read

Discourse 3: Criticism And Scrutiny Of Analyses Publicized Regarding Ali’s Cooperation With Caliphs’ Government

Conjectures Spread In This Regard

Some analyses relate to political attitudes and practical conduct of Imam Ali (‘a) with regard to Caliphs. Besides they also base their claims on his associates’ acceptance of post in military or civil service.

The efforts of unity-seekers to establish for readers that Imam was on good terms with Caliphs have distorted facts. Many historical evidences are overlooked. The reader concludes wrongly for himself that the Imam and his friends entertained agreeable relations with Caliphs. They cooperatively ran governmental affairs. Such close relations do not allow any crevice between the two wings of Islam.

They put forward this argument:

“If he cooperated with Caliphs for 25 years…if he was mild and polite with Caliphs’ government...You also do the same in this regard… and follow the behavior of your Imam regarding the Caliphs.”1

“His Eminence (‘a) did not leave the side of Abu Bakr for even a moment.”2

“When His Eminence paid allegiance to Abu Bakr, he honored all assignment given to him to the best of his capacity and this trend had a good impact on his relations with Caliphs.”3

“And as for co-operation and support of Imam Ali (‘a) and his associates with Umar, it was not restricted to advice and counsel, they also practically helped in this regard and even accepted governmental posts and also participated in battles without any hesitation.”!4

“During the period of the Second Caliph, Hazrat Ali (‘a) always solved religious problems and difficult jurisprudential matters in which the Caliphate asked his counsel. In encounters and military issues…at no time did he (Ali) allow his personal feelings and negative thoughts to deter him from all this.”!5

What Do Historical Documents And Sources Indicate?

To answer such deviation in analysis of historical events we first dwell upon some historical proofs that clearly disprove the deviated analysis:

Imam Ali (‘a) absolutely and always refrained from accepting a government post in Caliphs’ rule; more than this, Caliphs also were well aware of such attitude of the Imam towards them.

Regarding his cooperation with the First Caliph, it can be said:

Documentary Proof A) When some persons like Aswad Ansi, Musailama and Sajjah claimed prophethood and Abu Bakr prepared an army to fight them, he consulted Amr bin Aas regarding the command of forces and asked for his opinion about the choice of Ali. Amr bin Aas told him:

Ali would not cooperate with you;6 so Abu Bakr gave up the idea.7

Documentary Proof B) In the same way the Caliph tried to appoint His Eminence (‘a) for quelling disturbances of Kinda tribe, but Umar considered it impractical.8

The only instance when it could be claimed that Abu Bakr assigned command to Ali (‘a) was the responsibility of guarding the original road to Medina in a time when he (Abu Bakr) himself had caused the army of apostates to attack the city and they had reached near Medina.

Here the point worth nothing thing is that this case is also narrated only in Sunni sources and there are many doubts in its authenticity9 an example of which is as follows:

“Ibn Athir, in the portion of his history dealing with the campaign of First Caliph against false prophets, mentions: Abu Bakr assigned Ali, Zubair, Abdullah bin Masood and Talha to guard the hilly roads around Medina.

His Eminence, Ali (‘a) did not accept it because the issue of Caliphate was more important to him than this trifle matter of a person claiming prophethood and in numerous instances he disputed the issue of Caliphate with Abu Bakr…is it right that he should take the command of such a frivolous matter?

Does the narration of Ibn Athir not show how he and his co-religionists try to pose Ali as an agent of First Caliph and even at the price of mentioning the name of His Eminence in few instances!”10

Or consider the following:

“Beliefs of Shia and Sunni are not at parity on the issue of cooperation of Imam (‘a).”11 “It is necessary to mention that supposing this case is true, fighting the false claimants of prophethood (which is an important matter) is not something that needs permission of an usurper Caliph; on the contrary, the Ummah and usurper of Caliphate all are under mandate to seek permission of an Infallible Imam and be at his disposal to fight the false claimants. Besides, this issue is also binding on the Infallible Imam himself.”12

Therefore contrary to the claim publicized about the permanent company of Imam (‘a) with Abu Bakr it should be announced that:

“Relations between Abu Bakr and Imam were very cold and not worthy of mention.”13

About Imam’s Co-operation with the Second Caliph it can be said:

“The Second Caliph also was not pleased with the obstinacy and haughtiness of Imam Ali (‘a) and many times he appointed in-betweens who can motivate the Imam (‘a) to assist the regime; but Amirul Momineen (‘a) only looked to the interests of Islam. At the time of need, he forwarded his expert opinion. Commonly he ignored the requests of Caliphs for all-round cooperation.14

Documentary Proof A) Of course it was not that the Imam always fulfilled their requests. The Caliph asked Ali to accompany him in the journey to Syria, but Ali refused. Umar complained to Ibn Abbas:

I asked your cousin to accompany me to Syria but he refused…

Documentary Proof B) Likewise in the battle of Qadasia, Muslims sought Umar’s help.

The Caliph asked Imam (‘a) to take the command and go to the battlefront, but the Imam (‘a) did not accept.”15

Therefore the Caliph sent Saad bin Abi Waqqas.16

It is clear that in both cases the Imam rejected the request, still they falsely claim:

“In this way Ali (‘a) was always by the side of Umar.”!17

“When Umar asked Ali to take the command of Muslim forces to conquer Iran, Imam did so.”!18

Attention and contemplation on this matter related to always ‘Absence of acceptance of co-operation and bearing responsibility’ makes every researcher and investigator think His Eminence has not always denied co-operation with the caliphal regime; thus his non-acceptance of co-operation and responsibility in chosen instances must be for some special reason; such that Amirul Momineen (‘a) had some standard on the basis of which he either chose to help or refuse.

Therefore in the first stage it will be seen that the Imam never refused his help. But in the second stage it will be seen that the Imam also in some cases hit out at the chest of the rulers and refused to co-operate in some matters.

Conclusion

The attitude of the Imam in accepting occasional cooperation with government and fortuitous refusal to cooperate leads a reader to conclude that Imam had a particular outlook to the matters. It further leads to interpret the type and kind of relations he had with Caliphs.

Understanding Imam’s attitude will lead us to understand motives of both sides – why the posts were offered and why the Imam denied.

In fact after this point is proved that Imam only refused co-operation with the regime under some conditions and accepted responsibility only under some conditions the following two questions arise:

Firstly, what was the aim of Amirul Momineen (‘a) in co-operating with the Caliphs or refusing it?

Secondly, what was the policy Caliphs pursued towards the Imam when some posts were proposed to him in their government?

We shall dwell on these questions in the course of this book.

Analysis Of Ali’s Participation In Caliphs’ Government

“A scrutiny into Imam’s dealings with Caliphs shows that when Imam saw his cooperation would reflect his personal support to Caliphs he withheld his cooperation. But when occasions called his attention towards greater interests of Muslims or Islam itself he extended his cooperation without hesitation. Such as we see in the events in early period of Abu Bakr’s Caliphate, which was the start of things going astray from leadership. Perversion and deviation from the right path had already commenced. So the Imam is less seen among the cooperators.”19

In those days also Ali did not accept any office, which could have reflected his support and he did not desire to be any token or sign of his support to a deviated Caliphate and a perverted power.

Ali was aware of the fact that a peaceful life and security of that society depended on his co-operation with the junta. So he extended his co-operation.”20 “He had an understanding of the conditions prevalent at that time. So he cooperated when necessary although it was very bitter and much painful to him. He was readily available when existence of Islam was in question. But it cannot be said that he supported the system. Or whatever they did was agreeable to him. He also could not forget their incompetence to the post of Caliphate.

They also were aware of this attitude of Ali.”21

“The point worth nothing is that it was very hard for Ali to accept assignments or an office from those very persons who had occupied the seat, which should have belonged to him. They were usurpers of his right. They were sitting where Prophet in Ghadeer had already made him sit. How could he come to terms with his own oppressors or accept from them what they give while everything was his. He was expected to forego the whole and accept a part.”22

“However the isolation of Ali indicates that both sides knew each other and also that he cannot behave towards them that could be an indicator of his approval of their Caliphate. It was a divine post. God should choose. And God had chosen him and the Prophet had conveyed God’s choice. Ghadeer Khumm was a matter of yesterday. Still nobody had forgotten the ceremony.”23

“During the periods of three Caliphs Ali did not take any active part in government – politically or running its affairs. What he gave was advice by way of consultation, that’s all. He had no membership in their governments. It can be said that he was rather an opposition leader from a distance.”24

What Was Caliphs’ Aim In Giving Government Responsibilities To Ali?

On the basis of what is said so far it is possible to sketch the policy of Caliphs in giving these responsibilities to Amirul Momineen (‘a) as follows:

“For them it would have been far better had Ali taken the command of army under their order. A strong and powerful rival would have been in their row – one well-versed to reason and narrate Prophet’s words.”25

“Can it be accepted that the Caliph dismissed Khalid bin Saeed bin Aas from post of commander due to his inclination or leniency towards Ali? Their design was to give the post to Ali that could bring credibility and validity to their government. Then to dismiss him declaring among people that he was incompetent for the job. Anyway, in both cases they would have gained.”26

In the same way the regime by so doing would have satisfied the block of Ali and voices that clamored that Caliphate was right of Ali would have been muted by Ali himself.

“The Kinda tribes including Hadhramaut were pro-Ali. Because Caliphate was drawn away from Prophet’s house, they raised their voice of protest and opposition, which ended in a revolt.

So the regime and especially Abu Bakr tried to delegate Ali to quell the rebellion. They wanted to take advantage of Ali’s name. If he were seen in government, their opposition would have subsided.”27

In conclusion it can be said:

“The Caliph was trying to bring Ali into this matter and he consulted Umar in this regard…Umar was apprehensive about the excellences of Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a). He said that Ali is very careful in this matter (he is not inclined in encounter with the apostates) and if he did not attach any formal feature to apostates’ uprising nobody would go to war against them…

In addition to describing the fear of Umar this statement also shows Ali’s moral status in Muslim society. That is such was his influence in the society that if he did not show any inclination in that war no one among the Muslims would go. Therefore because of this fear Abu Bakr was too prudent in his behavior with Ali.”28

“Indeed Umar had another fear and he did not want Hadhramaut to be an additional front for the new Caliphate.

Though Ali (‘a) did not go to fight them, the regime of Caliphate even before seeking opinion of Ali (‘a) was afraid of this matter and they sent Akrama.”29

From this aspect it can be said:

Caliphs also in every condition were not prone to give any government office to Ali and this was complimentary to ‘absence of inclination to always co-operate’.

In other words, Caliphs wanted an opportunity to strengthen pillars of their Caliphate and gain Ali’s indulgence into affairs, which to them was tantamount to legitimacy of their Caliphate. On the other hand whenever Ali co-operated he did so in a way, which could not be interpreted as his approval to their Caliphate.

