations. How can Muslim historians be prohibited and restricted from reaching to root of the causes?
If it is claimed that it is an insult to the Prophet’s House where divine revelation descended, then what to say about the train of events that ensued, such as setting fire to the door of the House, miscarriage of Mohsin, threat of killing to Ali and a series of events? Should these events not be told or recorded in history?
In reply we say: None of these events can be considered as secrets as all are mentioned in Sunni books.
We invite our readers to the book, Attack on Fatima’s house by Abdul Zahra Mahdi. He has mentioned the event in detail with documentary proofs. The scholar has presented the events following Saqifah for public scrutiny and judgment.
Again, oriental scholars like Wilfred Madelung have written with courage recorded every bit of events of that early period of Islam and describes in detail the plot of Helpers and Emigrants. (Companions of the accursed scroll). All this is supported by documentary proofs and evidences.
“Wilfred Madelung, German orientialist, in his book,83 first puts forward the theory of Lammens84 i.e. the triumvirate of power (Abu Bakr, Umar and Abu Ubaidah Jarrah). Then he explains according to the analysis of Caetani85 that in this triangle, the inspiring element was Umar. According to Madelung, Abu Bakr had aspired power and undoubtedly, prior to the Prophet’s demise he had decided to be his caliph…Therefore he was determined to destroy his opponents who were Ahlul Bayt of Prophet and was waiting for an opportunity.
Further, Madelung stresses on existence of a pre-planned and well-decided design of Abu Bakr for obtaining Caliphate. However he thinks it was fortuitous, a matter of chance that the plot took shape in Saqifah. Besides, he considers the help of a few from the people of Quraish was very much efficacious which led to public allegiance…”86
The Second caliph has admitted most confidential matters quoted in Sulaym’s Book:
“During journey to Syria, when Umar reached the district of Shura he was informed of an epidemic in Damascus. Umar said: If I die and Abu Ubaidah were left alive, I would have appointed him to Caliphate. If he (Abu Ubaidah) is dead I will make Maaz bin Jabal87 a caliph.
If we keep this statement in line with episode of Saqifah it appears too congruous with its very spirit. Because the most important persons who supported candidacy of Abu Bakr were themselves: Umar, Abu Ubaidah Jarrah, Salim and Maaz bin Jabal.”88
On the basis of this except for the issues specified by Ja’fari jurisprudence every topic that in the view of unity-seekers is to be kept secret must be propagated if those things are mentioned in Sunni sources or they can be traced in Sunni books. Unity-seekers cannot prohibit making them public.
All these matters, that is about Caliphs, their identities, intentions etc. that exist only in Shia books and records are such that their refutation is nowhere to be seen in Sunni books and according to the authority of these books they are not disproved.
Now we should see as to where dissimulation stands in our days:
In every sense, silence of Ali in having intellectual discussions based on proofs was not to create differences nor did it carry any motive to foment disunity. Still they say:
“Imam Sadiq recommends unity. He advises dissimulation against tyrants in order to avoid divisions. It is especially for Shia and Sunni brothers that they should say that Muslims must have piety, they must practice dissimulation and refrain from creating any type of difference.”!91
Anyway, analysis of events of early Islamic days is an urgent need for Islamic society and our present young generation. It is also a valid foundation of creating unity.
A you have seen, unity-seekers have always made efforts so that events may be forgotten. They prefer that all records of deeds of usurper Caliphs should be forgotten. Recently they have also invited to maintain silence under the excuse of maintaining secrets and it also includes discussions related to Imamate and Wilayat (Guardianship) of Ahlul Bayt (‘a). In short, their endeavors are far reaching beyond past conjectures. Their aim is to distort face of Imamiyah school and extinguish lamp of Shiaism by perverting and deviating facts and fundamentals of Alawi Guardianship i.e. Wilayat. They even say:
“I do not deny that there were secrets in Ali’s heart. He did not reveal them because he did not see fit. We too should not reveal them in emulating our Chief, Ali. He even did not tell the nearest ones. We too must do the same.”!92
To analyze this we must first see what those secrets were, which Imam Ali (‘a) did not see fit to be revealed.
A glance at the article: Imam Ali (‘a) and Unity,93 shows that these secrets, which according to this claim must not be revealed, ‘The moral stations of the Imams; that is the splendor of their Wilayat, Imamate and guidance’. Thus they say:
“To acknowledge moral stations of Imams needs time. One should cross stages of learning and knowledge to know their position. Ali, prior and after Caliphate, used to speak regarding it. But he did not see among people required maturity and preparedness to reveal the secret of Guardianship. Later he settled in Kufa. His friends and companions too gathered there around him. Then he spoke some matters to them. Such matters that he told were most probably for Shias. Earlier to this, no one knew the facts except Salman, Abu Dharr, Miqdad and Ammar. Before Caliphate, a few persons knew the secrets. They were under mandate to keep them confidential.”!94
This claim is being made at the time when all this can be found with evidences in Sunni books. The superiority of morals, exalted tributes and divinely bestowed qualities of Imam Ali (‘a) glare from pages of Sunni books. What is so open now, is called a secret.
In the same way divine text (Nass) that supports the Wilayat (Guardianship) and Imamate of Ali can also be found in historical sources because history of the Message of Prophet cannot be separated from history of propagation of his teachings.
Allamah Abdul Husayn Amini; his literacy endeavors in compiling the book of Al-Ghadeer are too worthy and valuable and very much useful. Likewise, the valuable research of Indian scholar, Hamid Husayn, in his book Abaqaat al-Anwaar is too beneficial to a reader. Another scholar in this field, Qadi Nurullah Shushtari has also exerted efforts in compiling realities in his book Ihqaaq al-Haqq. Later on Allamah Sayyid Abdul Husayn Sharafuddin compiled a book titled Al-Murajaat. The documentary evidences and facts collected and compiled in these books clearly establish rights and moral stations of Ali and the Imams. That which makes these books more trustworthy is that all sources are from opponents of Shia School. Books of those who do not see eye to eye with Shia School are full of material, which stands a ground to defend Shia belief. As such this material is and never was confidential.
If Imam Ali (‘a) did not reveal the matter, it was because he was not under a mandate to do so. Taking into consideration twenty-three years of Prophet’s labor from the day of announcement of his Mission to Ghadeer, Ali was mandated to preserve the message. Muslim society had attained maturity to the extent of sufficiency.
Therefore, the Imam only exhausted the argument on the deniers and warned the negligent ones and he had no other purpose. Because secondly, in this matter, the Islamic Ummah is one that has the responsibility to refer to the Imam and Divine Proof (Hujjat).
There is thus no reason to argue its being confidential. This itself is enough proof of existence of pressure, which had crushed liberties in society. Imam Ali (‘a) could have done more had he been free. He did not tell because he could not. That Caliphs ruled with tyranny can well be understood by the very behavior of Imam Ali (‘a).
The Prophet had conveyed to the nation all aspects of guidance and attributes of Ali. What Ali should and could have said when the Prophet had told everything?
If the moral position of Ali be regarded as a secret, does it not crawl into oblivion? Will it not put the Message of Prophet to question?
There remains nothing unknown to Muslim society, which Shia cannot find in Sunni books.
Inspite of clear contradictions in the above-mentioned claim they make another:
“Imam instead of stressing on the Caliphate of Ahlul Bayt, has emphasized on their knowledge, intelligence and their scientific and spiritual centrality.”!95
And the emphasis of this view of unity-seekers to continue this attitude. Thus it is said:
“Difference between the issue of Caliphate and Imamate is a strong pillar of nearness.”96
The question is:
What is the motive of these contradictory statements?
The reply can be:
According to their thinking, the moral stations of Ahlul Bayt (‘a) are such that they can make their audiences conclude that the personal right of Imam Ali (‘a) was usurped and pillaged by three Caliphs. The Imam was deprived of right of Caliphate that God had bestowed on him. Caliphate was his heritage.
In the view of these people, whenever there was discussion of the moral stations of Ahlul Bayt (‘a), invariably there was also mention of the usurpation of personal rights of Amirul Momineen (‘a) through the Caliphs, secondly these issues should be considered as the hidden secrets?!
Therefore they treat it a secret in order not to talk about it. The word, secret is a good excuse and a covering on crimes of Caliphs. Their Caliphate loses its validity and credibility if facts were broached that it was Ali’s right. There is no way to conceal except to maintain silence. Secrets are not to be revealed. Hence such things should be ignored and gradually they would disappear from the root.
“These statements should not be considered as defense of personal rights…”97
“As for issues related to Caliphate there is much material in history and tradition on behalf of Ali in addition to narrations of Ali. This has not been evaluated from literary standard or according to Imam’s standard or motive. If evaluated they will not correspond with the attitude of Ali or Caliphs.