These and such efforts continued even after extending the borders of the country.

“The Caliph and his friends could not ignore the useful force such as him. They knew the courage and bravery of Ali. In lifetime of Prophet, they had witnessed from close Ali’s battles and fighting. So Ali with regard to battles was a very important element.

The Caliph and his associates also were not unaware of this or were opposed to it.

On the other hand his absence from the wars and his isolation could be a matter of question in the society.

Therefore the Caliph and his associates tried to involve Ali in government responsibilities. They wanted him to take part in military victories. This could have given credibility to their government. Besides, his supporters and Bani Hashim would be pleased and satisfied.”30

“Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) during these battles kept the same attitude, which he had in the time of Abu Bakr… The Caliph could not remain ignorant about Imam’s cooperation and guidance…He knew very well that Ali was not willing to participate in battles. Therefore he decided to get benefit of his advice. Ali was sensitive about Muslims and Islam. Therefore in the shape of consultations he rendered services to them…

Ali did not like to accept any responsibility, which directly or indirectly could be a helping element to the usurped Caliphate.”31

As it is seen, the regime was trying its best to establish contacts with Imam which could provide them validity.

When this could not be achieved, Caliphate tried to established indirect relations through consultations.

Abu Bakr wanted to assign Ali the command of army to fight against Ashath bin Qays. He took the advice of Umar, Umar was anxious and anticipated Ali’s refusal, which would lay harmful impact on their Caliphate. Therefore Umar proposed:

“My view is that you must keep Ali in Medina under your care as you are not needless of him and it is necessary for you to consult Ali in country’s affairs.”32

Indeed, what need the Caliph had of Imam’s advice and support?

Why Umar reminded the Caliph to observe that?

The reply to these questions can be found in the carefulness of Umar in rejecting the proposal of making Amirul Momineen (‘a) the commander of forces. When he said:

“I fear that Ali will refuse to fight these people and he will no do Jihad with these people. And if he does so no one from his side will move except under force and compulsion.”33

Now it must be asked:

How is it possible to attribute good relations between Imam (‘a) and the Caliphs and also proving that he took an active part of Wilayat during their regimes. And it is claimed that:

“The First Caliph was very much in need of his courage and valor in the fields of battle just as he always benefited from the knowledge, wisdom and advice of His Eminence in various matters in Medina Munawwara, the capital of the nascent regime.”!34

Was Ali given a Governmental responsibility during the tenure of the Caliphs?

After this investigation the only thing that is in need of analysis and interpretation is the claim that:

“During the period of Umar’s Caliphate whenever he left Medina, Ali was his deputy. He took the charge of affairs until his return.”35

Reply to this conjecture can be divided into two parts:

Part A: Analysis Of Acceptance Of Responsibility For Some Particular Instances

“According to Sunni sources there are only three occasions when Ali was appointed in place of Umar in Medina. He took the office and ran the affairs as he administered the country. Indeed, it does not seem probable that Ali should have accepted. How can he accept from one who had usurped Caliphate from him and he (Ali) had repeatedly stressed upon his superiority and competency to the job?

Such claims need to be investigated first. Why such a case is not referred to by any Shia historian?

It could be possible that Ali could have taken charge of judicial affairs not political or administrative ones…”36

“Shia books do not stress upon Ali’s deputation by Umar.

It appears that Ali, during the office of Umar, could have attended affairs of people and handled matters of justice.”37

“However the fundamental question is: Why at all Ali should accept to be deputy of Umar or his substitute? On the other hand Ali never agreed or saw any legality in Umar’s Caliphate. It was a thing that never belonged to him (Umar). Then he undergoes to be his deputy, to be his substitute. Why?

The answer lies in Tabari’s and Ibn Athir’s comments, which are congruous with Shia beliefs. As the very Caliphate of Umar from the viewpoint of Ali was short of legitimacy and lacked legal status the posts (if) given to others would also be illegal.

Thus on the basis of this acceptance of these responsibilities in fact would be hindering the qualified ones to get them. Because if in case posts are given to non-qualified persons it would be against divine will and Islamic values and Ali knew better than to have the power to oppose these illegalities to do thus; thus His Eminence (‘a) is not someone who sees illegal matters and does nothing about it.”38

Part B: Surrendering Responsibility To Ali In Some Particular Items

“During this period Ali was isolated from political arena. He did not occupy any post in Abu Bakr’s Caliphate. In Umar’s Caliphate, also he did the same. He did not even accept the post of commander for invading Iran.

The only exceptional case was when Umar had to leave for Palestine and he took with him senior companions of Prophet to help him in requirements of victory and success, while Ali’s had the responsibility of administration of Medina.

Although it is worth mention that Umar was strongly against Bani Hashim leaving Medina. He feared they would form groups in other areas and stage an uprising against his Caliphate.”39

The output of the policy of Second Caliph is surprising. He appointed Ali on three occasions in his place as his successor and does not appoint him in the six-person committee?!!

What was his aim in surrendering this responsibility to Amirul Momineen?

To comprehend the nature of relations of Caliphs’ government with Ali we refer to one more case:

“When Muhammad son of Abu Bakr wrote to Muawiyah censuring him for his disobedience to Imam Ali (‘a). Muawiyah in reply wrote to him that he had only followed the first two rulers.

Muawiyah added that those two persons did not intimate him in their confidential matters nor did they open way to him to share with them in affairs…”40

This shows that Caliphs did not want Ali to take any part in their affairs. Likewise they were not desirous of his advice. Whenever they sought his advice there was some other motive in it. Their motive in anyway was not in the interest of Islam or Islamic unity.

While they claim:

“Mutual relations between Ali and three Caliphs were towards preserving Islamic unity and the very seed of Islam itself.”41

Our endeavors in analysis of the relations are with the motive to understand the aim of Ali and the aim of Caliphs. Especially with regard to co-operation of His Eminence (‘a) in administrative and governmental affairs, which shall be explained and interpreted, so that the respected readers will see the difference between the aims of two sides. The outlook of Imam Ali (‘a) leads the reader to the root of the policy Caliphs held according to the demand of the occasion. But they overlook it and say:

“Until Muawiyah came to power, the successor of Prophet of God, Ali, adopted a policy of patience, tolerance, vigilance. His attitude with three Caliphs was friendly and co-operative. This resulted in good manners, good behavior and good conduct among Muslims. Inspite of criticism and censure expressed by Imam Ali (‘a) which were due to honesty, good manners and Islamic promise.”!42

Yes! Good demeanor and decorum, Islamic commitments and good manners formed the ground of cooperation of Imam Ali (‘a) with the three Caliphs. Whether the requests of Caliphs and their proposals too were based on same ground?

Let History answer:

“Caliphs’ government was very much in anticipation from Imam Ali (‘a). For instance, as he finally paid allegiance43 to Abu Bakr he was expected to give up or forego the demand for his right to Caliphate. Moreover, he was expected to be seen with sword in his hand to fight whoever opposed the Caliphs.

But the Imam rejected this request. Such an attitude and position of Imam was natural to impel the government to make him more humiliated in the view of people. This policy was able to isolate the Imam more and more.”44

In the same way:

“Among the complaints of Imam about the Caliphs was that they led a campaign to belittle the personality of Imam, which was highest and most respected one in the view of people during the days of Prophet.”45

Now when such is the case how can it be claimed that:

“That which this writer has claimed and proved is that there existed friendly relations between Hazrat Ali (‘a) and the Caliphs.”!46

Some examples of politics of belittling Amirul Momineen (‘a) are as follows:

“Umar in order to belittle Ali accorded more respect to Ibn Abbas. It was a policy so that Ibn Abbas may narrate traditions and give Tafseer of Quran.”47

“When Umar appointed the six-person committee he blamed each of them with a defect. He blamed Ali that he was a man having excess humor.”48

In short:

“The two Caliphs had assassinated the character of Ali among people and assassinated his personality.”49

The author of Pas az-Ghuroob writes: Even though the Bayyat of Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) was effective in mobilizing forces it is also not unlikely that the Caliph made the attack a pretext to obtain the support of His Eminence.”50

“Jundab bin Abdullah says: After swearing allegiance to Uthman I went to Iraq. There I used to narrate the attributes of Ali to people. The best reply that I got from the people was this: Leave these words. Think of something that may benefit you.

I answered them: These things are beneficial to both you and me. But the people on hearing this got up and dispersed.”51

“In a society of Muslims, Imam was forgotten. Therefore it was for this reason that Imam during his Caliphate reminded people of his station, services and the battles he fought and won for the sake of Islam, his nearness and relationship with Prophet.”52

Did Amirul Momineen (‘a) Have Positive Outlook To Battles Of Caliph’s Period?

As you know battles in the period of Caliphs particularly the Second Caliph are viewed from different angles, especially by the unity-mongers.

Thus they say:

“Regrettably of our doubts is that Ali (‘a) did not find any worth of Islamic battles…we see how much he supported these battles?”!53

For the scrutiny of this claim, we invite you to read the translation of Political Analysis of the life of Imam Hasan Mujtaba by Allamah Ja’far Murtadha Amili. (2nd edition) pages 170-200. Which in fact is to refute the conjecture propagated that Imams Hasan and Husayn participated in battles during the rule of Caliphs.54

That which we wish to remind in this section is their claim that participation of Amirul Momineen (‘a) and his associates in the victories proves their support and co-operation to the Caliphs’ regime. This is same as claim of participation in other matters. Thus they claim:

“If this unity was not preserved by Ali and if there was no co-operation, understanding and tolerance among Caliphs all these battles would have not been attained by the Muslims within such a short span of time.”55

While it should not be overlooked that in all these types of matters there had always been in existence a wide gulf and crevice between Imam’s motives and those of Caliphs. To consider them to be on friendly terms is a basic and fundamental mistake. We quote here another mistaken claim:

“Our belief is that leaders of truth do not approve participation in these battles. They do not think these battles to be useful to Muslims and Islam.

Imams desired extension of influence of Islam and its expansion as far as the length of globe. But they want it in congruity with divine laws and the way Caliphs undertook was wrong and detrimental.”56

“Accordingly if we accept and surrender to principle of battles and military action of Caliphs, we cannot deny the fact that most methods of persons in charge of actions from Caliphs’ side were not coherent with decorum of Prophet or warriors of Prophet’s days. But in some cases, they differed greatly so the stance of Ali and Hasan and Husayn is different. So it is obvious when Ali and Hasan and Husayn did not accept Caliphate and they disputed its legitimacy they of course cannot accept their battles, the motive of battles and consequent battles therefrom.”57

Even then it is said:

“They wanted Imam’s co-operation; His Eminence refrained from giving it.”58

On the basis of this Imam did not take any initial step with regard to battles. He did not participate in any of them.

“In Shia historical sources we do not find any evidence that could prove Imam’s personal presence in any battles; likewise, presence of Hasan and Husayn also. Beyond this, we do not have any Sunni source that could prove for us direct presence of Imam Ali (‘a) in Caliph’s battles.”59

“So history denies their presence. The least we can agree is their presence as consultants and advisors. This they did because they wanted to address their mistakes. We believe that they (the Imams) having had said not a word that could reflect their approval of Caliphs’ government or policies.”60

Although in this regard, they have claimed:

“It is evident that if Imam Ali (‘a) had ill will to Umar or he were displeased with him, and regarded him usurper of his rights, he would always have been awaiting every opportunity to get back his right and for getting rid of the usurper of his rights…advised him to go personally to the battlefield and get killed there.”!61

“One of the clearest proofs of Ali’s sincerity and friendship to Abu Bakr…and support to Caliphate!...was his attitude when Abu Bakr departed…he took charge of the army...God forbid, if Ali had any rancor and malice at heart against Abu Bakr, or had paid allegiance to him by force under dissimulation, this was an excellent opportunity for him. But on the contrary he advised Abu Bakr against going to the battlefield.”!62

Therefore it can be said:

The only period when Caliphs took to expand borders of country that entailed military actions did Amirul Momineen (‘a) interfere at the level and to the extent of advice and consultation. He did this to minimize pillage and plunder. This resulted in safety of Islam and Muslims. Although there was a wide difference between the motive of Amirul Momineen (‘a) in dispensing advice and the motive of the Caliphs in seeking the counsel of the Imam (‘a). They were exactly opposite.

Here we point to one of the political aims:

“To wage wars in name of Jihad in the way of God is the best way to hold differences at home. In those circumstances if one wanted to knock the door of Justice to regain his usurped right and the applicant, however noblest among the people, was easily blamed as a world loving man or one who is after power.

On the basis of this, it was an excellent opportunity for men of government to achieve their cherished political aims and consolidate their position.”63

Did Associates Of Amirul Momineen (‘a) Have Active Presence In Caliphs’ Government?

Another conjecture repeated in wrong analyses of participation of and support of Amirul Momineen (‘a) with the Caliphs in administrative affairs is that the special and selected associates and companions of the Imam (‘a) with concurrence of Imam himself, were in contact with the Caliphs.

In such a way that ultimately these respected persons were put under the command of the Caliph. Thus it is said:

“Companions and friends of Imam followed their leader (Ali) in their conduct and behavior. And they behaved with the Caliphs like Ali did, during the tenure of the Caliphs as well as after that. The Second Caliph appointed Salman Farsi as governor of Madayn. Ammar Yasir was appointed as governor of Kufa. Others by order of Caliph were sent to battlefield...”64

We recommend the translation of Salman Farsi by Sayyid Ja’far Murtadha Amili, New Edition,65 page 67-76 to our readers to acquaint themselves with facts. Here we just quote a few points:

Firstly, in all analyses especially regarding motive of Amirul Momineen (‘a) in his acceptance of participation is proved. This applies to his friends also. The informal presence in the scene for protection of religion but with this difference:

“Ali has the same attitude in practice also. He personally did not accept any official post from any Caliph. He did not accept command of army or governorship of a district. He also did not accept administration of Hajj or anything else.

If he had accepted any one of so many proposed offers, it was tantamount to withdrawal of demand of his right and in other words co-operation, while safeguarding unity of Islam was important to him.

Although he himself did not accept any office he did not restrain his friends or family members from accepting posts or offices whatever their desire was or whatever the offer was. He never viewed this as co-operation. In his view, it was never an approval to their Caliphate or his sanction for their occupying his seat.”66

“Another important point here is that government of the Caliph was not inclined to utilize services of friends of Ali except in few instances.

In this period, even companions of Prophet were ignored in political and government affairs.

The First Caliph has pointed out that the reason was their own unwillingness. The Second Caliph indicates the reason as restriction he had imposed on them from leaving Medina, i.e. their compulsory stay in Medina.

Perhaps the Caliph feared that if they left Medina since they could not be put under a check or control they might become a pivot of people’s attention and this might lead to problems for the regime.”67

In the same way: “During the reign of all three rulers, not one Hashemite was given any post.”68

On the basis of this such instances of co-operation can only be called such when there is willingness on both sides.

Otherwise reason must be searched behind policies of Caliphs.

“Ibn Shahar Aashob says about this: Umar appointed Salman as governor of Madayn. Umar’s motive by this act was to spoil Salman’s reputation and destroy his credibility if he happened to make a mistake. But Salman did not accept it before taking permission from Amirul Momineen Ali (‘a).

He went to Madayn and as long as he lived he remained there. He used to gather fuel wood in his outer gown. Half of which was his floor covering while the other half was his outer covering.”69

Before deceptive and political attitudes of the regime we cannot but say:

“In the instance some senior and sincere Companions took part in these battles it should be remembered that apparently they were unaware of the reality of the matter and their aim was only service to God by rendering service to Imam and Muslims. They were not knowing the view of the Infallible leaders regarding these battles. Because as we have seen it was openly endeavored that people do not come to know the opinion of Ali (‘a) and most probably the government institutions exercised force to send them to battlefronts.”70

In the same way:

“It is necessary to mention that the presence of Ali’s friends and followers in battles was not to support the regime and Caliphate. But it was to expand borders of Islam. They were absolutely sincere about it and their aim was not to gain spoils of war, such as fertile lands and rich cultivation,71 but it was only to gain God’s pleasure and spread Islam did they participate in these battles.”72

“There is no doubt that Ali and his sons had no share in any of these battles. People know the brilliant record of Ali and his bravery in battles. So it was not fear of death or his isolation.

The only reason was he did not like to be in service of one who was usurper of his Caliphate. His co-operation would have provided credibility to Governments of those who had occupied his place.

In addition to this his awareness about their motive in these territorial expansion was an impediment to his easy participation in those wars.

What could be said about Imam Ali (‘a) was that he did not refrain his associates and followers to participate in the campaigns...so that they may stop them from committing tyrannies and inhuman acts in contravention of teachings of Islam.”73

Conclusion

In a bird’s eye view, it can be said about the presence of some prominent associates of Amirul Momineen (‘a) in the battles that:

1 - Some of these gentlemen were such that their presence minimized atrocities. Secondly, they could achieve the aims that their Imam had designed and sketched for them.

2 - Some other of these respectable gentlemen were present there because they were forced by the Caliphs due to hidden aims of the Caliphs in sending them to the battlefronts. They were actually exiled by the establishment on this pretext.

It was such an exile that it was hoped that they would not return alive from there.

3 - Dishonest hands of interpolators and falsifiers of historical realities have added the names of these persons in the list of fighters of the Caliphs in order to show that the regime of Caliphs was not usurped one and to grant it legitimacy.

The best of these lists are taken from Sunni sources. So perhaps this analysis may be the nearest to reality.

Conjecture Mentioned In Haft Aasmaan Magazine – A Reply To It

Conjecture Mentioned In Haft Aasmaan Magazine74 – A Reply To It

Based on the premise that the Caliphs held consultations with Amirul Momineen (‘a) and also that His Eminence Ali (‘a) and his associates participated in the battles of this period the conjecture says:

“We start this short investigation of ours about the battles during the period of the Caliphs with three questions in this regard:

First question: What do you conclude by Ali’s help to Caliphs in many events and fate-making guidance at critical moments, besides, participation of Imam Hasan and Husayn in battles and Ali’s participation in some battles of Caliphs; and also his bearing of responsibilities in the government of the Caliphs? How do you justify them?”75

In continuation of these questions, the writer coins three examples. One of them relates to Abu Bakr’s seeking advice of Ali in the first year of his Caliphate about waging war against people of Kinda.

Ali advised him to stay in Medina and send others to combat. Similarly Ali advised Umar to not go himself in war against Romans and Iranians.76 From these cases the writer derives the following conclusion:

“For the sake of Allah! If Ali had your outlook about Caliphs’ wars he could not have given such useful advice to Umar.”77

The article writer in continuation of the first question as another example regarding consultation of the Caliphs with Amirul Momineen (‘a) further adds:

Many a times Amirul Momineen (‘a) accepted to substitute for Umar during his absence. Like when Umar had left to supervise the fronts, or he went to Jerusalem, Ali accepted to depute for Umar in Medina.”78

In continuation of these three instances, which he terms to be ‘many’ he mentions the instance of participation of his associates in the battles and concludes thus:

“These examples truly disprove the idea that Caliphs’ battles were a good pastime for people and a setback for progress of Islam.”

Can this be accepted that men of knowledge and experience and staunch belief like Salman, Ammar, Hujr bin Adi and Adi Hatim were not aware of facts and ignorant of Imam’s opinion?”79

In continuation of his writing and from that which he is influenced, he concludes:

“Imams of Ahlul Bayt (‘a) had a positive outlook to foreign wars. Some proofs of this are as follows:

A) Anxieties of Amirul Momineen (‘a) regarding Muslim battles during the period of the Caliphs and his concern for their victory in those battles and also his solving of problems for the Caliphs who were also leaders in those battles.

B) Participation of Hasan and Husayn in some wars

C) Participation of some first grade companions of Prophet like Salman, Ammar, Hujr bin Adi in the wars and their administration of the conquered districts. As these could not have been without permission of the Infallible Imam (‘a)...80”!81

They mostly quote these narrations in order to defend the battles of the period of Caliphs and the claim that the Imams (‘a) were having a positive outlook to foreign wars of Muslims. They are as follows:

Point 1 – Ali’s helps to Caliph in solving problems etc. while they were in fact also leaders of those wars!

Point 2 – Ali’s counsel and guidance to Caliphs in their most stringent circumstances. Also the fact that Amirul Momineen (‘a) never refused to heed their request for advice!

Point 3 – Anxieties of Amirul Momineen (‘a) regarding Muslim battles during the period of the Caliphs and his concern for their victory in those battles. Ali’s occupation of Umar’s seat in Medina in the days of battles!

Point 4 – Numerous instances of Hazrat Ali (‘a) substituting for Umar in Medina, and that also during the period of the battles!

Point 5 – Participation of Hasan and Husayn (‘a) in some battles of the Caliphs!

Point 6 – Participation of Hazrat Ali’s associates in some battles of the Caliphs supposing their being aware of the view of the Infallible Imam (‘a)!

Point 7 – Acceptance of responsibilities by Hazrat Ali’s associates in Caliphs’ government and their participation in administration of conquered regions by approval of Infallible Imam (‘a)!

Criticism and Scrutiny of Ali’s Positive Outlook to Battles

Criticism and Scrutiny of Ali’s Positive Outlook to Battles82

A brief review of discussions that we have mentioned so far will prove the weakness and irrelevance of their arguments and that too with the claim:

“The positive outlook of Imams towards the battles”!