If we keep this as a base to judge the authenticity of these statements we will see, mostly they are from the book of Sulaym bin Qays. Hence they do not carry any authenticity”!98
Now it should be asked: Let us see how the Imam’s conduct towards Caliphs was. And from where this should commence?
To make a correct judgment about any historical personality is there any other way except that the facts must be drawn from history or a reliable source?
Please pay attention: For a personality like Imam Ali (‘a), regarding his relations with Caliphate and Caliphs we must refer to narrations and information recorded in books of History.99
Therefore, it will not be logical that without referring to historical sources we only base our analysis on personal whims as far as the Imam’s attitude is concerned. And then make it the base and standard of correctness or incorrectness of historical evidences and narrations regarding the attitudes of His Eminence (‘a) towards the Caliphs.
In other words, exposing the biographical details of Amirul Momineen (‘a) with regard to his relationship with Caliphate or Caliphs is possible from analysis of captioned issues in history and traditions and in consequence of referring to these narration reports and sayings. Now how can these fruits and results be falsified on the basis of a standard drawn from some other sources?
This standard is invalid and its application is not aimed except to put a lid on the misdeeds of the usurpers of the rights of Amirul Momineen (‘a) and abuses against the Caliphs. Because every investigation has demonstrated that understanding the attitude of Ali by referring to History and narration reports related to their behavior has referred to these sources, so talking about the behavior of Amirul Momineen (‘a) in every matter will be meaningless.
From where have they arrived at the claim that Imam (‘a) refrained from emphasis on the usurpation of his rights at the hands of Caliphs that they should make it a reliable standard and scientific aspect to question the information contained in Shia History and hadith books?!
There is no other aim in this except to make interpretations based on ones personal whims to support their own claims and to refute what is in opposition to their views.
In fact in such a manner one is not in pursuit of finding the reality; one only endeavors to present that which one has accepted to be reality and which one has preferred through some selected evidences and rejection of all other sources.
- 1. Refer: Ali Labbaf: A Victim Lost in Saqifah, Vol. 4, Section 1, Discourse 1 and 2cc.
- 2. Documents and sources of siege on the house of Fatima (s.a.).
- 3. Refer: Ali Labbaf: A Victim Lost in Saqifah, Vol. 4, Section 1, Discourse 4.
- 4. In the discussions after this writing, we shall criticize and investigate these objections.
- 5. In addition to criticism of the conjecture “Absence of demanding the right of Caliphate” related to the conjectures of first type we will also refute the supposition of “Lack of explanation of the position of Imamate and Wilayat by Amirul Momineen (‘a)”.
- 6. Muhammad Ali Tashkhiri: Article quoted in Kayhan Farhangi, Issue No. 184, Bahman 80, Pg. 34.
- 7. Jalal Darikhsha: Mawaaze Siyasi Hazrat Ali Dar Qibal Mukhalifeen (Political stands of Ali against opponents), Pg. 42.
- 8. For deeper understanding of the stance of Abu Sufyan and his aims in this regard refer to the book, Tahleel Neem Qarn Siayasathai Tableeghi Amawiyaan dar Shaam, Pgs. 48-50, by Faheema Farhamandpoor; or the last part of the article: ‘Realism in the biography of Amirul Momineen (‘a) and the attitude of enemies’ by Abdur Reza Khalili printed in Jam-e-Jam Daily, Issue no. 4, Azar 1381.
- 9. Jalal Darikhsha: Mawaaze Siyasi Hazrat Ali Dar Qibal Mukhalifeen (Political stands of Ali against opponents), Pg. 43.
- 10. Asghar Qaidan: Tahleeli Bar Mawaze Siyasi Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) Research on political stands of Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a), Pg. 83.
- 11. Jalal Darikhsha: Mawaaze Siyasi Hazrat Ali Dar Qibal Mukhalifeen (Political stands of Ali against opponents), Pg. 44.
- 12. Ibid. Pg. 45.
- 13. Ali Muhammad Meer Jalili: Imam Ali (‘a) wa Zamaamdaaraan (Imam Ali and the Rulers), Pgs. 79-80.
- 14. Rasool Ja’faryan: Tarikh wa Seerah Siyasi Amir-e-Mominaan Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) History and political biography of Ali (‘a), Pg. 18.
- 15. Mustafa Dilshad Tehrani: Meeras Rabooda (Usurped inheritance), Pg. 89.