Because such types of conclusions depend on the introduction that we have criticized and scrutinized in the preceding chapters.

If our readers ponder on the results obtained by consultations of Caliphs with Ali and look back to its statistics the number of items or occasions will indicate that there is no such a thing except few occasions mentioned. Else, it is not a historical reality. Similarly, such guidance and connecting it to battles is a thing lacking sense as it is short of reason. It is only a product of their imagination and has no historical reality.

In the same way to say that since the Caliphs consulted Amirul Momineen (‘a) and he gave his advice and support it shows that he had a positive outlook for battles is wrong. Because to connect the instances of consultation with the battles is not proof enough that Ali (‘a) also was happy with their battles. Both the things are not having any connection at all.

Because even if it is proved that giving consultation to the Caliphs is proof of positive outlook of Amirul Momineen (‘a) to the battles as at that time they were rulers, before everything else it also included their usurpation of Caliphate of His Eminence (‘a) because at the time of seeking consultation also the Caliphs were rulers!

Similarly the same scrutinies show that there were only three instances of consultation in military matters and if we pay close attention it will clearly show the motives behind them that none of them had any connection with person of the Caliph or the actual battle.

The important thing to Amirul Momineen (‘a) was his anxiety that mistake must not be committed in those battles that could lead to total annihilation of Islam and complete domination of infidelity over Muslims.

Therefore from this aspect consultations had no connection with the person of the Caliph of the philosophy of wars in the view of His Eminence (‘a) that we should conclude from it that it shows positive outlook of Imams (‘a) to the battles.

When conditions demand vigilance because of war in which Islam has indulged itself the dire necessity becomes protection and safety of Islam. In such a case Imam would have an immediate and direct contact with the Caliph besides his advice for saving Muslims. But conditions differ. In reality, Umar had started war all by himself without consulting the Imam or taking his advice. The Caliph had done it by his own stubbornness.

In such conditions wherein there is no alternative but to send troops necessity dictates some provisionary measures to minimize danger which is certain or to avert uprooting blow from hitting Muslims and Islam. Therefore we see the Imam anxious and worried. Else he has no other reason. It was not and cannot be his approval of battles.

In other words, the wrong, rather insane decisions in military issues cause the Caliph’s life to be in the mortgage of Islam, i.e. protection of Islam. In such an event, there is no way out but to dispense the best advice for the sake of avoiding reversion to infidelity and saving religion from being wiped out completely. Imam Ali (‘a) did not pay any importance to Caliph’s life if that life was to bring back past ignorant days of idol worship. Ali had warned Umar: If the Caliph does not repent and does not give up the design to revert masses to the old days of infidelity and idol worship I will cut off his head.83

There is a great difference between the two attitudes of Imam Ali (‘a). According to his behavior we come to know that the life of Caliph in ordinary circumstances is not of any extra value or worth. Its value comes to worth only in case of its having an immediate link to Islam’s safety or that its end spells Islam’s end too. The dread of returning to infidelity of Muslim society or a likelihood of grip of idol worship upon the society makes a Caliph’s life worthy or attaches a corresponding worth to it.

Therefore consultation of Ali (‘a) in military affairs is not a sign of good relations. It does not establish any good terms on either side. So how can it be drawn in the sense of his approval of their Caliphate, or his acknowledgement of their government?

Thus it is said:

“A correct peep into events and a correct circumspection of Ali’s stand during 25 years of three Caliphs’ period and about 5 years of his own Caliphate leads us to conclude that Ali tried towards strengthening power of Muslims and pillars of Islam. And he did not fall short of efforts in this ground...”!84

However the battles – if Ali had a positive outlook towards them and had considered them holy, why he did not take part therein and beyond this why he rejected the office of commander that was proposed to him?

As for public deceiving claims that Ali was Umar’s deputy in Medina in itself is enough evidence to show their design to give a legal weight to their unlawful gain achieved at Saqifah. If we revise again what we analyzed earlier it would show clearly the motive of the writer of this article.

Participation of Hasan and Husayn (‘a) in battles of Caliphs

Participation of Hasan and Husayn (‘a) in battles of Caliphs85

In this respect Allamah Ja’far Murtadha has given a detailed sketch of events in his book Analysis of political life of Imam Hasan Mujtaba, New Edition, that is translated (into Persian). While we recommend this book and stress on the necessity of its perusal we draw your attention to some points:

Introduction

“Before entering into the theme, we point to the matters in relation to the outlook of Imam Hasan and Husayn to government and battles of Caliphs.

1 – No researcher has a right to deny or accept before and after applying historical sources and divine texts. The reason is some books are written with bigotry, which results in deviation, perversion and allegations. This is not our word. Shaykh Shaltut, the last Mufti (jurisprudent) of Egypt and chancellor of Al-Azhar University, who himself by faith, was like author of Al-Milal wan-Nihal, says:

Most of those who have written books on Islamic sects and faiths were influenced by a profane spirit of bigotry. Therefore their writing have always added fuel to existing fire among sons of Ummah. These writers have only one point of view as though other angles are closed to them. They see their adversaries from one point. Opinion of a religion, which they oppose and belief of opposite side, which they do not concur with, is belittled and vilified by them. They attribute blames, which could result in mischief and enhance animosity. Neither any good nor any advantage has ever been in contents of their pages. A man of moderation or little justice should not form an opinion about faith on ground of their books. For every sect it is better that he obtains relative literature to be acquainted with the truth concerned.86 How deplorable it is that in our colleges etc. such books are standard sources. By this they teach the youth students of various lands, who are supposed to learn about true Shiaism without studying their books that are criticisms of such books like the third volume of Al-Ghadeer.

2 – As a matter of principle, attention must be paid that historical words are like a raw material in our hand. Historian here has nothing other than to cater or feed information. Now the thing that matters is reason. When performing scrutiny we should place the bits side by side to complete a form picture. So the consistency, coherence, and concordance should constitute a sense not a sense distorted. Its ugliness could incite disdain while its comeliness would encourage love. If not so how right could be distinguished from wrong?8788

Criticism And Analysis

Similarly as we know, in no Shia or Sunni source there exists a single case to show the presence of Amirul Momineen (‘a) in Caliphs’ battles. In the same way no Shia source mentions that Imams Hasan and Husayn (‘a) participated in territorial expansion of period of Caliphs, which itself is a matter worth contemplation.

But some Sunni historians have mentioned the presence of Imams Hasan and Husayn (‘a) in these battles. This has gradually resulted in renown of this matter and historians and even some contemporary Shia scholars89 and jurisprudents90 have put it in their writings.

Most Sunni writers, like Ibn Athir and Ibn Katheer have quoted Tabari (d. 310) and made him basis of their writing and used the material in their work – Similar to words of Tabari. We dwell here on a few of them:

Tabari in his Tarikh-e-Umam wal Mulook (History of Nations and Kings) writes:

“In the year 30, Saeed bin Aas along with few companions like Hasan and Husayn and some soldiers left Kufa for Khorasan.”91

The above quote is the first thing that Tabari has written. In addition to the lack of narrators’ credibility92 it is also fraught with more significant aspect which makes it difficult to accept the presence of Hasan and Husayn in the battles.

Tabari continues the narration about the victory of a town of Tabristan named Tamisa:

“Saeed bin Aas93 assured the inhabitants of town that not one of them would be killed but when the gates of the town opened, except for one he killed all the people.”94

In addition to this the second narration of also Tabari is also related from the same narrators with the difference that in repeating the names of those who took part in the victory of Tabristan the names of Hasan and Husayn are missing.

Another point worth nothing is the year. Sunni sources mention it 30 Hijra. This year coincides with Uthman’s Caliphate. So the presence is during Uthman’s Caliphate while the event has taken place in Umar’s Caliphate.

In other words, it is a period when Ali refused to even give any consultation for the battles. It is impossible that Ali should have agreed to send his sons in a bloody campaign of Bani Umayyah in Tabristan.

More interesting is that Ali restricted the presence of Hasan and Husayn in battle of Siffeen because he was much anxious about their safety.95

So how could he send the two reminders of Fatima (s.a.) to fight in Tabristan under the command of Bani Umayyah?!

On the basis of this and the analysis of Allamah Ja’far Murtadha it is not possibl to accept the presence of Hasan and Husayn (‘a) in the battles of Caliphs.

Scrutiny Of Participation Of Ali’s Companions In Battles And Government Of Caliphs

Scrutiny Of Participation Of Ali’s Companions In Battles And Government Of Caliphs96

It is surprising that the writer of the article has no knowledge of companions with regard to facts and reality of matters and opinion of Imams about battles. This analysis is not based on authentic information but on probability and likelihood of participation of companions. This point is not noted.

Therefore, if this probability is not accepted, it cannot be a confirmation of battles. Supposing if companions of Amirul Momineen (‘a) attended on approval of Ali himself and were under no pressure, it is still not a ground to prove Imam Ali’s (‘a) positive outlook.

While it can be said that they might have taken part on ground of other productive reasons so this cannot be a proof of their approval. It could be that the presence of Imam’s friends could be a restriction for Caliph’s soldiers from plundering and pillaging conquered regions.

Now we would like to ask: what is the reason that all co-operations are confined to supporting their battles. Why they have simply passed by all reasons and causes?

If we accept positive outlook of Ali to battles, it will contradict his statement:

“A Muslim should not go to a holy war in company of one who has no belief in God’s command and does not carry God’s orders with regards to spoils of war.

If at all he goes and is killed, he has helped him in usurping our rights and shedding our blood. His death is a pagan’s death.”97

Are Battles Of Caliphs Worth Defending?

He who foments this conjecture while defending battles of Caliphs raises a question and reminds us the presence of Khalid bin Waleed among commanders of combat:

“What can you say about the appointment of this same Khalid bin Waleed by the Prophet himself?”98

Then he gives examples of his command in the days of Prophet99 by way of defending the record of Islamic army and Caliph’s battles. He writes:

“Actions of Muslims in battles and victories are well worth defending and their trifle mistakes can be overlooked. Such things are common in other places too. So instead of justifying piece by piece we should defend them as a whole.”!100

He continues:

“In wars of Prophet, Ali and Hasan also considerable shortcomings were seen on the part of the soldiers and men under their command.”!101

By quoting some examples of this he derives following conclusions:

“A group of eight or twelve men under command of Prophet’s cousin went on a campaign. They committed crimes such as killing two men in a sacred month without orders of the chief command…

The commander himself did not obey orders of Prophet. He killed a number of innocent men, probably Muslims;

When soldiers under the command of the likes of Ali (‘a) showed disobedience and looted the public treasury…

What can you expect from soldiers and commanders of Muslim armies that sometimes numbered 60,000?

…after all this can it still be said:

The fact is that the style of the battles of the Prophet was absolutely different from these territorial expansions of the Caliphs?102

As shall be seen in this section we shall try to prove that the style of battles of the Holy Prophet (S) was different from the battles of Caliphs and the attitude of their system. There does not exist any similarity between them. Because if men like Khalid bin Waleed were sent in Caliph’s wars, of course the Prophet too had sent Khalid to command the battles. But their wrongs were not overlooked and justified in Prophet’s days. The same person in the time of Caliphs wronged openly.

There is one main difference between battles of Caliphs and those of Prophet. It was divine permission. Caliphs did not have this. The Prophet, Ali and Hasan did not take a step without first getting God’s permission.

“On the basis of this those who have no permission from God regard themselves successors of Prophet. They are from viewpoint of Quran liars and most tyrannical of human beings. They deserve hardest punishments, even if they stand at the Mihraab or sit on a pulpit inviting people to virtue, piety and God-worship. Or they might have fought pagans and expanded Islamic borders and brought territories under the banner of Quran.”103

Secondly:

Another thing that is overlooked in these exaggerations is that they have omitted to say anything about the reaction of the Holy Prophet (S) and the Holy Imams (‘a) as what action they took when such heinous crimes were committed by their men. While in the case of the Caliphs we see that they took no action at all in response to the tyrannies committed by their men.

They have nicely quoted the incident of Khalid bin Waleed during the time of the Prophet how he wrought havoc on the Bani Jazima tribe104 but the writer has conveniently forgotten to mention what the Messenger of Allah (S) did in response to the misdoings of Khalid.

While historical testimonies show that when:

“News of Khalid’s crimes reached the Prophet, His Eminence was very angry and shocked. He raised his hands to the sky and said:

O, God! What Khalid has committed, I hate it and seek refuge with You from his doings. Khalid went to the Prophet and the Prophet was infuriated with him.

The Prophet immediately sent Ali to the tribe (victimized by Khalid) of Bani Jazima to compensate them their losses and pay blood money whatever they say to their satisfaction.

Prophet told Ali (‘a): Go to Bani Jazima, make amends for acts of ignorance and compensate for what Khalid has committed.

Ali paid their blood money and compensated for what Khalid had destroyed or drawn from them by force. Then finally Ali asked them whether there was anything left uncompensated or any blood unpaid. They said no. But for sake of correctness, whatever money was left with Ali he gave it to them telling them that perhaps something might have been forgotten.

Then he returned to the Prophet and reported all he had done. The Prophet appreciated his performance much and said: I had not given the command to Khalid. I had sent him only to invite them to Islam.

Some narrations say that the Prophet raised his hand toward the sky and said three times:

O, God! I seek immunity with You from whatever Khalid has done.”105

Regretfully not only have they omitted this reaction of the Prophet we don’t understand why the writer has not mentioned all these details? The writer does not miss to mention any wrongs or crimes committed by cousin of the Prophet or soldiers of Ali. But he so easily missed to write about the reactions of Prophet or Ali to these criminal actions, or what they did to redress and make amend for their crimes. Whether he mentions or misses, the truth finally does appear. The facts cannot be hidden for long as the clouds cannot hide the sun. He is only anxious to hold one dimension as if no other dimension exists. Only battles matter to him.

In the same way when he writes about the disobedience of soldiers under the command of Amirul Momineen (‘a) and their plunder of treasury, he has not mentioned that this took place in the absence of His Eminence (‘a). When Amirul Momineen (‘a) learnt of this he was shocked and punished the wrongdoers and announced his dissociation with this act of theirs. But the writer had not mentioned all this.106

Anyway he does not see such a big blunder committed by Khalid bin Waleed so he does not mention it. Let us remind him about Malik bin Nuwairah and his tribe which was the only quarter which did not acknowledge Abu Bakr’s rule as legitimate. So what did Khalid do?

When:

“Khalid killed Malik while he was saying that he was a Muslim. He kept Malik’s severed head under the cooking pot and the same night he slept with his widow...”107

After this terrible crime was committed by Khalid – commander and messenger of the First Caliph;

Abu Bakr said: “I will not stone him. He did Ijtihaad and made a mistake…I shall not sheathe the sword that God has drawn out.108109

Although the reaction of the First Caliph in this regard was not limited to this, but as Tabari writes:

“Abu Bakr never punished any of his officers and soldiers. As if in his policy he did not believe in imposing any penalties on his officers and soldiers.”110

The Second Caliph also adopted the same policy with regard to his courtiers, friends, servants, associates and those who were around him. Umar too never punished any religious transgression. One instance is that of Mughaira bin Shoba whom Umar had appointed as governor of Basrah province in Iraq. He committed adultery, which makes one liable for stoning according to Islamic legislation. Umar did not obey God’s order in punishing Mughaira; but did a most interesting thing.

Not only the Second Caliph arrested the fourth witness in the case of Mughaira he also subjected the remaining three witnesses to religious punishment at the hands of Mughaira himself. The punishment, which he was supposed to execute against Mughaira because he was the criminal in question.111

After these two cases how can we expect the Caliphs to punish their men who had been instrumental in earning such important victories?!

Perhaps the article writer regards as trifle and frivolous and worth being overlooked even the crime that Khalid committed in the name of Islam and Islamic government with regard to Malik bin Nuwairah and his wife!112

But the Prophet never defended his relatives or staff or anyone associated to him in event of their being wrong or having done a wrong. He held them responsible for their mistakes; and imposed upon them punishment relative to that crime or crimes. But did the First and Second Caliph who were sitting in place of Prophet and were supposed to be in track of Prophet and tread the very path of the Prophet also do this? No. Rather they tried all means to cover the mistakes of their men and it also seen that:

Such crimes flourished because of support of Caliphs. If government officials become criminals and government was to turn a blind eye upon their crimes who remains there to check them?! Though these men had committed the most horrible crimes!!

Forced Participations Of Amirul Momineen Ali (‘a) In Caliphs’ Government

The last point worth noting at the end of the discussion regarding participation of Amirul Momineen (‘a) in the government of the Caliphs is that in some instances the policy of the Caliphal regime was such that it should in any way compel His Eminence (‘a) to take some steps; for example, one case of applying force to enable strengthening of the foundation of Caliphate was as follows:

“Giving importance to congregation prayers and denouncing and even tagging those who do not attend their congregation as apostates.

Traditions censuring non-attendance of congregation leading to disunity of Muslims were emphasized. Necessity of being in the congregation as a right of the leadership of the Prophet (S) or the Imam was applied to themselves and even traditions in this regard were fabricated...”113

In such circumstances, not only the absence of Amirul Momineen (‘a) in such customs would have given excuse to the regime to suppress him further;114 but more than that it would have destroyed all chances of Imam’s intervention in affairs of the regime aimed at guarding the religion of Islam.

While the Imam (‘a) was not in pursuit of such a kind of seclusion from Islamic society.

On the basis of this as has been proved so far there does not exist any evidence that some instances of Imam’s help and advice denote similarity of his aims with the Caliphs. Rather if we pay attention to the narrations we find that there is a wide gulf of difference between the policy aims of both the parties.

Such that they could be considered to be fundamental differences:

Amirul Momineen (‘a) never allowed that his attitudes be interpreted to be in favor of Caliphate and behavior of the Caliphs or that they may get an opportunity to take advantage of his attitude to help their deviated aims.

What the Imam (‘a) was in pursuit of is completely different to what the Caliphal regime aimed in obtaining his help and support.

In spite of the fact that wrong interpretations and analyses are propagated to the contrary.

Thus they claim:

“Other notable example of co-operation of Ali (‘a) is his participation in congregational prayers led by Abu Bakr.”!115

“On the basis of statements of modern Shia scholars like Dr. Sayyid Muhammad Baqir Hujjati, Amirul Momineen (‘a)…participated in their congregation prayers so much that people never noticed his absence in he society. And never imagined that Amirul Momineen Ali was heading in another direction! And that he had severed connection with the society ruled by the Caliphs.”!116

Although there is another analysis regarding this that in no way talks of any special meaning that could be derived from these actions of Imam (‘a) because it is believed that:

“In such circumstances going to the Masjid and being present there… was ordinary matter.117

This analysis also ultimately does not consider these steps to be construed as support to the Caliphs and their behavior.

“Presence of Amirul Momineen (‘a) in their gatherings was not voluntary and willful. His Eminence spent most of his time in the Prophet’s mosque and the same presence was followed by his presence in their assemblies.

On the basis of this His Eminence did not go there especially to attend their gatherings.”

Moreover, even if he attended their gatherings with intent it was with the purpose of forbidding evil, because they used to refer to His Eminence in many issues.118

On the basis of this a correct attitude and a firm connection with affairs of religion were the factors of his presence in their gatherings.”119

Historical documents and sources show that after Abu Bakr emerged from three-day seclusion120 there ensued another debate and discussion at the end of which Amirul Momineen (‘a) said in reply to another invitation of his associates:

“Then by Allah I did not enter the Masjid except like brother Moosa and Haroon when his companions said to him: go therefore you and your Lord, then fight you both, surely we will here sit down. (5:24)

And by Allah I do not enter except for the Ziarat of the Messenger of Allah (S) or to decide a case…”121

This narration clearly shows the limited aims of the presence of His Eminence (‘a) in the Masjid.

Did Amirul Momineen (‘a) Always Attend Caliphs’ Prayers?

Ustad Sayyid Ali Husayni Milani, in this respect has this to say:

“Regarding presence of Imam Ali (‘a) in Prayers of Caliphs this much can be said: Although it is well-rumored there is no basis to it. There are many matters and subjects, sometimes new and interesting – but without a root or a base to it. Although some have taken for granted these things as sure and certain, but we inspite of our search do not find any documentary proof to it. What document or evidence, valid or otherwise exists to establish that Ali was always present in their prayers?

The only thing that exists is the material written by Abu Saad Samani in his book Al-Ansaab that can be regarded as a miracle of Ali with regard to exposing scandals of opponents. We have narrated the case earlier.

The case in question might have occurred earlier to Ali’s acknowledgment to Abu Bakr’s authority. Or his (Ali’s) dissidence with Caliphs should have been already known to public. Else there seems no ground for their decision to kill Imam Ali (‘a).”122

The author in another place referring to the actual case says:

“So far we have not found any creditable source to bring this fact home to us that Imam Ali (‘a) was obliged to be present in Prayers of Abu Bakr or someone else. On the basis of what Samani’s book123 says:

Ali was present in Prayers of Abu Bakr. Abu Bakr had issued orders to Khalid earlier to kill Ali. Abu Bakr was still in Prayers he spoke to Khalid not to do what he had asked him to do.

Of course, speaking during Prayer invalidates it, but Abu Bakr regardless to this fact spoke. Because Samani’s is not a book of traditions to be particular for creditability.