- 16. Sayyid Hasan Fatimi: Article: Saqifah quoted in Danish Nama Imam Ali (‘a), Vol. 8, Pg. 446.
- 17. Hashmatullah Qambari Hamadani: Asraar wa Asaar Saqifah Bani Saada (Secrets and relics of Saqifah Bani Saada), Pg. 85.
- 18. Jalal Darikhsha: Mawaaze Siyasi Hazrat Ali Dar Qibal Mukhalifeen (Political stands of Ali against opponents), Pgs. 43-44.
- 19. Sayyid Hasan Fatimi: Article: Saqifah quoted in Danish Nama Imam Ali (‘a), Vol. 8, Pg. 458; quoted from: Ihtijaaj Tabarsi: Vol. 1, Pgs. 186-199.
- 20. Quoted from: Kitab Sulaym Ibn Qays, Vol. 2, Pg. 583.
- 21. Quoted from: Ibid. Vol. 2, Pg. 865.
- 22. Quoted from: Ibid. Vol. 2, Pg. 589.
- 23. Quoted from: Ihtijaaj Tabarsi: Vol. 1, Pgs. 185.
- 24. Sayyid Hasan Fatimi: Article: Saqifah quoted in Danish Nama Imam Ali (‘a), Vol. 8, Pg. 456.
- 25. Ustad Murtadha Mutahhari: Seeri Dar Seerah Aimmah-e-Athaar (A Glance at the Life of Purified Imams), Pg. 22.
- 26. Ibid. Pg. 20.
- 27. Yusuf Gholami: Pas az Ghuroob (After Sunset), Pg. 191.
- 28. Muhammad Waizzaada Khorasani: Article quoted in Kitab Naqd Magazine, Issue No. 19, (Vol. 2), Summer 80, Pg. 21.
- 29. Muhammad Waizzaada Khorasani: Article quoted in Kitab Naqd Magazine, Issue No. 19, (Vol. 2), Summer 80, Pg. 21.
- 30. Ezzatudin Abu Hamid Motazalli (Ibn Abi Hadeed) writes: One day the Prophet hit on the shoulder of Ali and cried and said: “I weep for the hatred that is in the hearts of the nation. They do not make it open to you as long as I am alive”. Ibn Askar writes: Ali asked as to what he should do then. The Prophet told him to be patient. Ali asked: What would happen if I couldn’t do that? The Prophet said: You will face hardships. (Yusuf Gholami After Sunset, Pg. 160 narrated from Nahjul Balagha) Vol. 4, Pg. 107; History of City of Damascus Vol. 2, Pg. 325.
- 31. This incident happened in the third week of Abu Bakr’s Caliphate.
- 32. Sayyid Hasan Fatimi: Article: Saqifah quoted in Danish Nama Imam Ali (‘a), Vol. 8, Pg. 449.
- 33. Jalal Darikhsha: Mawaaze Siyasi Hazrat Ali Dar Qibal Mukhalifeen (Political stands of Ali against opponents), Pgs. 49-50.
- 34. Yusuf Gholami: Bohraan-e-Jansheeni-e-Payambar (Crisis of Succession to the Prophet), Pgs. 34-35.
- 35. Yusuf Gholami: Pas az Ghuroob (After Sunset), Pgs. 191-192.
- 36. Jalal Darikhsha: Mawaaze Siyasi Hazrat Ali Dar Qibal Mukhalifeen (Political stands of Ali against opponents), Pg. 49.
- 37. Yusuf Gholami: Bohraan-e-Jansheeni-e-Payambar (Crisis of Succession to the Prophet), Pg. 65.
- 38. Ali Muhammad Meer Jalili: Imam Ali (‘a) wa Zamaamdaaraan (Imam Ali and the Rulers), Pg. 160.
- 39. Yusuf Gholami: Pas az Ghuroob (After Sunset), Pgs. 194-195.
- 40. Refer: Ali Labbaf: A Victim Lost in Saqifah, Vol. 4, Section 1.
- 41. Jalal Darikhsha: Mawaaze Siyasi Hazrat Ali Dar Qibal Mukhalifeen (Political stands of Ali against opponents), Pgs. 44-45.
- 42. Abdul Qadir Dahqaan Siraawaani: Article quoted in Nida-e-Islam Magazine, Issue No. 15, Autumn 82, Pg. 11.
- 43. Jalal Darikhsha: Mawaaze Siyasi Hazrat Ali Dar Qibal Mukhalifeen (Political stands of Ali against opponents), Pgs. 46-47.