And it is the will of God that this case reached to our knowledge although other authors tried to hide it.”124

Deviation In Narration From Shia Sources

It won’t be out of place to remind that in order to prove good relations between Amirul Momineen (‘a) and Caliphs they bring two narrations from books of Shia scholars and present them under the title: ‘Prayers with Caliphs’…

“Shaykh Hurr Amili writes in Wasaelush Shia, Kitabus Salaat, Pg. 534 that Imam (‘a) says: The Prophet of Allah (S) established relation with the Caliphs and Ali (‘a) performed Prayers behind them.

The great Shia scholar, Late Allamah Sayyid Abdul Husayn Sharafuddin, writes in Answers to issues of Moosa Jarulla:

Prayer of Ali behind Abu Bakr and Umar was not a dissimulation. An Infallible Imam cannot worship Allah on a basis of dissimulation. On the other hand a Shia can pray behind a Sunni. His Prayers is correct – not wrong.”!125

In reply to this objection first we investigate the narration of Wasaelush Shia and make three notable points:

Point One

The statement that: The Prophet married two daughters of Caliphs and Ali prayed behind them is silent about the cause and description of how this was done. To find the conditions or circumstances governing these attitudes it is enough to look at titles under which Shia scholars have narrated the incidents.

Shaykh Hurr Amili has classified according to his own intelligence and understanding. In fact, the titles chosen by him show his insight in relation to contents of narrations.

It is interesting that the late Shaykh in his book mentions them under the heading: ‘Chapter of appreciability of attending Congregation Prayers in dissimulation behind one who is not qualified to lead prayers and standing with him in the first row’.

In the same way this narration is mentioned in Biharul Anwar126 and Mustadrak al-Wasael127 under following chapters:

• Chapter Of Marriage Of Polytheists, Infidels And Ahlul Bayt-Haters.

• Chapter of lawfulness of marrying the deprived, those who are doubtful but show themselves to be Muslims and detestability of giving a Shia lady to them in marriage.

Result Drawn From Contemplating On These Headings:

Firstly: The Imam (leader) of prayers in these narrations is not eligible to be followed, i.e. to pray behind him. Besides, from the angle of jurisprudence too he is not fit to the office of leading congregation prayers. He is neither a just man nor conditions in him qualify him to lead prayers for a congregation – no matter, small or large. In other words, the Imam of prayers is impaired with his followers of prayers. As such, to pray behind such a man can only be possible in dissimulation and the reward mentioned for this act is like the value of dissimulation and it has no connection with the leader of prayer.

Secondly: Narrators who have quoted these narrations in the section related to ‘The Prophet married’ in the discussion of marriage, have clearly kept veiled the entity and personality of wife and Imam of prayers. This reflects the conditions prevalent in society, which necessitated dissimulation.

Point Two

To understand a part of a narration we cannot ignore the wordings ahead or behind which would result in making the narration itself deficient.

Such a look would end in a contradictory comprehension in relation to its real meaning. Therefore we write a full extract from, Wasaelush Shia (the Aal al-Bait Print). The narration runs as follows:

“Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Isa, in his miscellaneous reports from Uthman bin Isa from Samma that he said:128 I asked him about their marriages and prayers behind them. He said: This is a difficult thing. You cannot do that. The Prophet married and Ali prayed behind them.”129

In the first part we read the tradition:

“It is a difficult thing that you are asked to do and you cannot cut off relations with them and are compelled to do it.”

This shows there was compulsion and coercion. One is forced to maintain relations with the opponents.

As if the main thing is to keep away but under compulsion one is to remain with them.

Point Three

If we ignore the beginning of this narration and suffice on the part, we conclude that the narration is silent with regard to conditions. To learn about the conditions prevailing at that time we have to seek some other report similar to these narrations.

This tradition is known as the ninth tradition and exists in Wasaelush Shia in the following wordings:

“Ali bin Ja’far says in his book narrating from his brother, Moosa bin Ja’far, that Hasan and Husayn prayed behind Marwan and we prayed along with them.”130

Attention is required here. In the contents it is not clear whether Hasan and Husayn, although praying in a group, prayed individually or prayed following the leader of prayers; i.e. Marwan. The contents do not disclose whether Ali too prayed with them. Also not obvious in the contents is whether Hasan and Husayn prayed in dissimulation or what the conditions were for their praying. However, in the contents there arise great many questions.

Therefore, we must search for narrations, which could open doors for us to see prayers, which our Imams performed with opponents and adversaries.

A salient difference exists between congregation prayers of Shias and other than Shia. The leaders of prayers (Imam of congregation) in Shia must be a just man, i.e. a man of probity and piety, virtue and having justice. This clearly proves that if a Shia prays behind an opponent of Shia faith, it does not mean that he has paid allegiance to him, his opinion, his school or his belief, because in this instance the condition of justice is cancelled.

Alongside this group of narrations, there are also traditions that clarify the matter further as follows:

“Ja’far bin Muhammad narrates from his father that Hasan and Husayn used to recite the opening chapter and other chapter when they prayed behind Imam of prayers.”131

This narration in fact tells us how the Infallible Imams prayed behind their opponents. This not only explains the method of prayers of Hasan and Husayn (‘a) in the narration about congregation prayer under the leadership of Marwan, it also tells us about the way Amirul Momineen (‘a) prayed behind the Caliphs.

On the other hand, Allamah Majlisi has this to say under the explanation of these narrations, which is worth nothing:

“When Imams prayed behind the leaders of tyranny they used to pray under dissimulation and they did not make an intention of following them. They used to recite as if independently; reciting the Surah Hamd and another Surah themselves.

On the other hand, it has been much stressed to attend congregation prayers. There are also traditions in this respect. It becomes compulsory in time of dissimulation.

But it is recommended that if possible one should pray at home and then join them in congregation and pray with them. And if not then it is obligatory to recite the opening chapter and another Surah oneself. And according to well known view in their leadership Qiraat is not cancelled. Rather in the book of Muntaha it is mentioned that: We do not have an opposing view in this matter, and in these prayers it is not required to recite the Hamd and Surah loudly and even if it is not possible to recite the Surah only Hamd is sufficient; although in my view it is obligatory to recite the Surah also and apparently in this matter there is no difference of opinions. If the Imam of congregation goes into Ruku (kneeling) before finishing the chapter he can finish the chapter in Ruku. Some say that reciting the Hamd and Surah is exempted in helplessness. In the same way in Tahzeeb this absolute view is mentioned and that this same prayer is valid. It is even said that: If one could not catch them in reciting the chapter, he can leave it altogether and join them in Ruku, and his prayer will be correct, but it is precautionary to later repeat even the Prayer in which one has recited Hamd and Surah in his heart, under dissimulation.”

The message of this outlook means to say the view of all jurisprudents of Imamiyah sect is at parity. From many aspects it is in the category of response given by Allamah Sharafuddin in his Answer to the Problems of Jarallah. We quote the actual text from his book. In the meantime, we must point out that Bi-Aazaar Shirazi has clearly and openly distorted the text. The facts and realities are sacrificed for the sake of so-called unity. It reflects a criminal tendency to distort authentic texts of well-known scholars of Imamiyah sect for their own benefits and ends.

According to the extract taken from his book of Answer to the Problems of Jarallah, Allamah Sharafuddin believes:

“Dissimulation in worship acts is that the Imam performs an action without intention that it be for proximity to God. It is only based on fear of a tyrant ruler.

And dissimulation in propagation of religion is that the Imam attributes a verdict to the Prophet while in fact, it is not from him. Although it is clear that dissimulation is never practiced by an Infallible Imam. And to consider narrations and worship acts of Imam as being dissimulation is to ridicule his infallibility and honesty.”132

In other words, Moosa Jarullah from this statement intends to inject the readers mind with belief that dissimulation is a possibility for an Imam that enables him the performance of a thing not for God’s sake but to find a scapegoat from detrimental surrounding imposed by a tyrant. In fact, it does not befit the Imam to stoop to such a category. If we accept this we have to deny his status of being infallible, which is irrecusable.

Jarallah after this marginal introduction in which he sets dissimulation to face infallibility of Imam prepares the minds of the readers to accept Imam’s actions on the basis of dissimulation proceeds further to say:

Allamah Sayyid Abdul Husayn Sharafuddin (q.s.) says in response to these claims:

“Ali, peace be upon him and his sons, was punctual to perform prayers in their early hours. He was particular to perform prayers in congregation following the three Caliphs. He did this for the sake of God. He also prayed Friday prayers behind all three Caliphs seeking God’s satisfaction. His prayers were on the ground of his virtue and piety.”133

By this Jarallah aims to secure credibility and validity for Caliphs. He wants to establish legitimacy of their Caliphate because Ali prayed behind them. So they were men of justice and moral.

Jarallah represents dissimulation as an act of show and a trick. So considers prayers of Imam outside circle of worship and bereft of sincere intention to seek nearness to God. On the other hand he refers to prayers of Ali, which he performed behind three Caliphs as remote from dissimulation to establish his own motives and aims.

Allamah Sayyid Abdul Husayn Sharafuddin against such propaganda says:

“I said: No, never. Ali prayed only to seek nearness with God. He prayed to impart what God has obliged him to do. His prayer behind them was only with aim to please God. We prayed following prayers of Imam and we sought nearness with God. We too have prayed several times behind Sunni Imam of prayers being too sincere to God. This is allowed in faith of Ahlul Bayt. The worshiper, though behind a Sunni, obtains the reward as he does while praying behind a Shia. One who knows our faith, is aware of the condition of justice for the leader of prayers. On the basis of this following a sinner and ignorant Shia was not allowed while these conditions do not exist for the leader of congregation in Sunni sect and they are allowed to follow anyone.”134

From the comments of Sharafuddin, we discover that he has corrected the specifications of dissimulation given by Jarallah. In the second place he (Sharafuddin) has explained dissimulation within domain of worship – and not as Jarallah describes it.

According to Sharafuddin, the act of dissimulation represents God’s command within teaching of faith. Sharafuddin regards dissimulation a means of proximity to God. As such he totally rejects the opinion of Jarallah with regard to dissimulation.

Finally, Sharafuddin impedes the way paved by Jarallah to benefit from dissimulation to gain legitimacy and legality for Caliphs. The man who leads prayers in Shia school must be just and of good reputation. This condition invalidates the endeavor of Jarallah. The leader of Prayer must not be profane or a man of no respect among the people. We shall deal with this subject in detail as “Justice is not a condition for a man who leads prayers in other than Shia sect.”

He has clearly displayed the worth of prayer behind a Shia and behind a Sunni individual (or Caliphs). The justice of Caliphs or they being men of justice and piety he puts to question and repudiates this quality in them. In the light of this description the reader becomes attentive that the act of Imam Ali (‘a) and his followers, Shias, does not give any support to them nor do they agree with them. Their dissidence is already concealed in their behavior.

In any case, firstly the response of Sharafuddin to the query of Jarallah is not personal inclination. It reflects the conditions prevalent in society. The direction of thought is an element at a zenith that cannot be neglected but necessarily to conceive the entailing developments.

Secondly: This answer of Sharafuddin refutes the conjecture, which Jarallah disseminates and not that it is to censure deviation of a tradition or taking a part of it for own benefit as it does not need an answer because later the truth is bound to become known.

Because such arrangement of texts is bound to put doubts in the minds of readers with regard to the behavior of Amirul Momineen (‘a) this group is more dangerous than that of unity-seekers. It is thus said:

“…His Eminence, Ali (‘a) was always with our chief, Abu Bakr and was present in all prayers behind him.”135

“Ali (‘a) himself also joined in Prayer with the Righteous Caliphs.”136

  • 1. Muhammad Jawad Hujjati Kermani: Aftaab-e-Yazd Daily, Issue No. 8, Khordad 1381.
  • 2. Fareedoon Islamniya: Ashra-e-Mubashira (1st Edition 1380), Pg. 140.
  • 3. Ibrahim Baizoon (Translated by Ali Asghar Muhammadi Seejaani): Rafataar Shinashi Imam Ali (‘a) Dar Aaina-e-Tareekh (Understanding the stand of Imam Ali in the Mirror of History) (1st Edition), 1379, Pg. 38.
  • 4. Sayyid Ahmad Mawassaqi: Istiratazi-e-Wahdat (Strategy of Unity), Vol. 1, Pg. 128.
  • 5. Muhammad Barfi: Seemai Ali Az Manzar Ahlul Sunnat (Portrait of Ali from the Sunni point of view), 1st Edition 1380, Pg. 104.
  • 6. The later history shows that the reason why Caliph referred to Amr Aas was that the latter had a deep understanding of the personality of Amirul Momineen (‘a). The Qasida of Ghadeeriya also mentions this point.
  • 7. Yaqoobi: Tarikh Yaqoobi, Vol. 2, Pg. 129.
  • 8. Allamah Ja’far Murtadha Amili: Tahlili Az Zindagi-e-Siyasi Imam Hasan Mujtaba (‘a) (1st Edition), Pg. 198; quoting from Futuh Ibn Athim, Vol. 1, Pg. 72.
  • 9. Refer: Ali Labbaf: A Victim Lost in Saqifah, Vol. 3, Pgs. 143-144.
  • 10. Abdullah Khanaqli Hamadani: Siyasat Imam Ali-o-Hasnain Dar Raabita Ba Hukoomat-o-Futuhaat Kholafa, Pgs. 84-85.
  • 11. Yusuf Gholami: Pas az Ghuroob (After Sunset), Pg. 225.
  • 12. Abdullah Khanaqli Hamadani: Siyasat Imam Ali-o-Hasnain Dar Raabita Ba Hukoomat-o-Futuhaat Kholafa, Pg. 85.
  • 13. Rasool Ja’faryan: Tarikh wa Seerah Siyasi Amir-e-Mominaan Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) History and political biography of Ali (‘a), Pg. 16.
  • 14. Hasan Yusufyan: Article ‘Imam Ali wa Mukhaalifaan’ quoted in Danish Nama Imam Ali (‘a), Vol. 6, Pg. 216.
  • 15. Ali Muhammad Meer Jalili: Imam Ali (‘a) wa Zamaamdaaraan (Imam Ali and the Rulers), Pg. 227; quoting from: Sharh Nahjul Balagha, Ibn Abil Hadeed, Vol. 12, Pgs. 78-79 and quoting from: Futuh al-Buldan of Balazari, Pg. 264.
  • 16. Masoodi in Muruj az-Zahab (Vol. 2, Pgs. 309-310) has also explained that Uthman mediated in this matter but the Imam rejected the commandership.
  • 17. Ibrahim Baizoon (Translated by Ali Asghar Muhammadi Seejaani): Rafataar Shinashi Imam Ali (‘a) Dar Aaina-e-Tareekh (Understanding the stand of Imam Ali in the Mirror of History) (1st Edition), 1379, Pg. 43.
  • 18. Muhammad Ali Taskhiri: Article quoted in Kayhan Farhangi, Issue No. 184, Bahman 80, Pg. 35.
  • 19. Ali Muhammad Meer Jalili: Imam Ali (‘a) wa Zamaamdaaraan (Imam Ali and the Rulers), Pg. 225.
  • 20. Jalal Darikhsha: Mawaaze Siyasi Hazrat Ali Dar Qibal Mukhalifeen (Political stands of Ali against opponents), Pg. 50.
  • 21. Ibid. Pg. 51.
  • 22. Asghar Qaidan: Tahleeli Bar Mawaze Siyasi Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) Research on political stands of Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a), Pg. 104.
  • 23. Rasool Ja’faryan: Hayat-e-Fikri O Siyasi-e-Imamaan-e-Shia (Intellectual and Political Life of Shia Imams), Pg. 60.
  • 24. Ibid. Pg. 61.
  • 25. Sayyid Ja’far Murtadha Amili: Tahlili Az Zindagi-e-Siyasi Imam Hasan Mujtaba (‘a), Pg. 199.
  • 26. Ibid. Pg. 199; quoting from: Shaykh Ali Ahmadi Miyanji.
  • 27. Asghar Qaidan: Tahleeli Bar Mawaze Siyasi Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) Research on political stands of Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a), Pg. 102.
  • 28. Ibid. Pg. 102.
  • 29. Ibid. Pg. 102, Footnote 3.
  • 30. Ibid. Pg. 103.
  • 31. Ibid. Pg. 109.
  • 32. Sayyid Ja’far Murtadha Amili: Tahlili Az Zindagi-e-Siyasi Imam Hasan Mujtaba (‘a), Pg. 199; quoting from Futuh Ibn Athim, Vol. 1, Pg. 72.
  • 33. Ibid. Pg. 199; quoting from Futuh Ibn Athim, Vol. 1, Pg. 72.
  • 34. Abdul Kareem Bi-Aazaar Shirazi: Seemai Imam-e-Muttaqeen, (Portrait of the Imam of the Pious), Vol. 4, Pg. 17.
  • 35. Muhammad Barfi: Seemai Ali Az Manzar Ahlul Sunnat (Portrait of Ali from the Sunni point of view), 1st Edition 1380, Pg. 110.
  • 36. Asghar Qaidan: Tahleeli Bar Mawaze Siyasi Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) Research on political stands of Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a), Pgs. 123-124.
  • 37. Yusuf Gholami: Pas az Ghuroob (After Sunset), Pg. 282.
  • 38. Abdullah Khanaqli Hamadani: Siyasat Imam Ali-o-Hasnain Dar Raabita Ba Hukoomat-o-Futuhaat Kholafa, Pg. 101.
  • 39. Jalal Darikhsha: Mawaaze Siyasi Hazrat Ali Dar Qibal Mukhalifeen (Political stands of Ali against opponents), Pg. 54.
  • 40. Yusuf Gholami: Pas az Ghuroob (After Sunset), Pgs. 136-137; quoting from: Muruj az-Zahab, Vol. 3, Pgs. 21-22; Ansaab al-Ashraaf, Vol. 2, Pg. 31 & Pgs. 393-397.
  • 41. Sayyid Ahmad Mawassaqi: Istiratazi-e-Wahdat (Strategy of Unity), Vol. 1, Pg. 120.
  • 42. Ibid. Istiratazi-e-Wahdat (Strategy of Unity), Vol. 1, Pg. 120.
  • 43. Regarding Bayyat, Refer: Ali Labbaf: A Victim Lost in Saqifah, Vol. 4, Section 1.
  • 44. Rasool Ja’faryan: Hayat-e-Fikri O Siyasi-e-Imamaan-e-Shia (Intellectual and Political Life of Shia Imams), Pg. 53.
  • 45. Ali Muhammad Meer Jalili: Imam Ali (‘a) wa Zamaamdaaraan (Imam Ali and the Rulers), Pgs. 105-106.
  • 46. Muhammad Jawad Hujjati Kermani: Aftaab-e-Yazd Daily, Issue No. 8, Khordad 1381.
  • 47. Allamah Al-Askari: Saqifah, Pg. 73.
  • 48. Rasool Ja’faryan: Tarikh wa Seerah Siyasi Amir-e-Mominaan Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) History and political biography of Ali (‘a), Pg. 14.
  • 49. Ibid. Pg. 15.
  • 50. Yusuf Gholami: Pas az Ghuroob, Pg. 171.
  • 51. Ibid. Pgs. 14-15.
  • 52. Ibid. Pg. 16.
  • 53. Muhammad Waizzaada Khorasani: Interview in ‘Haft Aasmaan’ (Seven Skies) Magazine, Issues 9 & 10, Spring & Summer 80, Pg. 34.
  • 54. Like the claim that: The Imam sent his dear son, Hasan Mujtaba to command forces in the area of hostilities. (Zainul Aabideen Qurbani: Ilal Peshraft wa Inhitaat-e-Muslimeen (Causes of Progress and Decadence of Muslims), Pg. 88).
  • 55. Sayyid Ahmad Mawassaqi: Istiratazi-e-Wahdat (Strategy of Unity), Vol. 1, Pg. 137.
  • 56. Allamah Ja’far Murtadha Amili: Tahlili Az Zindagi-e-Siyasi Imam Hasan Mujtaba (‘a) (1st Edition), Pgs. 193-194.
  • 57. Abdullah Khanaqli Hamadani: Siyasat Imam Ali-o-Hasnain Dar Raabita Ba Hukoomat-o-Futuhaat Kholafa, Pgs. 58-59.
  • 58. Sayyid Ja’far Murtadha Amili: Tahlili Az Zindagi-e-Siyasi Imam Hasan Mujtaba (‘a) (1st Edition), Pg. 197.
  • 59. Abdullah Khanaqli Hamadani: Siyasat Imam Ali-o-Hasnain Dar Raabita Ba Hukoomat-o-Futuhaat Kholafa, Pg. 124.
  • 60. Ibid. Pg. 130.
  • 61. Abdul Qadir Dahqaan Siraawaani: Article quoted in Nida-e-Islam Magazine, Issue No. 11, Autumn 81, Pg. 7.
  • 62. Ibid. Article quoted in Nida-e-Islam Magazine, Issue No. 15, Autumn 82, Pgs. 11-12.
  • 63. Yusuf Gholami: Pas az Ghuroob (After Sunset), Pgs. 293-294.