- 44. Farooq Safizaada: Article quoted in Kayhan Farhangi, Issue 170, Azar 79, Pg. 82.
- 45. Ibid. Article quoted in Kayhan Farhangi, Issue 170, Azar 79, Pg. 82.
- 46. Ibrahim Baizoon (Translated by Ali Asghar Muhammadi Seejaani): Rafataar Shinashi Imam Ali (‘a) Dar Aaina-e-Tareekh (Understanding the stand of Imam Ali in the Mirror of History) (1st Edition), 1379, Pg. 37.
- 47. Farooq Safizaada: Article quoted in Kayhan Farhangi, Issue 170, Azar 79, Pg. 80.
- 48. Rasool Ja'faryan: Tarikh wa Seerah Siyasi Amir-e-Mominaan Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) History and political biography of Ali (‘a), Pg. 18.
- 49. Asghar Qaidan: Tahleeli Bar Mawaze Siyasi Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) Research on political stands of Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a), Pg. 127.
- 50. Rasool Ja'faryan: Tarikh wa Seerah Siyasi Amir-e-Mominaan Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) History and political biography of Ali (‘a), Pg. 29; quoted from Tarikh Tabari, Vol. 5, Pg. 76.
- 51. Ibrahim Baizoon (Translated by Ali Asghar Muhammadi Seejaani): Rafataar Shinashi Imam Ali (‘a) Dar Aaina-e-Tareekh (Understanding the stand of Imam Ali in the Mirror of History) (1st Edition), 1379, Pg. 44.
- 52. Ali (‘a) and Umar.
- 53. Ibrahim Baizoon (Translated by Ali Asghar Muhammadi Seejaani): Rafataar Shinashi Imam Ali (‘a) Dar Aaina-e-Tareekh (Understanding the stand of Imam Ali in the Mirror of History) (1st Edition), 1379, Pg. 41.
- 54. Surah Taubah 9:12.
- 55. Najmuddin Al-Askari: Ali wal Khulafa, Pg. 120; quoted from Manaqib Khwarizmi, Pg.(196), 59.
- 56. Muhammad Waizzaada Khorasani: Article quoted in Kitab Naqd Magazine, Issue No. 19, (Vol. 2), Summer 80, Pg. 21 This article is also quoted with many additional parts in Collected Papers of International Conference on Imam Ali 1st Edition 1381, Vol. 2.
- 57. Asghar Qaidan: Tahleeli Bar Mawaze Siyasi Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) Research on political stands of Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a), Pg. 82.
- 58. Sayyid Hasan Fatimi: Article: Saqifah quoted in Danish Nama Imam Ali (‘a), Vol. 8, Pg. 457
- 59. Refer: Muhammad Baqir Ansari: Chaharda Qarn Ba Ghadeer (Fourteen centuries with Ghadeer) (Itmaam-e-Hujjatha Bahashai Ilmi Munaziraat…), Pgs. 39-61.
- 60. In the book Chaharda Qarn Ba Ghadeer (Fourteen centuries with Ghadeer) 31 proofs of Ghadeer Tradition are mentioned.
- 61. The Right of the Imam to Caliphate was his self-right that had originated from divine text (Nass). It was not a right by qualification. So to take back the right is to revive divine text (Nass). So in the society it denotes his position that comes next to the Prophet.
- 62. Sayyid Razi: Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 6.
- 63. Ibid. Sermon 172.
- 64. Ibid. Sermon 100.
- 65. Ali Muhammad Meer Jalili: Imam Ali (‘a) wa Zamaamdaaraan (Imam Ali and the Rulers), Pgs. 83-87.
- 66. Sayyid Razi: Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 74.
- 67. Ibn Qutaibah: Al-Imamah was-Siyasah, Pg. 206.
- 68. Danish Nama Imam Ali (‘a), Vol. 5, Pg. 162; quoted from: Maqri Fiyumi: Al-Misbah al-Muneer, Pg. 198.
- 69. Rasool Ja'faryan: Tarikh wa Seerah Siyasi Amir-e-Mominaan Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) History and political biography of Ali (‘a), Pg. 134.
- 70. Sayyid Hasan Fatimi: Article: Saqifah quoted in Danish Nama Imam Ali (‘a), Vol. 8, Pgs. 459-460.
- 71. Rasool Ja'faryan: Tarikh wa Seerah Siyasi Amir-e-Mominaan Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) History and political biography of Ali (‘a), Pg. 135; quoted from: Al-Ghaaraat, Vol. 2, Pgs. 195-204.