  • 64. Muhammad Waizzaada Khorasani: Article quoted in Kitab Naqd Magazine, Issue No. 19, (Vol. 2), Summer 80, Pgs. 24-25.
  • 65. This book is republished in 1382 in co-operation with Shirkat Chaap O Nashr Bainul Milal.
  • 66. Ustad Murtadha Mutahhari: Imamat-o-Rahbari (Imamate and Leadership), Pgs. 20-21.
  • 67. Asghar Qaidan: Tahleeli Bar Mawaze Siyasi Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) Research on political stands of Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a), Pg. 118.
  • 68. Yusuf Gholami: Pas az Ghuroob (After Sunset), Pg. 282.
  • 69. Sayyid Ja’far Murtadha Amili: Salman Farsi, Pg. 85; quoting from: Ad-Darajaat ar-Rafia (Elevated Positions), Pg. 215.
  • 70. Ibid. Pg. 200.
  • 71. ‘Iqta’ is in the meaning of ‘Qate-Zameeni’ a piece of land that a king allotted to a person so that he may earn his livelihood from it.
  • 72. Asghar Qaidan: Tahleeli Bar Mawaze Siyasi Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) Research on political stands of Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a), Pg. 116.
  • 73. Yusuf Gholami: Pas az Ghuroob (After Sunset), Pg. 290.
  • 74. Since this reply needs an introduction the readers may once more refer to the prefaces in the second and third section of this book.
  • 75. Sayyid Muhammad Reza Tabatabai: Article quoted in Haft Aasmaan Magazine, Issue Nos. 12-13, Winter 80 & Spring 81, Pg. 225.
  • 76. Refer: Tables in Section Two.
  • 77. Ibid. Article quoted in Haft Aasmaan Magazine, Issue Nos. 12-13, Winter 80 & Spring 81, Pg. 226.
  • 78. Ibid. Article quoted in Haft Aasmaan Magazine, Issue Nos. 12-13, Winter 80 & Spring 81, Pg. 228.
  • 79. Ibid. Article quoted in Haft Aasmaan Magazine, Issue Nos. 12-13, Winter 80 & Spring 81, Pg. 229.
  • 80. Arguments of the writer continue.
  • 81. Ibid. Article quoted in Haft Aasmaan Magazine, Issue Nos. 12-13, Winter 80 & Spring 81, Pgs. 231-232.
  • 82. Criticism and scrutiny of Point 1, Conjecture 4.
  • 83. Refer: Najmuddin Al-Askari: Ali wal Khulafa, Pg. 120; quoted from Manaqib Khwarizmi, Pg. 59.
  • 84. Muhammad Jawad Hujjati Kermani: Aftaab-e-Yazd Daily, Issue No. 9, Khordad 1381.
  • 85. Investigation of Point 5.
  • 86. Quoted from: Asad Haider: Al-Imam as-Sadiq wa Mazahib-e-Arba, Vol. 6, Pgs. 391-392.
  • 87. And also if an analysis is not logical we cannot accept it.
  • 88. Abdullah Khanaqli Hamadani: Siyasat Imam Ali-o-Hasnain Dar Raabita Ba Hukoomat-o-Futuhaat Kholafa, Pgs. 121-122.
  • 89. Refer: Baqir Sharif Qarashi, Hayat Imam Hasan bin Ali Life of Imam Hasan (‘a), Vol. 1, Pgs. 201-202.
    Hashim Maroof Hasani: Seeratul Aaimma Ithna Ashar, Vol. 1, Pgs. 282-283 & Vol. 2, Pgs. 15-16.
  • 90. Refer: Hasan Modarresi Tabatabai: Zameen Dar Fiqh-e-Islami.
  • 91. Tabari: Tarikh al-Umam wal-Mulook, Vol. 3, Pg. 323.
  • 92. For example: Books of Rijaal of Ahlul Sunnat by Ali bin Mujahid (a narrator of this report) has mentioned him to be a liar and a forger.
    Refer: Midhi: Tahzeeb al-Kamaal, Pgs. 118-119; Dhahabi: Mizan al-Etedaal, Vol. 4, Pg. 72.
  • 93. That is the commander of this army under whom were Imams Hasan and Husayn (‘a).
  • 94. Tabari: Tarikh al-Umam wal-Mulook, Vol. 3, Pg. 324.
  • 95. Tabari: Tarikh al-Umam wal-Mulook, Vol. 4, Pg. 44.
  • 96. Scrutiny of objections 6-7.
  • 97. Shaykh Hurr Amili: Wasaelush Shia, Vol. 11, Pg. 34.
  • 98. Sayyid Muhammad Reza Tabatabai: Article quoted in Haft Aasmaan Magazine, Issue Nos. 12-13, Winter 80 & Spring 81, Pg. 229.
  • 99. Even supposing if this commandership is proved we can say:
    The appointment of Khalid bin Waleed (who led forces against Islam in the battles of Uhad) shows the submission of Quraish to the power and domination of Islam.
    This appointment has a deep effect on subduing the tribes who sided with the Meccans in their opposition to Islam.
  • 100. Ibid. Article quoted in Haft Aasmaan Magazine, Issue Nos. 12-13, Winter 80 & Spring 81, Pg. 235.
  • 101. Ibid. Article quoted in Haft Aasmaan Magazine, Issue Nos. 12-13, Winter 80 & Spring 81, Pg. 241.
  • 102. Ibid. Article quoted in Haft Aasmaan Magazine, Issue Nos. 12-13, Winter 80 & Spring 81, Pgs. 225-226.
  • 103. Refer: Ustad Sayyid Muhammad Dhiyabaadi: Dar Justujoo-e-Ilm-e-Deen (In search of religious knowledge), Pgs. 170-171.
  • 104. Refer: Sayyid Muhammad Reza Tabatabai: Article quoted in Haft Aasmaan Magazine, Issue Nos. 12-13, Winter 80 & Spring 81, Pg. 244.
  • 105. Mustafa Dilshad Tehrani: Meeras Rabooda (Usurped inheritance), Pgs. 171-172; quoting from: Al-Maghazi, Vol. 2, Pgs. 875-881; Sirah Ibn Hisham, Vol. 4, Pgs. 53-55; Tabaqat al-Kubra, Vol. 2, Pgs. 147-148; Tarikh Tabari, Vol. 3, Pgs. 66-68; Al-Kamil Fit Tarikh, Pgs. 255-256; Sirah Ibn Kathir, Vol. 2, Pgs. 201-202.
  • 106. Refer: Sayyid Muhammad Reza Tabatabai: Article quoted in Haft Aasmaan Magazine, Issue Nos. 12-13, Winter 80 & Spring 81, Pg. 244.
  • 107. Allamah Sayyid Murtadha Al-Askari: Naqsh-e-Aaimma Dar Ahya-e-Deen (Role of Imams in the Revival of Religion), Vol. 16, Pg. 44.
  • 108. Refer: Al-Bidaya wan Nihaya, Vol. 6, Pg. 322.
  • 109. Ibid. Vol. 16, Pg. 45.
  • 110. Yusuf Gholami: Pas az Ghuroob (After Sunset), Pg. 229.
  • 111. Refer: Sayyid Abdul Husayn Sharafuddin: Ijtihaad Dar Maqabil-e-Nass (Translated by Ali Dawani), Pgs. 340-345.
  • 112. Refer: Ali Gholami Dahqi: Janghai Irtdidat wa Bohran Janasheeni-e-Payambar, Section Six, Pgs. 81-94.
  • 113. Dr. Ali Akbar Hasani: Tarikh Tahlili wa Siyasi Islam, Vol. 1, Pg. 354.
  • 114. Thus Saad bin Ubadah only because he did not give Bayyat to the Caliph and did not participate in their gatherings he was first exiled to Syria and then killed.
  • 115. Sayyid Ahmad Mawassaqi: Istiratazi-e-Wahdat (Strategy of Unity), Vol. 1, Pg. 124.
  • 116. Muhammad Barfi: Seemai Ali Az Manzar Ahlul Sunnat (Portrait of Ali from the Sunni viewpoint), 1st Edition 1380, Pg. 130.
  • 117. Rasool Ja’faryan: Tarikh wa Seerah Siyasi Amir-e-Mominaan Ali Ibn Abi Talib (‘a) History and political biography of Ali (‘a), Pg. 20.
  • 118. Scrutinies of Discourse 2 show that this was too less for the period of 25 years of the Caliphs’ rule.
  • 119. Sayyid Murtadha Alamul Huda: Tanziyaul Anbiya (Translated by Ameer Salmani Raheemi), Pg. 227.
  • 120. Sayyid Hasan Fatimi: Article: Saqifah quoted in Danish Nama Imam Ali (‘a), Vol. 8, Pg. 458.
  • 121. Tabarsi: Ihtijaaj, Vol. 1, Pg. 81; Majlisi: Biharul Anwar, Vol. 28, Pg. 208.
  • 122. Ustad Sayyid Ali Husayni Milani: Imamat-e-Bila Fasl (Edit. Muhammad Reza Kareemi), Pgs. 223-224.
  • 123. Samani: Al-Ansaab, Vol. 6, Pg. 170, Published by Muhammad Amin Samaj, Beirut, 1400 A.H..
  • 124. Sayyid Ali Husayni Milani: Imamat-e-Bila Fasl (Edit. Muhammad Reza Kareemi), Pg 143.
  • 125. Abdul Kareem Bi-Aazaar Shirazi: Article: Nahjul Balagha and Wahdat-e-Islami, quoted in Mashal-e-Ittehaad (Torch of Unity), Pg. 26; Sayyid Ahmad Mawassaqi: Istiratazi-e-Wahdat (Strategy of Unity), Vol. 1, Pgs. 124-125.
  • 126. Allamah Majlisi: Biharul Anwar, Vol. 103, Pg. 375.
  • 127. Muhaddith Noori: Mustadrak al-Wasael, Vol. 14, Pg. 440.
  • 128. Mustadrak al-Wasael, Vol. 14, Pg. 144.
  • 129. Shaykh Hurr Amili: Wasaelush Shia, Vol. 8, Pg. 301, Tr. 10.
  • 130. Ibid. Vol. 8, Pg. 301, Tr. 9.
  • 131. Allamah Majlisi: Biharul Anwar, Vol. 88, Pg. 47, Tr. 5; quoting from: Qurbul Asnaad.
  • 132. Allamah Sharafuddin: Ajooba Masail-e-Jarullah (Matbatul Irfan – Saida – 1953 A.D., 1373 A.H. 2nd Edition), Pg. 84.
  • 133. Ibid. Pg. 86.
  • 134. Ibid. Pg. 87.
  • 135. Abdul Qadir Dahqaan Siraawaani: Article quoted in Nida-e-Islam Magazine, Issue No. 15, Autumn 82, Pg. 11.
  • 136. Muhammad Jawad Hujjati Kermani: Interview in Nida-e-Islam Magazine, Issue No. 4, Summer 79, Pg. 60.