- 72. Muhammad Waizzaada Khorasani: Article quoted in Kitab Naqd Magazine, Issue No. 19, (Vol. 2), Summer 80, Pgs. 20-21.
- 73. Ibid. Article quoted in Kitab Naqd Magazine, Issue No. 19, (Vol. 2), Summer 80, Pg. 21.
- 74. Ibid. Article quoted in Kitab Naqd Magazine, Issue No. 19, (Vol. 2), Summer 80, Pg. 23.
- 75. Ibid. Interview in ‘Haft Aasmaan’ (Seven Skies) Magazine, Issues 9 & 10, Spring & Summer 80, Pg. 15.
- 76. Ibid. Article quoted in Kitab Naqd Magazine, Issue No. 19, (Vol. 2), Summer 80, Pg. 22.
- 77. Ibid. Article quoted in Kitab Naqd Magazine, Issue No. 19, (Vol. 2), Summer 80, Pg. 13.
- 78. Ibid. Article quoted in Kitab Naqd Magazine, Issue No. 19, (Vol. 2), Summer 80, Pg. 10.
- 79. When people had doubts about Sunnah of Prophet, instead of Ali (‘a) they used to go to Ayesha and accept whatever she said whether it was right or wrong. Yusuf Gholami: Pas az Ghuroob, Pg. 281.
- 80. Ali Muhammad Meer Jalili: Imam Ali (‘a) wa Zamaamdaaraan (Imam Ali (‘a) and the Rulers), Pgs. 87-88; quoting from Nahjul Balagha, Sermon 2.
- 81. Referring to dictionaries like Taj al-Uroos and Qamoos it would be known that ‘Sirr’ is not only ‘that which he hides’ it also conveys things like ‘purity of all things’ ‘fear of all things’ etc.
- 82. Muhammad Jawad Hujjati Kermani: Jam-e-Jam Daily, Iss.ue No. 10, Bahman 1379.
- 83. Succession of His Eminence, Muhammad.
- 84. Belgian orientalist.
- 85. Italian orientalist.
- 86. Allamah Al-Askari: Saqifah, Pgs. 11-13, Preface by Dr. Mahdi Dashti.
- 87. He was from the Ansaar – emigrants.
- 88. Ali Muhammad Meer Jalili: Imam Ali (‘a) wa Zamaamdaaraan (Imam Ali and the Rulers), Pg. 58; quoting from: Tarikh Tabari, Vol. 4, Pg. 227.
- 89. He was a Persian.
- 90. Ali Muhammad Meer Jalili: Imam Ali (‘a) wa Zamaamdaaraan (Imam Ali and the Rulers), Pg. 59; quoting from: Tarikh Tabari, Vol. 4, Pg. 227.
The point to be noted is that the Caliph is talking of conditions of successorship of Maaz and Salim but before that in Saqifah he had argued on the basis of Caliphate for Quraish and overpowered the Ansaar.
- 91. Abdul Kareem Bi-Aazaar Shirazi: Payaam-e-Taqreeb, (Message of Unity) Pg. 80.
- 92. Muhammad Waizzaada Khorasani: Article quoted in Kitab Naqd Magazine, Issue No. 19, (Vol. 2), Summer 80, Pg. 24.
- 93. Ibid. Muhammad Waizzaada Khorasani: Article quoted in Kitab Naqd Magazine, Issue No. 19, (Vol. 2), Summer 80, Pgs. 2-31.
- 94. Ibid. Muhammad Waizzaada Khorasani: Article quoted in Kitab Naqd Magazine, Issue No. 19, (Vol. 2), Summer 80, Pgs. 22-23.
- 95. Muhammad Waizzaada Khorasani: Article quoted in Kitab Naqd Magazine, Issue No. 19, (Vol. 2), Summer 80, Pg. 22.
- 96. Ibid. Article quoted in Kitab-e-Wahdat, Pg. 256.
- 97. Ibid. Article quoted in Kitab Naqd Magazine, Issue No. 19, (Vol. 2), Summer 80, Pg. 21.
- 98. Ibid. Article quoted in Kitab Naqd Magazine, Issue No. 19, (Vol. 2), Summer 80, Pg. 23.
- 99. Although that which confirms the correctness of these traditions is the special tenor of these narrations mentioned in books related to this subject but it shall be applicable to these narrations only.